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Recent years have seen borders and bordering practices gain ever-greater 
visibility and political purchase in a variety of locations across the globe. 
In Bordering intimacy: Postcolonial governance and the policing of family, 
Joe Turner powerfully examines how borders work to manage intimacy 
in the present. He explores how intimacy, manifest in particular ideas 
of the family, is constructed historically through the racial categories 
and processes of governance that were central to imperial and colonial 
formations. He does this through an exploration of ideas and practices 
of domestication and the deprivation of rights and of the creation of 
monsters and the contrast with notions of the good migrant. In particular, 
he suggests that ideas of family were not only used to create hierarchies 
of development, but that such notions were a key aspect in the processes 
by way of which colonised peoples were dispossessed and disinherited.
Whilst Turner’s substantive focus is on Britain and the British Empire, 
his analysis has a much broader resonance in terms of setting out how 
the co-constitution of intimacy and borders has been a central feature, 
more generally, of modes of postcolonial governance. He traces the 
continuity to the present of colonial-era ideas of who is understood to 
be fully human or not-quite-human and therefore who has even the 
possibility of being able to belong. Turner expertly contextualises this 
in relation to the making and remaking of racialised violence in the 
periphery and its perpetuation in the metropole. In bringing together 
scholarship on coloniality, race, borders, intimacy and family, Turner 
extends the boundaries of the fields within which he works and marks 
a distinctive position for his arguments within them.
The Theory for a Global Age series, of which this book is a part, 
seeks to transform the standard understandings which shape our dis-
ciplines and academic fields by starting from other places. Turner 
brilliantly demonstrates how work that situates Britain itself as post-
colonial, that recognises Britain’s contemporary political landscape as 
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configured by its historical colonial conditions, opens up new vistas 
and new questions which have the potential to startle us out of our 
complacent renditions and understandings. This book is a powerful 
recontextualisation of contemporary Britain as postcolonial Britain 
understood in terms of its discourses and practices around borders and 
bordering, intimacy and family, governance and domestication. In the 
process, it also provokes us to rethink our understandings of borders, 
of intimacy, of family and of governance. It is a superb, and timely, 
addition to the series.
Gurminder K. Bhambra
University of Sussex
I always like reading acknowledgements. Academic labour is too often 
individualised so it is good to be reminded of the collaborative character 
of knowledge production. Books so often have communal origins and 
the writing of them is shaped by complex intimacies. This one is no 
different.
The groundwork for this book began in 2015 and I would like to 
thank all of those who provided initial support and an intellectual 
environment where the idea could develop. Robbie Shilliam saw potential 
in the project from the start and for that I am grateful. The germination 
of this work was helped by two years of involvement in the Postcolonial 
Governmentality workshops organised by Terri-Anne Teo and Elisa 
Wynne-Hughes. Likewise, the creation of the Colonial, Decolonial and 
Postcolonial BISA working group by Meera Sabaratnam, Mustapha 
Pasha and Robbie (and continued by Lisa Tilley, Kerem Nisancioglu, 
Nivi Manchanda and Gargi Bhattacharya) provided a vital and inspiring 
intellectual space for the type of research which does not always fit in 
British politics departments. Books start with an idea (or in this case 
an encounter) but they are pursued through an orientation and drive. 
For me this was to recognise the importance of (and yet absence of) 
the colonial to my work and the reasons for that. For this I am indebted 
to Inanna Hamati-Ataya’s questioning of Eurocentric positionality 
throughout my research.
During my time at the University of Sheffield I was lucky enough 
to find a group of supportive colleagues. Particular thanks go out to 
those involved in the International Politics Research Group, as well as 
to the IR and Decolonial reading group members for interesting discus-
sions and solidarity. In our regular book club, I found colleagues who 
were willing not only to share ideas, read drafts and give constructive 
feedback but also to support the emotional labour of booking writing. 
To Joanna Tidy, Liam Stanley and Jonna Nyman – a big thank you! 
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I am so pleased that the book has a home in the wonderful Theory 
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and the book’s inclusion in the series feels particularly right given that 
so much of her research has inspired my own work. I would also like 
to thank Caroline Wintersgill and Alun Richards from Manchester 
University Press for their patience and support through the editing 
process and Joe Haining for his diligent copy-editing of the manuscript.
This book was only made possible by the hidden labour and support 
of my friends-family, in Sheffield, Manchester, Leeds, Toronto and 
Istanbul. Thank you for constantly reminding me of the often-narrow 
confines of academia. Unintentionally or not, many a late-night discussion 
concerning inequality, immigration, child care, colonialism (sometimes 
all at the same time) has shaped the course of this book. I also want to 
thank Jill Turner for her courage and commitment to creativity in both 
her life and work; to Matt and Caroline Turner for their constant 
emotional support and wisdom; Gülşen and Kemal Aridici, who 
constantly remind me of the sacrifice demanded to resist domination 
and to stand for something you believe in. This book would not have 
been finished without the love and support of Nuray. For her patience 
whilst I worked through difficult parts of the book with her and for 
her kindness and optimism that can clear the darkest of northern skies. 
Lastly, to Willie-Cem who would far rather I ran around with him 
outside than try and read him this book.
This book began on an EasyJet flight. Or to be more specific, it began 
when my partner and I were stopped from getting on an EasyJet flight.
In the early hours of the morning we had arrived at the airport to 
board a flight to Sicily for fieldwork and to attend a conference. As we 
queued to board the plane with our young son, the airline staff made 
a further inspection of my partner’s visa documents and her recently 
acquired family migration visa and marriage certificate. Unsure of the 
rules that applied to non-EU citizens travelling with family members 
to the Schengen Area, the airline staff had to contact immigration advisers 
for their approval for us to fly. Since 2000, as so many of us have become 
accustomed to, airline carriers bear the responsibility for checking the 
documentation of anyone boarding a plane. And in doing so they enact 
the (inter)national border. Whilst the plane waited on the tarmac, it 
became increasingly clear that the airline staff were not going to risk 
allowing us to board before they had received an official response from 
their head office. Whilst having a legal right to travel with myself as an 
EU citizen to an EU country, my partner needed to confirm this right 
with the UK Permanent Resident card, which she had yet to acquire. 
‘You’ll probably just be deported as soon as you land in Catania’, was 
the response of the ground staff as they finally confirmed that the plane 
would leave without us.
As we watched the plane fly away, we ruminated on the inequality 
of border practices that made my partner constantly experience precarity, 
not only in terms of increasingly limited rights in the UK but also access 
to mobility as a non-EU national. Whilst many of our colleagues’ access 
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to the plane was seamless, barriers were raised for her, just as they were 
in everyday life in Britain. Years of legislative change have rendered the 
family route to settlement and rights into a precarious and uncertain 
process, with non-EU nationals finding themselves blocked from welfare 
support, subject to language, intimacy tests and high salary thresholds. 
This was merely another reminder of such precarity, brought into stark 
relief.
At the same time as we sat in the dour terminal building waiting to 
be formally led back ‘across the UK border’, our minds turned to other 
points of transit and (im)mobility that had recently been in the news. 
Throughout the summer of 2015, EU states and border agencies had 
intensified the policing of people fleeing war in the Middle East and 
structural inequality throughout much of Africa who found themselves 
contained in camps, forced behind barbed wire, left stranded at sea, 
managed through infrastructural blockings such as closing down railways, 
road checkpoints and of course air travel. Newspapers were still full of 
images of the scores of refugees drowned off the Sicilian coast where 
we were due to travel. Our situation was an administrative nightmare, 
a financial and professional inconvenience, stuck in a terminal for hours, 
unable to attend an academic conference. But it served as a further 
reminder that if some borders work to violently dismantle bodies, 
relations, kinships, others work through more mundane means of 
confinement. We would walk out of the airport with each other. My 
partner would continue to enact her limited rights to settlement under 
the guise of our romantic connection to each other, and in turn the 
privilege of my settled citizenship and whiteness. Others would not be 
afforded this right.
As we were led sternly by a member of the airline staff ‘back through’ 
the UK border (a border we had perhaps never crossed because we 
were never allowed to leave) the border agent again demanded to see 
our passports and visa documentation. Grumbling at this bizarre, 
Kafka-like process, the border agent angrily replied to us that ‘this is 
what it takes if you want a secure border!’ To which my partner replied: 
‘That assumes that we want a secure border.’ More than the content of 
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this exchange, what was significant was the intimate connections this 
opened up.
Walking away from the desk, the member of staff escorting us turned 
to my partner and began to discuss, initially in hushed tones, her own 
experience of ‘borders’. Something, it seemed, connected her to the 
experience of being stopped from boarding the plane and being forced 
to prove formal status again and again. As a self-identified British Asian 
she quite candidly began describing the everyday racism she experienced 
as a member of the airline crew. Her experience of customer service 
was saturated with derogatory references to her skin colour by passengers, 
racist language, even incidents of spitting, claims that she was not 
‘properly British’ and often vile forms of Islamophobia, even though 
she was not in fact a Muslim. She then went on to describe how, as a 
part of her job, she was forced to monitor and regulate who could board 
flights, turn people away, question people’s identity documents. She 
was torn, she said, and it caused her great discomfort; whilst experiencing 
solidarity with those she was policing, the economic realities of her life 
made the job, and following the prescribed rules, a necessity.
The intimate policing of where my partner could move to/from – in 
administrative errors, barriers to flying and the threat of deportation 
– meets here with everyday structures of race/racism in the UK, which 
in turn connect with the globally orientated management of mobility. 
Untangling these connections, which initially were merely felt and sensed, 
and to document them in a more ‘analytical’ manner has inspired the 
trajectory of this book and the further research and questions it poses. 
On reflection, the airline staff member’s orientation towards my partner’s 
exclusion, and sense of solidarity with those she was forced to police, 
reveal, I propose, a series of connections that are at the heart of the 
way that government, and with that bordering, functions in postcolonial 
Britain.
We might consider in this encounter how borders worked to manage 
intimacy, just as dominant ideas of intimacy, linked to love and family, 
organised (im)mobility. Not being ‘family’ enough to travel was a source 
of exclusion and precarity. At the same time being ‘family’ enough to 
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continue to live in the UK was also a source of limited rights and 
temporal settlement (especially read against the violence done to those 
seeking to cross into Europe from the Global South). We might suggest 
here that (not) looking familial (or looking familial for the state and 
related authorities) is a source of power but also abandonment (Povinelli 
2011). Abandonment here relates to both the propensity for violence, 
social and biological death but also more cruddy and everyday acts of 
forgetting and neglect (in camps, detention centres, on boats lost in 
the Mediterranean). We are reminded here that the history of being 
excluded for not looking like, being recognised as, deemed a ‘proper 
family’ has multiple histories which relate to the intersections of gender, 
sexuality, class, but also race. Perhaps it is the power of race that brings 
these different acts of bordering together.
The airline staff member’s experience of structural/everyday racism 
is a stark reminder that colonial ideas of who belongs or who is properly 
human are alive and well in Britain today. However, it should also 
remind us that race has never solely been about biological markers or 
skin colour. Colonial racism was equally arranged by characterising 
kinships, affective relations, intimacies as improper and ‘undomesticated’ 
(McClintock 1995). So, the weight of race flows through these border 
encounters, just as it charges and energises the policing of borders more 
widely. Borders, we are reminded here, are not merely document inspec-
tions in the airport space but are instead materialised long before in 
bureaucratic complexity, visa regimes, barriers to citizenship and 
infrastructural blockages, and are performed in the everyday racism 
and structural violence that the airline crew member was subjected to 
and was forced (through economic survival and labour market pressure) 
to enact. Bordering can be performed and policed by legal categories 
of the state, by international organisations and private companies, just 
as it is enacted in spit from the mouth of the racist.
In revealing a series of circulations that tie together questions of 
intimacy, family, race, empire, borders, this event opens up a series of 
questions that drive this book: what ties the policing of family at the 
border to the structures of race? What role does family play in the 
Introduction 5
management of mobility? How might we understand the coming together 
of questions over family, bordering and race as part of broader patterns 
of government and the distribution of violence in liberal states such as 
Britain? The purpose of this book is to explore how intimacy, manifest 
in dominant and authorised forms of ‘family’, is inextricably bound 
with the racial categories and governance of empire. And in turn how 
empire and colonial power is continually expressed, relived and resus-
citated in practices of borders/bordering in contemporary Britain.
What this book does
This book traces the role that intimacy and ‘family’ plays in the con-
temporary government of mobility; specifically, how borders function 
to control certain people and populations as part of the ongoing legacies 
of European (and more specifically British) empire. As the title of this 
book suggests, it explores how intimacy and borders relate to each other 
as a conduit for postcolonial governance – that is, how borders make 
intimacy but equally how intimacy makes borders and how this remains 
bound up with the remaking of racialised violence. This is what is meant 
by ‘bordering intimacy’.
It is perhaps easier to consider how intimacy and family are made 
and policed through borders. For example, we can think about who is 
allowed to move across a state border or claim rights based on ‘family’ 
or ‘dependency’. This concerns who is allowed to be intimate with whom 
and have this intimacy sanctioned, recognised and managed by the 
state. But this book also explores how dominant modes of intimacy 
make borders. This views intimacy and, more specifically, family as 
having political power. In light of this I explore how dominant modes 
of socio-sexual intimacy known as ‘family’ have been central to the 
organisation of personhood and violence in modernity, including 
questions of who can/cannot move.
European ideas of normative sexuality and domesticity (i.e. ‘family’) 
emerged within the ideologies and practices of colonial violence, 
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accumulation and dispossession, of which policing mobility through 
bordering was a vital tool. The global management of mobility began 
as an imperial project, relying on racial demarcations between ‘civilised’ 
(European) and ‘backwards’ (colonised) peoples. Central to such racial 
demarcations were ideas about which populations were capable of ‘proper 
family life’ and which were bereft and perverse. This book examines 
how shifting normative claims to family continue to shape how states 
restrict mobility, settlement and citizenship through bordering today. 
Whilst postcolonial states such as Britain now pledge to be ‘postracial’, 
ideas of who does family properly, who is capable of ‘real love’ and ‘real 
family life’, arguably continue to structure racial demarcations around 
who can belong, who must be controlled, who can be excluded. This 
raises further questions as to why we view colonial rule as a thing of 
the past rather than a present.
Britain (and with it other European postmetropoles) is still rarely 
analysed as a postcolonial state. That label instead conjures up images 
of the Global South, as mapped out in development studies and 
international relations; spaces of ‘illegitimate’ and often ‘authoritarian’ 
violence, detached from the legitimacy, freedom and democracy which 
supposedly defines the Global North. Despite the healthy upsurge in 
postcolonial and decolonial theory in studies of international politics 
(Anievas et al. 2015; Agathangelou and Killian 2016; Sabaratnam 2017; 
Rutazibwa and Shilliam 2018; Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2019), 
there is still a hesitance in bringing these analyses to bear on questions 
of government in spaces like Britain (although see Virdee 2014; Kapoor 
2018; Shilliam 2018; Innes 2019). Whilst there is much historical 
scholarship on the British Empire, far less is said about how postme-
tropoles were and remain a site for ongoing forms of colonial rule 
(Barder 2015; Stoler 2016; Davies and Isakjee 2018). And, most impor-
tantly, how populations, communities and subjects both within and 
moving to these states are subject to the workings of colonial power 
and racial governance today. This of course reflects the contradictory 
place of empire in the wider social landscape of postcolonial northern 
states such as Britain. Colonial amnesia is rife in public discourse. And 
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yet, as events such as the EU referendum in Britain show, empire both 
continues to be a source of nostalgia and to shape political possibilities, 
imaginations and institutions (El-Enany 2016, 2017; Bhambra 2017a; 
Andrews 2018).
Despite a huge body of evidence demonstrating how the British state 
functions as the racial state par excellence (see Andrews and Palmer 
2016; Institute of Race Relations 2018; Kapoor 2018), studies of 
international politics have still rarely ventured to trace and tease out 
these connections and tie them to more global histories of empire. That 
in 2018 the UK incarcerated more black men as a percentage of the 
population than the United States still raises little attention among 
international politics scholars (Elliot-Cooper 2016; Sturge 2018). Nor 
how the life chances of many, in terms of education, health, labour 
market access or immigration status are most powerfully stratified by 
race (Shilliam 2018; Danewid 2019). Nor how the UK continually polices 
racialised groups through counter-insurgency tactics born out of colonial 
war (Sabir 2017; Turner 2018).
Where race is studied in Britain it often remains disconnected from 
questions of intimacy, love or family. Putting these terms together still 
occasions blank stares. Despite an extensive body of postcolonial, 
decolonial and black feminist scholarship on family, sexuality and 
race (Spillers 1987; Roberts 1997, 2015; Ferguson 2003; Povinelli 
2006; Lugones 2008; Sharpe 2010; Arvin et al. 2013; Scott 2013), such 
studies have made little impact on how government, rule and power 
is analysed. Burgeoning feminist and queer work on intimacy and 
geopolitics have provided nuanced and startling insights into how issues 
of the intimate and domestic relate to governmental power (Mountz 
and Hyndman 2006; Oswin and Olund 2010; Pain and Staeheli 2014; 
Peterson 2014a). And yet these studies still rarely connect with the 
continuity of empire (for an overview see Peterson 2017; although see 
also Burton 2009; Lowe 2015; Mendoza 2016). Equally, scholars of 
family, sexuality and race still have relatively little to say about borders 
(although see Agathangelou 2004; Luibhéid and Cantú 2005; Lewis  
2014).
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Perhaps more surprisingly, given the modern function of borders, 
empire, race and family remain just as underanalysed in migration 
studies. Despite claims throughout the 1990s that we were increasingly 
living in a ‘borderless’ world, late liberal capitalism has instead produced 
a proliferation of borders (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). We now have 
a complex understanding of how mobility is policed and governed 
in northern states (Walters 2006; Tazzioli 2014; Vaughan-Williams 
2015; Jones 2016) but studies still struggle to draw upon postcolonial, 
decolonial and critical race theory to understand such trajectories 
(although see Bhambra 2017b; Mayblin 2017; Moffette and Walters 
2018; de Noronha 2019). Despite the fact that migration patterns are 
almost invariably embedded within imperial histories (materialised 
through kinship, labour patterns, wealth inequalities and linguistic 
ties), it is surprising how the study of migration and the governance 
of mobility and borders often overlook or downplay the role of empire, 
either as historical or contemporary experience (although see Lake and 
Reynolds 2008; Saucier and Woods 2014; Walia 2014; Danewid 2017). 
Prem Kumar Rajaram (2018: 627) argues instead that migration studies 
‘tends to study refugees and migrants as groups with no relation to the 
racial and class structures and hierarchies of the societies in which they 
reside. They are strangers, governed through “integration” policy and 
border management.’ Against this trend, recent studies have begun to 
push a postcolonial analysis of race onto the agenda (Grosfoguel et al. 
2015; Danewid 2017; Mayblin 2017; De Genova 2018; El- Tudor 2018; 
El-Enany 2020). As yet though, this work has rarely connected up with 
questions of intimacy, love or family.
An emergent body of work within migration studies and international 
politics has begun to explore the role of ‘family migration’ in wider 
patterns of control and bordering (Kilkey and Palenga-Möllenbeck 
2016). The best of this work historicises and challenges how intimacy 
and family are defined and managed in northern immigration regimes 
(Bonjour and Hart 2013; D’Aoust 2014, 2018) by tracing the particular 
relationship between family and exclusion. Such studies have sought 
to understand how ‘family unification’ is policed (Bonjour and Block 
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2016; Carver 2016; Wray 2016), the relationship between family, love, 
heteronormativity and citizenship (White 2014; D’Aoust 2018), and the 
treatment of family in detention/deportation regimes (Martin 2011, 
2012; Gupta 2014; Beattie 2016). This book deepens and broadens this 
work, and in doing so speaks to the enduring silence regarding post-
colonial rule in modern Britain. It does this in three ways:
1) It traces how government in Britain remains bound to empire. 
Here Britain is not only treated as a postcolonial state but a 
space for the ongoing remaking and reworking of colonial rule. 
This provides an opportunity to recontextualise contemporary 
processes such as the control of mobility, the architecture of the 
hostile environment or security practices of the War on Terror 
as part of the fabric of colonial rule and imperial formations.
2) It provides an alternative account of the politics of love and 
family. By taking seriously the work of postcolonial, decolonial 
and black feminists, the role that ‘family’ played in the making 
of empire is revealed – that is, in the making and unmaking of 
personhood through race – and how this is continued into the 
present day.
3) It explores how borders/bordering provide a particular transit 
point for reworking colonial rule and regimes of the family. Here 
borders/bordering are treated as more than immigration policy 
(as they so often are in migration studies). It examines borders/
bordering functions across numerous sites of government, from 
policing, welfare, education and housing to counter-terrorism 
(to name but a few).
Whilst there is fascinating work on coloniality, race, borders and family, 
these are almost always dealt with as discrete categories and processes. 
This book brings this work together by examining the circulations 
between borders and family, both historically and in the contemporary 
political landscape in Britain. This, I argue, opens up further insights 




In stating that this book is about bordering intimacy and the policing 
of family, what I want to emphasise is the political work that intimacy 
and family do. What it produces and brings together and equally silences 
and excludes. As I have begun to tease out, I am not only interested in 
how family is policed but also how dominant claims to family and 
intimacy also police. In the example I started with, ‘family’ is shown to 
make rights and mobility possible; just as these possibilities are closed 
down through acts of bordering (i.e. not appearing familial enough to 
travel). This opens up vital questions about the historical contingency 
of who gets to be a family. Or, more precisely, who is accorded the social 
and political power that comes from being recognised as sharing ‘real 
love’ and being a ‘real family’ (D’Aoust 2018). Being recognised (legally 
and culturally) as a real family opens doors (and borders) and possibilities; 
just as not being a real family closes them. To add to this, ‘family’ can 
also work as a rationale for creating borders, that is to say in the name 
of protecting family and with this the familial nation and ‘civilisation’. 
Just as borders make and unmake families (through deportation, contain-
ment or the offer of rights), claims to protect, sustain and foster real 
family also make borders appear possible, necessary and naturalised.
As feminist international politics scholars have long demonstrated, 
the power of family is not only enacted by states but also remakes states 
and (inter)national order (Enloe 1990; Peterson 1992, 1999; Stevens 
1999; Parashar et al. 2018). States, lest we forget, constantly make families. 
Whilst this takes place within a wider historical and cultural milieu, 
states continue to relay the power to authorise and privilege certain 
affective relations over others, in the codification and performance of 
marriage law, inheritance rights, the organisation of private property 
and so forth (Yuval-Davis 1997; Cott 2000; Neti 2014). Nowhere is this 
more starkly revealed than in immigration and citizenship law and 
practice (Shah 2012). We might consider, for instance, how citizenship 
is often inherited through legal definitions of parentage, or ‘earnt’ through 
evidencing intimate and romantic relations as a partner or spouse. 
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Intimacy codified as ‘family’, regulated by the state, is bound up with 
more than the organisation of movement; it also structures access to 
resources, wealth, property and exposure to spectacular and cruddy 
forms of violence and abandonment.
But states, and, with this, the liberal order, also rely upon ‘family’ 
as a site of reproduction, bound as this often is to heteronormative 
futurism (Edelman 2004). The family is the site for the continuity of 
labour, the nation and imperial civilisation (until the mid-twentieth 
century this would have been explicitly referenced as ‘race’). As the 
unit of biopolitical intervention par excellence, the family promises 
continuity of capitalist heteronormative order (Foucault 1991). So, whilst 
appeals to ‘family values’ show that ‘family’ holds symbolic power, it 
is also bound into the material regeneration of biological, economic 
and cultural resources. States do not just intervene in family but family 
energises and propels a broader heteronormative order and with it 
practices of borders/bordering.
Investigations into the politics of family have often centred on ques-
tions of gender and sexuality, justifiably as sites of oppression and social 
reproduction (Federici 2004; Enloe 2018). Despite powerful interventions 
(McClintock 1995; Collins 1998; Feder 2007; Thomas 2007; Puar 2008; 
Rifkin 2015) far less is still said of how family is also deeply racialised. 
This is why tracing the history of family, borders and empire together 
is of such importance. Despite the privileging of European and internal 
national histories of domesticity and family (McKeon 2005), imperial 
encounters and colonial experiments in creating hierarchies of humanity 
were central to the history of the family. Without comprehending the 
formative history of where ideas about family come from, and the role 
they had in European empire, we are unable to grapple with the con-
temporary work that appeals to family organise and produce (see Scott 
2013). If ‘family’ continues to wield social and political power, who is 
left inside/outside this story matters.
‘Family’ has a distinctly colonial/imperial history. This is relevant to 
whether we are examining the role of family in European society or in 
the (previously) colonised world. The family was viewed throughout 
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the nineteenth century as the site for the reproduction not only of the 
nation but also of the empire (Davin 1978). Whilst states are vital in 
relation to the power of family, love and domesticity, as I noted above, 
we must remember that European states emerged as colonial and imperial 
before becoming national states (Bhambra 2016). So, the role of the 
modern state in making family is always/already imperial in orientation 
(and only later national).
In light of this, we should consider how claims to family, and with 
it, heteronormativity, are always bound to the making and unmaking 
of people within what Roderick Ferguson (2003: 78) calls ‘taxonomies 
of perversion’. Taxonomies of perversion were part of the spatial and 
temporal markers of empire. Imperial mapping of the world into spaces 
of civilisation and spaces of savagery was frequently premised on accounts 
and imaginaries of perversions from European ideals of family and 
domesticity (McClintock 1995; Ghosh 2006) – that is, consumptive 
domesticity, Christian marriage, heterosexuality and patriarchal gendered 
relations. Whilst this casts perversions of sexuality as a form of arrested 
development (Hoad 2000; Weber 2016), these distinctions were already 
racialised in terms of who could be properly human/modern and with 
it not-quite/non-human (Spillers 1987; Weheliye 2014). This was used 
in colonies to justify and shore up colonial dispossession, violence and 
subjugation (Trexler 1995). But it was also networked into metropoles 
with regard to who was identified as civilised and how people were 
incorporated into capitalist political economy. In light of this, family 
must be understood to play a vital role in claims to modernity and with 
it the capitalist heteropatriarchy central to the spread of empire (Wynter 
2003; Quijano 2007). These are not histories that are behind us; they 
are instead alive in the fabric of how family functions today.
Family and government
To speak of family in relation to race-making, empire and borders, 
as I do here, is to demonstrate that such an analysis goes beyond the 
production of symbolic hierarchies. It is about material processes and 
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social organisation. In saying that intimacy and family make, I explore 
how claims to family were central to the ideology of empire and practices 
of colonial rule, of which I suggest borders and bordering are one 
important dimension. Claims to European domesticity and the bourgeois 
home not only placed people in a hierarchy of cultural inferiority, but 
this was also central to how they were governed, for example as bereft 
of humanity proper, as primed for labour, or conducive to genocide or 
slavery, as subjects of pacification and domestication. To Rifkin (2015: 11):
Populations are racialised through their insertion into a political economy 
shaped around a foundational distinction between public and private 
sphere, with the latter defined by a naturalised, nuclear ideal against 
which other modes of sociality appear as lack/aberrance.
It is not just that ‘difference’ was constituted through measuring people’s 
‘progress’ towards European modernity/domesticity but that who was 
viewed as with/without family structured both the rationale and practice 
of dispossession and violence. ‘Family’ was not just an ideology of empire, 
it was part of the raw materials through which people were governed. 
And with this, how mobility was governed. It became an anthropological, 
sociological and governmental category for discovering, including/
assimilating and expunging different forms of intimacy and sociality 
which were different to the emerging European family (Amadiume 
1987; Thomas 2007).
The point I make in this book is that we need to situate contemporary 
borders/bordering with these histories. Because, despite widespread 
forgetting and ignorance to the contrary, the management of mobility 
is shaped by these colonial histories of the family and empire. Borders/
bordering play an active part in the push to contain, manage, expel and 
include/exclude people through modern citizenship. This is not separate 
from but historically conditioned by empire (including categories and 
laws of citizenship itself). Not only do the structures of imperialism 
underpin how and why people move to postmetropoles like Britain, 
but the practices that border people and work to exclude them are 
directly related to the management of populations across European 
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empires. This is not just about keeping certain people ‘out’ of places 
like Britain but also how the wish to exclude through colonial racism 
is also linked to internal forms of control.
To sum this up we might say that the role that family played in 
making empire is retold in border practices today. This is a broader 
point than merely suggesting that those who move for ‘family life’ are 
discriminated against. I go further than only looking at how people 
categorised as ‘family migrants’ are racialised and treated in places like 
Britain. Instead I examine how the imperial control of mobility was in 
part reliant upon different claims to protect or harness the family and 
that this structured the modern regulation of mobility. Further to this, 
I show how family does wider work in border regimes and in ongoing 
forms of internal colonisation in postmetropoles like Britain. External 
colonialism (in colonies) was always attached to internal colonialism 
(within the metropole) and this relationship intensifies through the 
practice of borders/bordering today.
To recognise the continuity and changes in the way colonial and 
imperial constructions of family work in contemporary government, 
Povinelli (2006) argues that whilst liberal claims to humanity often rely 
on the idea that ‘love is universal’, such apparently neutral claims remain 
bound to claims of superior civilisation and empire. Whether propelled 
through Hollywood romance or the legal apparatus of the state, ‘liberal 
adult love depends on instantiating its opposite, a particular kind of 
illiberal, tribal, customary and ancestral love’ (Povinelli 2006: 226). 
Properly romantic love is bound to white hetero- (and increasingly 
homo)normative coupledom, against which other intimacy and relations 
are viewed as (relatively) perverse.
Immigration law relies on sanctioning who can move on the basis 
of ‘family life’, just as citizenship law demarcates who can inherit property 
and rights through kinship. This has led to detailed practices of border 
officials attempting to document, evidence and decipher who can claim 
to be properly ‘in love’ – just as immigration law is a site for struggle 
over who is deemed properly familial – for example in the writing out 
and exclusion of polygamy from immigration law, or the writing in of 
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same-sex marriage (D’Aoust 2018). We can trace the colonial orientation 
of questions of family in the way that ideas of ‘sham’ and forced marriage 
dominate debates surrounding family unification in the UK. Or how 
the Home Office’s Operation Equal disrupts wedding ceremonies involv-
ing foreign nationals on the basis that the marriage may be one of 
‘convenience’. Appeals to the cultural neutrality of love work to constantly 
resurrect the unmarked colonial history of the European family and 
domesticity.
To consider the durability of colonial rule, it is useful to consider 
Stoler’s (2016) approach to duress. Imperial and colonial rule does not 
so much continue from formal empire but is readapted and repurposed. 
To speak of duress then is to consider reinscriptions, modified displace-
ments and amplified recuperations of colonial rule (Stoler 2016: 27). 
However, colonial duress is about more than immigration law. As this 
book contends, border/bordering practices and the regulation of move-
ment around intimacy and family is found in more than just immigration 
law, and in the policing of people with migrant status. Immigration 
policy provides just one tool that connects up with a myriad of other 
practices which attempt to confine, contain, expel and domesticate 
racialised movement. This is why I distinguish between the concepts 
of ‘bordering’ and ‘the border’.
Throughout the book, I trace out how ‘family’ works as an ideological 
rationale and site of intervention that circulates through numerous 
areas of government – social work, counter-terrorism, citizenship policy, 
policing – for example in the joining up of the UK counter-terrorism 
strategy, Prevent, with social work and the policing of ‘failed’ Muslim 
families; or in the way that criminals prosecuted for grooming have been 
deprived of their citizenship; or in how ideas of childhood structure 
who is allowed to be a ‘real’ refugee. It is this broader form of racialised 
governance that I refer to as ‘bordering’. In showing how these sites 
are forms of bordering, I connect the treatment of people moving as 
migrants to that of settled black and South Asian communities within 
Britain who are frequently policed as ‘internal colonies’ (Turner 2018). 
The emphasis here is on the interconnection between the racialised 
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governance and bordering of both ‘migrants’ and ‘citizens’. But at the 
same time, there is a need to be sensitive to specific immigration practices 
that are focused on creating hierarchies of mobility and rights through 
sovereign power. Thus, when I speak of ‘borders’, I refer to practices 
which have a specific connection to immigration policy – that is, the 
sovereign law of a particular state with regard to migration, settlement 
and citizenship. When I speak of ‘bordering’, I refer to the broader 
process through which people are made ‘out of place’ (Ahmed 2000). 
This speaks to how bordering was/is constitutive of the broader push to 
manage populations through colonisation and the shifting dynamics of 
imperial/racialised capitalism, which borders play one distinct part in.
Violence and normalisation
In exploring the connection between borders/bordering and family, I 
am interested in how they are bound to the distribution of violence – that 
is, biophysical force and harm, as well more cruddy and everyday forms 
of structural inequality and abandonment (Povinelli 2011; Sharpe 2016). 
In the example I began with, my partner appeared to briefly lose her 
right to be counted as familial, or familial enough to travel, and this 
points at the wider issues of this book – how dominant notions of who 
is family/who is not sustains certain bodies and relationships as more 
or less perverse and more or less human. Whilst the dominant appeal 
to family is of warmth, closeness and familiarity, we also need to turn 
some of these affective, common-sense attachments on their head. The 
ongoing power of heteronormativity furnishes particular bodies and 
affective relations but it also excludes others who are deemed not only 
unfamilial but in turn unworthy/without value. This is more than 
organising who can feel at home, or who can belong (although this 
might be important). What I am interested here is how being familial 
– that is, with or without value – organises violence. Or, more specifically, 
how it energises, targets and normalises the violence of borders.
Take, for example, the dominant construction of the ‘refugee crisis’ 
in Europe which reached a peak in the summers of 2015 and 2016. A 
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common-sense refrain to justify the exclusion of refugees has been a 
focus on single men on the move. These men, we are told, are not ‘real 
refugees’ and neither are they real men. During the UK’s 2016 referendum 
on EU membership, one of the dominant images of the ‘Leave’ campaign 
was Nigel Farage (at the time leader of the far-right anti-immigration 
party UKIP, and subsequently leader of the Brexit Party) standing in 
front of a poster of predominantly male asylum seekers walking through 
Slovenia. The words ‘breaking point’, plastered over the image, further 
revealed the threat of race instilled in this moment. When asked in 
2018 if he regretted the use of such imagery, Farage questioned where 
‘all the women and children’ were in the picture. To Farage, these were 
just men: ‘Where were the old people?’ he remonstrated. ‘Where were 
the disabled people? These were not refugees in any classic sense’ (BBC 
2018a, my emphasis). The unmarked appeal to family here does vital 
political work to dismantle and make the (inter)national rights of refuge/
asylum. We learn that ‘real refugees’ are not single brown men. Real 
refugees are ‘victims’ and ‘families’ (and, we assume here, whiter, het-
erosexual families). Single brown men are ‘migrants’, calculating economic 
migrants. If they were real refugees and real men, as the refrain goes, 
why did they not stay and fight in Syria, or Eritrea, or Libya (see Elshtain 
1987)? For ‘stay and fight’, read protect their women folk, motherland 
and children as a real father would. Here the ‘unreal’ refugee/migrant 
is first presented as devoid of family – as a ‘failed father’ – and then 
presented as a racialised-sexualised threat to Europe (the danger of the 
single, male migrant).
This only makes sense once we are able to excavate how colonised 
populations were already posed as being unable to do family properly, 
and how family was tied to claims of modernity, humanness and civilisa-
tion. Moments such as this replay key imaginaries of empire, such as 
the threat of the ‘black peril’ (McCulloch 2000), the hypersexuality of 
the Orient (Said 1978) and the need to protect and foster the white 
family at all costs from savage hordes. Such demarcations and imaginaries 
are of central importance because they organise not just the abandonment 
of bodies and people (to camps, indefinite waiting, deportation or death) 
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but normalise and hide the function of race through an appeal to family 
values.
In light of this, this book is engaged in both examining how borders 
and claims to family are brought together to violently exclude, but also 
investigating the work that family does to normalise and build the 
conditions of this violence – that is, to (re)produce sensibilities and 
orientations through which empire is both remade and hidden from 
view. We should remember, as I stated above, that love and family make. 
They were central to the building of empire and with it connected to 
acquisition of territories, dispossession, accumulation, the regulation 
of mobility, processes of civilisation and domestication. Equally, they 
continue to make today in ongoing distributions of violence and govern-
ment in Britain and beyond. Here this making must be understood in 
terms of how borders work to delimit, refuse, expel and exclude people 
as unfamilial, but also how appeals to protect ‘proper family’ (often 
heteronormative and white) energise and rationalise borders both within 
and beyond the state. As feminists have long demonstrated, appeals to 
family are so powerful because they are naturalised and deemed ‘outside 
of politics’, this is why it is so vital to challenge and monitor the political 
work that claims to family enact.
Whilst one of the central claims I make is that family makes borders 
(and vice versa), family can also work as a site of powerful contestation 
and struggle. Because it has social and political power, claims to protect 
family can be used to make rights claims, to contest imperial repression 
and dehumanising violence (for ‘home’ and resistance see hooks 1999; 
Beckles-Raymond 2019; and also Turner 2016). In such struggles, a 
claim to family may rehumanise subjects by appealing to the dominant 
frame that ‘family matters’. An example of this might be campaigns to 
stop the incarceration of irregularised migrant families and in particular 
children in British detention centres such as Yarl’s Wood, or the separation 
of families through deportation regimes in Europe and North America. 
Appeals that families should not suffer can often work to contest (however 
momentarily) the racialised practices of detention, deportation and 
exclusion. On the one hand, we need to stay attuned to how appeals 
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to family can be unruly and work to contest violence; on the other, we 
also need to investigate the limits of this type of contestation. At what 
and at whose expense does the protection and inclusion of some as 
‘family’ come?
It may be the case that the ‘inclusion’ of subjects or the extension of 
rights through appeals to family work to ‘reify the contours of legitimacy’ 
(Puar 2008: 126) of existing practices of exclusion and violence, such 
as citizenship and the colonial-racial state. But struggles might also 
leave traces and possibilities of more radical alternatives and less racially 
charged, colonial and heteropatriarchal capitalist futures. Throughout 
this book I try to demonstrate what a colonial reading of ‘family’ does 
to reveal the limits of such contestation, whilst recognising the way in 
which intimacies, dependencies and kinships sustain communities and 
often give rise to practices of survival within colonial rule (see, for 
example, hooks 1999, 2008; Rifkin 2015).
Researching bordering intimacy
In exploring both the continuity and reworking of imperial sensibilities 
and colonial practices of rule into contemporary Britain, this book is 
dedicated to a particular approach to history. This is in many ways a 
‘history of the present’ (Foucault 1984). I am interested in tracing where 
ideas, knowledges, practices, discourses and structures that shape the 
present emerged from and how their orientation and function may 
change or stay relatively continuous. For example, how knowledge of 
‘family’ was produced by elites, from anthropologists to colonial 
administrators in the nineteenth century and how this (dis)connects 
with ideas of the family today, such as in border agents’ monitoring of 
family visas, or the monitoring and safeguarding practices of social 
workers. This is broadly about how certain ways of doing, thinking and 
being became entrenched within modes of power and rendered normal 
(Walters 2012: 120; on colonial archives see Arondekar 2005). One way 
of exploring such a history is through law, and the way the law builds 
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and collapses subjectivities, relations and bodies across time and space 
(Dayan 2011). An example of this is examining how colonial ordinances 
and acts of parliaments circulate across imperial space and how the 
law today builds and resurrects this architecture. Such an approach 
underpins much of the archival work in this book.
This is not solely a history of knowledge but also of practice. I trace 
where practices (which can also be legal practice) emerged from and 
what this tells us. For instance, in examining the history of borders/
bordering, I look at both the historical context through which the 
regulation of movement emerged (as a logic of government) but also 
where the specific practices that are used to govern people today – such 
as photo IDs, deportation and port inspections – came from (Ballantyne 
and Burton 2009). This reveals important material histories which in 
turn help us understand the orientation and functions of these practices 
today. It matters that we can trace the history of the passport and photo 
surveillance to the containment and ownership of slaves or the policing 
of indentured labourers (Browne 2015). This connects with how the 
exclusion of certain bodies and not others is organised through these 
practices today.
Revealing both the will to govern and the practices used to govern 
teases out in detail the shaping of modernity through colonialism in 
ways that are not always adequately addressed by work that focuses 
solely on issues of representation. Tracing where representative practices 
regarding race, gender, sexuality, class came from is of vital importance. 
These practices include orientalist imaginaries and inferior representation 
of body, mind, culture and so on (such as I sketched out above with 
regard to male asylum seekers). But I also want to supplement these 
histories by showing how tools, strategies and practices of rule and law 
emerged under imperial and colonial governance and how they are 
reused and resuscitated in Britain today, for example in the deprivation 
of citizenship or the use of marriage law to ratify legitimacy.
The analytical approach that I take throughout this book is equally 
indebted to feminist historiography (Stoler 2002, 2006) and feminist 
and queer geopolitical approaches to intimacy (Gopinath 2005; Lowe 
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2015; Pain 2015; Peterson 2017). There is an obvious connection to the 
intimate that runs through these pages: that intimacy and with that 
love, family, proximities and the innermost are always sites for the 
(re)production of power, and for the control and management of order. 
This follows from the most searing challenge of feminists to acknowledge 
that the personal is political.
Whilst this work is inspired by key debates in feminist and queer 
approaches to intimacy and family (Barrett and McIntosh 1991; Bell 
and Binnie 2000; Peterson 2014a), I put this into conversation with 
postcolonial and black feminists such as Elizabeth Povinelli, Christina 
Sharpe and Hortense Spillers, as well as scholars working in international 
politics on questions of international order and violence (Kaplan 2005; 
Owens 2015). Bringing this work together means better understanding 
the role of family with regard to the reproduction of government and 
the liberal international order (i.e. the intimate, the biopolitical and the 
geopolitical), and the very colonial and imperial and racialised roots 
of this role.
Drawing inspiration from Lisa Lowe (2015), I treat intimacy as an 
approach to historical and contemporary enquiry. Intimacy can work 
as a method that helps to collapse commonsensical approaches to space 
and time. Intimacy can help us explore and think in terms of circulations, 
for example the circulations of ways of doing, thinking, logics and 
rationalities that bind seemingly disparate and distant places, bodies 
and practices together. Intimate connections can make the past appear 
into the present. Thinking through the intimate in terms of time also 
helps us make geographical connections, from the globally distant to 
the proximate (Lowe 2015: 18). This helps us to recognise how processes 
such as slavery in the Caribbean, or the organisation of indentured 
labour in Tamil Nadu or South Africa, were not somehow separate but 
integrally bound to social, economic and domestic life in Britain and 
other spaces of the Empire. Intimate markers and connections remain 
– they remain in relations, ruins, and in structural connections, economies 
and modes of thought (Stoler 2016). These remains are important because 
they challenge the liberal push to divide time and history into the nation 
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state (Lowe 2015: 19; also see Ballantyne and Burton 2009). Equally, 
by following the circulations of ideas, logics and practices, we are able 
to explore connections that work across areas of government – welfare, 
policing, counter-terrorism, immigration – that share familiar charac-
teristics and would otherwise be obscured.
One element of using intimacies is connecting what are often termed 
‘macro’ processes of state formation, colonialism and geopolitics with 
processes of the everyday and the mundane (Legg 2010; Guillaume 
2011; Smith 2012). Once we start exploring the joining up of processes 
and exploring what is connected up in the meeting of family and borders, 
we can explore the different social and political sites in which power 
is reproduced. Here I am interested in examining how seemingly disparate 
processes, such as popular culture, exhibitions, images, narratives, novels 
and emotions, work to reform and energise dominant ideas about family, 
race, borders, and thus play a powerful role in mobilising and normalising 
forms of rule, practices of the state and legal apparatus. Thinking in 
this joined-up, circulatory way is useful for exploring where borders 
go and what they do, as well as how ‘family’ emerges to condition and 
propel these forms of rule. For instance, I examine how photography 
exhibitions connect to the global/humanitarian response to mobility, 
or how drone strikes in Syria connect to the criminals tried for child 
sexual exploitation offences in Rotherham, how popular ‘confessional’ 
novels are linked to white nationalist appeals to protect the ‘real’ white 
family, or how the policing of sham marriage connects to the UK 
counter-terrorism strategy Prevent. This matters, because studying law, 
policy and institutional arrangements only gets us so far. We miss out 
on the broader cultural landscape in which these processes operate and 
certain ways of doing and thinking become normalised and connected. 
Equally, only studying the everyday, representational or mundane fails 
to show how rule operates with regard to the apparatus of states and 
global/international order. We thus need both. Thinking through intimacy 
and circulations gives us that.
Amidst these broad methodological commitments within each chapter 
I also develop and draw upon different research methods. Whilst archival 
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research of the sort I explored above underpins this work, this is sup-
plemented with discourse analysis, intertextual reading of documents, 
institutional analysis, visual analysis, ethnography and interviews. The 
use of a range of methods is propelled by a desire to trace the multitude 
of sites through which government occurs and with that the way that 
ongoing modes of colonial violence are accepted and distributed. Rather 
than spending time justifying and explaining the methods used in the 
main text, I have offered endnotes, where relevant, to expand in more 
detail on how the evidence was gathered and analysed.
Book structure
In order to take up this task, this book is arranged into two parts. The 
first explores in more detail the conceptual and historical trajectories 
that bring family and borders together through empire. The second 
examines the relationship between family and borders in contemporary 
Britain and with this, the duress of colonial rule. I first set out the 
mutually entangled history of family and borders under formal empire 
(chapters 1 and 2) before examining how different borders/bordering 
operate in the UK. The second part of the book is organised around 
tracing three different forms of borders/bordering and their colonial 
orientations, what I call ‘intimate borders’ (chapter 3); ‘sticky borders’ 
(chapters 4 and 5); and ‘visual borders’ (chapter 6). The final chapter 
(chapter 7) examines strategies and forms of resistance that have worked 
to contest colonial bordering, in social movements but also in creative 
activist projects.
Chapter 1, ‘Domestication’, further asks how we can understand the 
relationship between family, borders and empire. I argue that turning 
towards an analysis of domestication helps us understand how ‘family’ 
is situated in relation to state formation, the organisation of violence 
and the control of movement. Whilst the modern state has always been 
orientated towards domestication (pacification and producing [dis]
order), this has always been a colonial and imperial project. It has a 
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colonial/global rather than national history. Domestication here relates 
to the order of the domus – the household, home and family – just as 
it relates to the means of dominating the unruly and the uncivilised 
(McClintock 1995; Owens 2015).
To fully flesh out my approach to domestication and its colonial/
imperial orientation, I turn to an analysis of the figure of Bertha Mason in 
Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre (Amadiume 1846). This nineteenth-century 
novel provides a rich site to both study the material traces of Victorian 
Empire and to theorise the role of family and borders. I do this by 
examining the treatment of Bertha, who is confined within the attic of 
Mr Rochester’s English manor house. I ask how might we understand 
Bertha to be domesticated. Through drawing together a literature on 
government, domesticity and coloniality, I show how she is ‘bordered’ 
within the attic (and later abandoned to die) because she is both bereft 
of and a threat to ‘proper family’. Here I develop a clearer connection to 
the work of postcolonial, decolonial and black feminists and the role that 
family had in empire-making (Amadiume 1987; Spillers 1987; Povinelli 
2006; Lugones 2008). I propose that we should understand the role that 
family has in terms of organising development, dispossession and control.
Drawing upon the theory of domestication I outline in the first chapter, 
chapter 2, ‘Making love, making empire’, takes up a history of family and 
borders across the British Empire from the early nineteenth century. It 
traces how family was central to the development, dispossession and 
control of colonised populations. This chapter shows that whilst family 
was fostered and promoted for the coloniser, the destruction of kinships 
through territorial acquisition, imposition of labour markets and colonial 
war was constantly justified because non-European/colonised people 
were deemed ‘undomesticated’. In contributing to a history of borders/
bordering, this shows how nascent practices of borders/bordering formed 
around the management of undomesticated movement – that which either 
ran counter to the expansion of the state, emergent imperial capitalism or 
the racialised-sexualised order of the colonial administration. Here we can 
understand how family connected up with the management of mobility. 
Notions of family could rationalise containment and sedentarism, just 
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as practices of expulsion and restriction were justified on the basis of 
the threat of interracial intimacies and the dangers to (white) family 
life. In this chapter, I begin to demonstrate that what we have come to 
know as immigration policy/law was experimented with in the control 
of movement across imperial space (particularly in settler colonies), 
before being entrenched in the metropole from 1905. I then show 
how immigration law worked to arrange intimacies of those moving 
to Britain around different taxonomies of family/perversion throughout 
the mid-to-late twentieth century.
After teasing out the conceptual framework the book rests upon in 
chapter 1 and the more traditional historical background in chapter 2, 
chapter 3, titled ‘Shams’, evidences how colonial logics and hierarchies 
are adapted and resuscitated in the present. It analyses the discourse 
of ‘sham marriage’ in the UK as a site of colonial duress. Sham marriage 
became an increasingly prominent issue in immigration policy throughout 
the 2000s, with elites and immigration ‘experts’ attempting to limit the 
number of people able to claim a right to settle in the UK as a ‘family 
member’. This chapter first traces the racialised-sexualised coordinates 
of debates around sham marriage, debates which I show mirror discus-
sions about the evolutionary hierarchy of marriage and family forms 
under the British Empire (who could be family/who was perverse). I 
thus ask: what is it to be a ‘sham’? And what does the sham do? In the 
UK what has driven family migration restrictions has been a dual anxiety 
surrounding marriages of ‘convenience’ (i.e. for the benefit of immigration 
status) with concerns about deviant kinship practices such as polygamy, 
forced marriage and so-called honour killings, which are predominantly 
tied to Muslim communities.
I show how debates around shams link up with the wider history 
of bordering across empire, which I call ‘intimate borders’. What has 
propelled this ‘intimate bordering’ has been a particular figuration of 
the ‘unintegrated woman’. Intimate bordering tries to capture and govern 
the unintegrated woman, who is both at risk and risky. The last part of 
the chapter investigates how concerns about shams (sham marriages, 
intimacies or families) have increasingly been cast as both a national 
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and civilisational threat by their inclusion in counter-terrorism strategies 
prompted by the War on Terror. Since 2010, Muslim families have been 
increasingly subject to intimate bordering through the UK Prevent 
strategy, such as in the intervention of social workers into ‘radicalised 
homes’. What this tells us is that imperial and colonial categories of 
‘modern’ or ‘backwards’ forms of family life are reinscribed into the 
present day through often mundane practices of government – from 
family migration visas and integration strategies, to safeguarding in 
social work.
Following on from this, chapters 4 and 5 focus on how claims to 
protect ‘real family’ can create borders and in doing so rationalise and 
justify certain types of violence. In chapter 4, ‘Monsters’, I examine the 
commitment made by the Home Office in 2016 to deprive of their citizen-
ship subjects convicted of ‘street grooming’. Deprivation of citizenship 
has increased in use since 2002 and intensified from 2010, often targeting 
‘suspected terrorists’. In this chapter I use the threat of deprivation to 
explore how borders ‘stick’ to certain bodies and populations (and not 
others). Borders appear to stick to some people even when they have 
settled/formal rights of citizenship. The effect of this is turning ‘citizens’ 
into ‘migrants’ who can be deported and killed with impunity. I explore 
what conditioned the move to deprive criminals of their citizenship 
and explore how street grooming has been made into a particular type 
of monstrous act. The chapter traces how the monstrousness of this 
crime relates to the way this violence was posed as a racialised-sexualised 
threat against ‘white girls’ by ‘Asian men’. If chapter 3 examined the 
figure of the at risk/risky unintegrated woman, chapter 4 examines the 
politics of the deviant/hypersexualised black or Asian man. This familiar 
colonial figure animates numerous sticky bordering practices in the 
UK, from deprivation of citizenship, to the assassinations of ‘terrorists’ 
at the end of RAF drones, to the policing of gangs. I argue that in 
promising to violently deprive ‘grooming’ criminals of their citizenship, 
the British state is partaking in a white nationalist fantasy to secure 
and protect the ‘real’ (white) family against all odds. Borders do not 
just intervene in the intimacies of populations. Claims to protect, sustain 
and foster family also work to energise and animate borders.
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Chapter 5, titled ‘Deprivation’, continues the discussion of sticky 
borders by examining what acts of deprivation tell us about postcolonial 
citizenship in places like Britain. The push by the British state to expand 
the terms of deprivation and denaturalisation has the effect of making 
large numbers of British citizens deportable. It makes populations who 
had settled rights subject to authoritarian immigration laws which target 
migrants. Whilst use of authoritarian security practices like deprivation 
of citizenship, detention and deportation has increased during the War 
on Terror and through anti-Muslim racism, I demonstrate in this chapter 
how deprivation must be understood as formative of modern citizenship 
crafted under empire. Deprivation of rights today is bound to the 
deprivation of personhood that structured imperial and colonial rule 
(organising people into racial categories of human/not-quite/non-human). 
Rather than an aberration of citizenship, sticky borders instead reveal 
the (im)possibility of citizenship after empire.
In chapter 6, ‘The good migrant’, I ask who can be ‘included’ in 
contemporary Britain. Or, more specifically, what the ‘good’ or domes-
ticated migrant might look like. I argue that examining who can be 
imagined/imaged to be ‘included’ tells us about how exclusion is both 
organised and normalised. To do this, I first explore how visuals (looking, 
imaging, being seen) are central to borders/bordering. This means 
investigating the technical history of how visuals, and with this pho-
tography, have played a role in colonial government. It also means 
investigating the cultural history of who looks ‘out of place’ and who 
belongs – in other words, who looks like a ‘real’ refugee, a ‘real’ victim, 
a ‘real’ family, and so on. This history, I show, is bound up with pho-
tographic techniques such as the family portrait, something which is 
increasingly relied upon into border practices today (i.e. in visa regimes, 
cataloguing/judging settlement and right claims). So, if borders are 
intimate, and if they are sticky, we learn they are also visual.
In order to answer what the contemporary ‘good’ migrant looks like, 
I explore how humanitarian approaches to the ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe 
have sought to photograph migrants in order to ‘humanise’ them. I 
focus on an exhibition in Sheffield, England, called Arrivals: Making 
Sheffield Home as one example of such a liberal, inclusive strategy. Whilst 
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different from more explicitly colonial ways of seeing migrants (as 
swarms, hordes, dangers, perverse) there are limits to this promise to 
‘include’. Not only do humanitarian and progressive nationalist promises 
to humanise migrants forget colonial/imperial histories, they equally 
risk forgetting day-to-day border violence through a celebration of 
progressive or tolerant ‘whiteness’. This equally works to eviscerate and 
forget those that do not fit in and who can be violently excluded. Whilst 
appearing to be a family (heteronormative, domesticated) ameliorates 
migrants’ troubling differences within this politics, migrants ultimately 
remain compared to the ‘good’ white host who is praised for welcoming 
and ‘saving’ them.
Chapter 7, ‘Looking back’, follows on from the discussion that 
concludes chapter 6 by exploring other ways of looking back and contest-
ing borders. This poses the question: if humanitarianism and ‘compas-
sionate nationalism’ can be co-opted and fail to challenge colonial power, 
then what other orientations, imaginaries and struggles can we turn 
to? Whilst the previous five chapters examine the duress of colonial 
rule in Britain, this chapter turns to practices of contestation and resist-
ance. It draws from bell hooks’s (1992) provocation that an oppositional 
gaze was always a central strategy against racist subjugation historically 
and continues today, even in the face of insurmountable violence. Whilst 
focused primarily on visual practices, this offers reflections on how 
various struggles contest the colonial politics of mobility, family, borders 
more broadly and how we can think this relationship differently. I offer 
three different ways of looking back: resistance, escape and decolonial 
aesthesis. Whilst all offer powerful challenges, I argue that decolonial 
aesthesis, linked to a broader decolonial politics, offers lessons for how 
we might think family and love otherwise than with empire.
In the short conclusion I reflect on the main conclusions that I draw 
across these chapters and explore why such a study is important. I then 
offer a few provocations on the absences and silences that echo through 
the book.
Bertha Mason is mad, and she came of a mad family; – idiots and maniacs 
through three generations! Her mother, the Creole, was both a mad 
woman and a drunkard!…
He lifted the hangings from the wall, uncovering the second door: 
this, too, he opened. In a room without a window, there burnt a fire 
guarded by a high and strong fender, and a lamp suspended from the 
ceiling by a chain. … In the deep shade, at the farther end of the room, 
a figure ran backwards and forwards. What it was, whether beast or 
human being, one could not, at first sight, tell: it grovelled, seemingly, 
on all fours; it snatched and growled like some strange wild animal: but 
it was covered with clothing, and a quantity of dark, grizzled hair, wild 
as a mane, hid its head and face.
(Charlotte Bronte’s initial introduction and description  
of Bertha Mason, Jane Eyre, 1847: 246–247)
Fearful and ghastly to me … It was a discoloured face – it was a savage 
face. I wish I could forget the roll of red eyes and the fearful blackened 
inflation of lineaments.
(Jane Eyre vocalising her encounter with Bertha Mason,  
Charlotte Bronte, Jane Eyre, 1847: 247)
The above event, and the narrative of Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre more 
broadly, provides a compelling theorisation of familial domesticity and 
the regulation of mobility under the British Empire. Bertha Mason, the 
subject of the above passage, is presented as the first ‘creole’ wife of Mr 




in the attic of Rochester’s house remains a powerful example of the 
nature of racialisation and control in Victorian England. This chapter 
uses the figure of Bertha and her treatment as a way of conceptualising 
and problematising the relationship between family, borders and empire 
and its continuity into the present day. Not only is Bertha subject to 
colonial racism, as we see in the above passage, but her dehumanisation 
also reveals the complex spatialisation of empire and networking of 
imperial power through sites of the intimate and the familial. Throughout 
this chapter, I move to tease out and explore these links.
In Bronte’s novel we are told that Bertha was ‘brought’ to Rochester’s 
English manor house after being wed. Being an heiress of a plantation 
in Jamaica she is described as a ‘creole’, or of ‘mixed blood’. In Jamaica, 
Bertha was part of a section of the middle class fostered by the British 
as a barrier between former black, enslaved and indentured communities 
and white settler colonialists. Whilst her racialisation in Jamaica was 
more ambiguous and relatively privileged, on her arrival in England it 
is revealed that she harbours a madness within her which is presented 
in terms of the animalism of blackness and oversexuality. We are told 
by Bronte that such madness is ‘inherited’ through the mixing of blood, 
and the degeneracy of the colonial family (‘idiots and maniacs over 
three generations!’ declares Rochester). Bertha is subsequently imprisoned 
in the attic and hidden away from local society, remaining both a living 
and active danger. We are told, for example, that she has the capacity 
for extraordinary violence. The novel’s ending is conditioned by Bertha’s 
death when she burns down Rochester’s manor house, an episode which 
also leads to the blinding of Rochester. As a parable of intimate social 
relations, the story ends with the white, empowered protagonist Jane 
Eyre marrying Rochester as an act of choice and thus ‘proper’ love. 
Rochester slowly recovers his sight through Jane’s intimate labour, love 
and care as his ‘real’ wife.
Through this chapter, I examine, perhaps counterintuitively, what 
the treatment of Bertha reveals about colonial rule, family and the 
management of mobility. I explore what Bertha can tell us about the 
duress of colonial rule, which I consider to relate to the domesticating 
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power of the modern state. I thus set out how family – as the dominant 
mode of European socio-sexual intimacy – played a role in race-making 
across European empire. I also examine the role that borders had in 
taming, domesticating and managing populations deemed familial and 
non-familial. Just as importantly, I stress how this is reworked into 
contemporary immigration practices and forms of government in 
postcolonial states such as Britain.
As many commentators have argued, Jane Eyre reveals, quite dramati-
cally, the dual silencing and significance of race to both modern literature 
and the socio-economic relations of (Victorian) England. It is clear 
from the above quote that Bertha is represented through multiple accounts 
of imperial racism – animalism, madness, sensuality – for instance how 
she is described as grovelling ‘on all fours … like some strange wild 
animal’. She is presented as dangerous, untamed (McKee 2009). Against, 
this construction, Jane Eyre is presented as the embodiment of the 
rising bourgeoisie and proto-feminism, shrouded as this is in unmarked 
whiteness (Gilbert and Gubar 2000). This provides a powerful demonstra-
tion of how race underpinned the formation of ‘modern’ freedoms, 
individualism and reason through empire. However, whilst the racialisa-
tion of Bertha is significant, what is arguably of more significance for 
this chapter is how she is confined to the attic of Rochester’s house. 
She is kept here under lock and key, as a wild and undomesticated 
presence within the bourgeois home, until her eventual ‘release’ when 
she burns down the house.
Focusing on the spatial/temporal location of Bertha is important. 
We can firstly consider how Bertha’s presence in the attic is symbolic 
of the authoritarian, paternalistic violence of colonialism and the control 
of mobility this was often premised on. This tells us important things 
about the character and place of borders and domesticity. Bertha is 
within the domestic space but presented as a ‘wild’ element. She is that 
which must be contained and regulated through carceral practices. She 
is bound to the attic as the lock, keys, doors, windows ‘border’ her in. 
Her movement is violently curbed and regulated as a threat and yet we 
must remember that she has been able to move across the Empire from 
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Jamaica to England, enabled as this was through marriage to Rochester 
and the passage of whiteness this relationship entailed. Mobility – or 
control of mobility through borders – was of course essential to imperial-
ism, from the flow of capital, trade, administrators, labour to the dispos-
session of indigenous people from their land.
Whilst we can think of Bertha as ‘bordered’ in the attic, she is also 
simultaneously connected to the rest of the house and the British Empire. 
The novel reveals the many subtle intimacies of empire (Lowe 2015), 
which collapse down common-sense logics about where colonialism 
took place. Here we are shown, for instance, how capital circulations 
and dispossession binds plantation slavery in Jamaica to pastoral England 
and the ‘family home’. Rochester’s household is ultimately sustained by 
Bertha’s presence, not merely symbolically but materially. Plantation 
slavery in Jamaica underpins the wealth of the manor house. We learn 
from Jean Rhys’s retelling of Bertha’s story in Wide Sargasso Sea ([1966] 
2000) that Bertha had ‘money’. She is the embodied connection of this 
structural link to Jamaica and the dispossessive suffering of slavery that 
continues to finance capital and shape landownership in England to 
this day (Hall 2013). Here we learn that bodies move or are captured 
along imperial lines, through the dictates of racialised capitalism 
(Robinson 1983); just as England (and Britain) itself is constituted as 
imperial terrain (Burton 1998: 5).
Bertha’s eventual death at her own hands is often read by postcolonial 
feminists as symbolising the violence of white imperial feminism (Spivak 
1985; McKee 2009) – that is, how the emancipation of European women 
(symbolised by Jane) was built on the racialisation of women of colour 
and white women’s complicity with empire (Grewal 1996). To add to 
this, we should consider how Bertha’s death also produces the possibility 
of heteronormative family. Just as she threatens the possibility of ‘proper 
family’ – through her sensuality, darkness and madness – she is also 
arguably its redemption. It is her death, after all, that allows Jane and 
Rochester to form a union and have a son. Following Judith Butler 
(2010), we might consider how Bertha’s death is not grievable but instead 
celebrated. We learn here that not only does the ‘wild’ element of the 
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household need to be domesticated (through both containment and 
death) but in doing so this creates the possibility for ‘proper’ family life 
and the reproduction of whiteness. Bertha is forced to suffer colonial 
violence that both imprisons her but equally uses her as a resource to 
create and sustain European domesticity.
I return to Jane Eyre as a site of the material processes of empire 
and coloniality throughout this chapter. I treat the novel as both an 
imprint of logics of empire (as a historical text) and a site of theorisation 
(bringing together abstractions which help us understand complex social 
phenomena). What is striking for me is how the figuration of Bertha 
holds together a set of unstable logics which are repeated across metro-
imperial space and time – that is, from Jamaica to England, from the 
past into the present. Borders are shown to concern both the constraint 
and enabling of mobility (of bodies, relations and commodities); familial 
domesticity and white European socio-sexual relations are both presented 
as threatened but also conditioned by racialised ‘others’ and their move-
ment. Colonial violence and dispossession reach across empire from 
colony to metropole, attached to certain bodies and populations, just 
as they remain entangled in sites of intimacy such as the ‘family home’.
In this chapter I flesh out these tentative connections in more detail. 
I argue that what draws these processes (mobility, family, racialised 
violence) together is a compulsion towards domestication that defines 
the modern colonial and imperial state. To present this approach I build 
up different readings of Bertha from literatures focused on questions 
of domestication, colonisation and the family, and borders. The intention 
of this is to reveal how these literatures can help us build up an intercon-
nected analysis and provide a set of tools which I travel with and extend 
over the next five chapters. To do so I ask three overlapping questions 
of the figure of Bertha Mason: what does it mean to say that Bertha is 
subject to ‘domestication’? What does it mean to say that Bertha is 
made ‘unfamilial’? And, finally, how is Bertha bordered? The chapter 
is arranged around answering these three provocations.
Bertha, I argue, is domesticated within the manor house in Jane 
Eyre, but this domestication intimately binds her to the wider (non-fictive) 
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violence of empire and racialised colonial governance, of which bordering 
is one key tool. To set out a theory of domestication I synthesise work 
on the domesticating power of liberal states (Owens 2015) with Fou-
cauldian approaches to the family (Foucault 1991; Stoler 1995; Feder 
2007). Whilst I show how a Foucauldian analysis helps us understand 
how family worked as a technique of rule and normalisation central to 
the management of populations, I argue that such an approach still 
underdevelops the role that race, colonialism and mobility played in 
the emergence of modern liberal rule. In drawing upon the work of 
decolonial and postcolonial and black feminist scholars (Spillers 1987; 
McClintock 1995; Povinelli 2006; Lugones 2011), this provides a more 
historically nuanced account of the role of that ‘family’ has had in creating 
and sustaining colonial hierarchies of personhood – that is to say the 
categorisation of people and spaces into the human/not-quite/non-human 
(Weheliye 2014). I tie this intersectional account of race/humanity to 
the workings of the modern colonial state, which is constantly attuned 
to ordering populations around historically produced notions of family.
Whilst in contemporary scholarship the state is understood to sustain 
the life of the population, I argue that this is anchored to particular 
heteronormative claims of family (i.e. the domestic in the impulse to 
domesticate). We know from a long history of feminist scholarship that 
family worked to serve dominant social relations of capitalist heteropa-
triarchy and has thus been central to the organisation of violence. But 
to push this further we need to recognise how family emerged as a 
means of governing people differently based upon racial geographies 
of empire (Povinelli 2006; Rifkin 2015). ‘Family’ in this sense was always 
a particularistic claim to family as European and predominantly white 
bourgeois domesticity. We can consider how the figure of Bertha is 
denied personhood because she can never be part of the European/
white family. But she is equally controlled by its parameters, such as 
being locked in the attic. What drives this chapter is the provocation 
that ‘family’ is not merely a site for racist, gendered and sexist ideas to 
manifest but part of the construction of racial demarcations and central 
to the operation and drive of colonialism and imperialism.
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Once we better understand the role of family in empire-making, we 
are also better placed to understand the persistence of colonial rule 
into the present and how it is entangled in policing and creation of 
borders both within and beyond postcolonial Britain – that is, how the 
regulation of movement and settlement remain bound to the sensibilities 
and ‘grooves’ of imperialism (de Noronha 2018). Borders have been 
key tools of domesticating states concerned with movement. However, 
rather than a national history, this is an extensible imperial and globally 
orientated one (something I evidence in more detail in the next chapter). 
In thinking of borders/bordering alongside claims to family and domestic-
ity, I want to recognise the role that bordering played and continues to 
play in hardening categories of race based on distinctions of who can 
move, who needs to be contained and who needs to be removed. Border-
ing can be attuned to supporting the movement of people based on 
claims to family life; or ‘making’ families such as through citizenship 
law; or borders can be about restraining movement as a threat to ‘proper’ 
family life. Forged through the imperial control of movement, borders 
continue to work as transit points for colonial ideas about familial 
intimacy today.
Domestication
It is my contention that we cannot understand the politics of either 
family or borders without understanding the role of the modern state, 
as a particular type of domesticating and colonising state. Questions 
of domesticity have arguably had a renaissance in contemporary scholar-
ship. Whilst there has been a long history of work on the exclusory 
dynamics of normative domesticity and intimacy from queer theorists 
and feminist scholars (Barrett and McIntosh 1991; Stevens 1999; Duggan 
2003; Oswin and Olund 2010), theorists of government and international 
order have also begun, tentatively, to bring analysis of the household 
into their work (Walters 2004; Kaplan 2005; Owens 2015; Weber 2016; 
also see Hage 1996). In this latter body of work, domesticity is less 
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about cultural norms but about how different scales of government 
bind the management of the state (the ‘public’) to domestic spaces (the 
‘private’ and ‘familial’). This work has been concerned with understanding 
domesticity as a particular form of state power, where social relations 
are crafted out of the use of violence to produce a ‘domestic’ and thus 
‘domesticated’ social order (Kaplan 2005). In this reading, domesticity 
is not only a key aspect of liberal political economy (social reproduction, 
wage labour) but societies are arranged as domesticities, where life 
processes are administrated based on ideas taken from the governance 
of patriarchal households (Owens 2015). Drawing on some of these 
ideas, I firstly want to ask what it means to say that Bertha is subject 
to domestication.
In Jane Eyre, Bertha is subject to bordering practices which keep 
her contained in the attic – locked away from the rest of the household 
and wider society. But equally, she is fed, clothed and ‘cared for’ by her 
maid, Grace, who is also forced to move with Bertha from Jamaica. 
Rather than being expelled, Bertha is instead subject to both confinement 
and care (before her eventual death). Such conditions resemble other 
nineteenth-century carceral and institutional spaces such as prisons or 
asylums. Bronte rationalises such containment by pointing to Bertha’s 
unruly and disordered characteristics (her madness, animalism, violent 
behaviour). Such discipline is far from exceptional but part of a broader 
logic of modern government (Foucault 1991). To say she is domesticated 
is to pay attention to how such violence is made to seem necessary to 
sustain the order of the ‘civilised’ manor household and, in turn, wider 
Victorian society.
To consider this a process of domestication is to recognise how the 
power to domesticate has been central to the operation of modern 
liberal politics. To Patricia Owens (2015) what defines the liberal state 
and social relations is the scaling up of household rule to the level of 
the state, which she argues emerged in the seventeenth century. Notice-
ably, this occurred as colonial expansion was intensified. The production 
and sustaining of societal and economic relations rely, Owens argues, 
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on domesticating the life processes of state inhabitants, through despotic 
means if necessary:
From this perspective, we might say that ‘domestic’ government occurs 
when the inhabitants of household space submit (are forced to submit 
through violence and other necessities) to the disciplinary authority of 
a household. After all, ‘dominate’ is by extension ‘one of the derivatives 
of the Latin word domus’. (Owens 2015: 3)
Reflecting Owens’s approach to domestication, Bertha’s treatment echoes 
such relations of force: she is forced to submit to coercion, as part of 
the patriarchal rule of the household administrated by Rochester. What 
defines modern state rule more broadly is this promise to domesticate 
those who may potentially resist or disrupt the regulation of life systems 
and the care of the household (also see Hage 1996). Violence is ration-
alised here precisely to pacify the internally and externally unruly. But 
domestication, as a liberal form of power, is premised on a developmental 
logic. Such violence is justified for the ‘progress’ and ‘development’ of 
the population and its backwards elements. It is not only punishment 
but also discipline for the reform and sustaining of social order. Bertha 
takes up the subject position of the undomesticated element within the 
home which ‘threatens’ the wider social order. Locking her away in the 
attic is not just a punishment but an act for sustaining and producing 
a domestic and ‘civilised’ order.
In considering modern and liberal rule as domestication, we need 
to see this as a colonising form of power and one attuned to the claims 
of Eurocentric civilisation which drove the expansion of empires. 
Domestication works as a liberal humanist project in which European 
order is imagined to be universal and universalised through imperialism. 
Under colonial logics, indigenous lands were viewed as undomesticated 
but also prime spaces for the bringing and building of social order 
which could replicate the relations of private ownership, production 
and labour in the metropole. Domestication is thus attached to ideas 
of progress; it is the will to produce order in its absence that justifies 
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colonial violence and in doing so links the domestication of societies 
in the metropole with colonies. Colony and metropole are thus intimately 
connected but never treated equally (more on which later). The will to 
domesticate is, therefore, to conquer, dominate, colonise and paternally 
‘develop’ those peoples and spaces who have yet to find their inner 
domesticity (Kaplan 2005: 26).
When John Locke justified the violent appropriation of native 
Amerindian land in the seventeenth century it was precisely because 
of this appeal to domestication – symbolised in pacifying, taming and 
labouring of a territory that was not so much empty as ‘unproductive’ 
and ‘wasted’ (Gidwani and Reddy 2011). As Anthony Pagden (2003: 
183) argues:
Since the right to unclaimed land was a natural right, any attempt to 
prevent it from being exercised, by vicious aboriginals, constituted a 
violation of the natural law. As such they could, in Locke’s celebrated 
denunciation, ‘be destroyed as a Lion or a Tiger, one of those wild Savage 
beasts, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security.’ … Furthermore, 
it could also be argued that even if the aboriginals offered no opposition 
to the seizure of their lands, by failing to exercise their natural rights to 
improvement, they have also failed as people.
In considering Locke’s justification of the destruction of ‘wild savage 
beasts’ we find here a key element of the genocidal logic of domestica-
tion – the destruction of those deemed unsuitable for domestic and 
civilised order (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010). To return to Jane Eyre, it 
is Bertha’s savagery and untamed nature which is deemed as ultimately 
threatening the household. Her death is normalised and merely treated 
as part of the march of progress and the reclaiming of the household 
by its more worthy (modern and white) inhabitants – Rochester and, 
eventually, Jane.
Here domesticity relates to particular forms of developmental violence 
(Neocleous 2008). Under European empire, domesticity formed part 
of the conditioning of lands and people for the spread of racialised 
capitalism through primitive accumulation (Robinson 1983; Marx 2008: 
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363; Neocleous 2011). This was arranged through forms of dispossessive 
violence, through territory acquisition, dispersal and land enclosures 
and the development of ‘colonial sciences’. What many of these processes 
focused upon was the management of movement. James Scott (2017) has 
highlighted the extensive role that coercion played in the move towards 
sedentary social organisation and its often contingent and fractured 
history. The control of movement through emergent bordering was 
increasingly a facet of European colonial expansion and consolidation 
from the seventeenth century. This was not merely orientated towards 
the restraint of mobility (sedentarism or containment) but also the 
compulsion to move in practices of urbanisation, labour migration, 
resettlement, plantation and reserve management, and forced migration.
Whilst the gendered household was viewed as essential for the 
reproduction of social relations in the metropole (at least from the 
mid-eighteenth century; see McKeon 2005), this was often the opposite 
in colonies, where domestication sometimes worked to pacify populations 
into village or household structures (Owens 2015: 173–208). However, 
it also often worked to create land for settlement and pools of mobile 
labour, leading to the destruction of kinship patterns. What early 
nineteenth-century colonial administrators in India obsessed over, was 
not movement as such but unregulated and ‘unrestrained’ movement 
(see Sleeman 1839). Just as with vagrancy in the metropole, it was 
pilgrimages, roaming banditry, nomads who unnerved the expanding 
colonial state (Singha 2000). Control over movement functioned within 
the evolving dictates of imperial capitalism as the opening up of new 
markets demanded labour to move, often across or within specific 
European empires. This demanded sites of capture to filter the flow of 
people through practices such as indentured labourer contracts, medical 
inspections, work camps, detention and expulsion. As Hagar Kotef 
(2015) argues, this form of rule necessitated categorising certain types 
of movement as with value or without value.
Here I have begun to outline how domestication emerged as a colonis-
ing mode of power from the seventeenth century. This was organised 
around the administration of ‘developmental’ claims to violence, order 
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and the management of movement (in which we see the emergence 
of bordering/borders, which I expand on below). To this end, we can 
consider how Bertha is domesticated as an unruly and uncivilised pres-
ence (linked to how violent ‘civilisation’ occurred in colonies) through 
the control of movement and the administration of her life systems. 
She is provided for in terms of food and shelter but always through the 
possibility of normalised violence and coercion. Bertha’s treatment in 
England shows that domesticating violence is not necessarily attuned to 
the geography of imperial expansion but race. Bertha is presented as of 
the backwards colonised world and thus in need of further domestication 
within English society. This reminds us that whilst domestication took 
place in metropoles and colonies, who was subject to different forms of 
violence and oppression was rationalised by demarcations of personhood 
and humanity (more on this below).
Family and domestication
Whilst some scholars treat domestication as primarily household rule 
(Walters 2004; Kaplan 2005; Owens 2015), that is to say in the case of 
Jane Eyre Bertha is controlled and managed as part of the household, 
I argue that we need to consider how domestication and with it claims 
to civilisation and superiority always rely on normative claims to family. 
It is my argument that domestication works by privileging and fostering 
particular types of domesticity that are deemed familial. To Anne 
McClintock (1995), the promise of domesticity that energised Victorian 
imperialism was intimately bound to the social and economic relations 
of the white bourgeois family. To consider domestication as not just 
ordering but also as an appeal to a certain imaginary and practice of 
order is to recognise its relationship to unfolding normative and natu-
ralised appeals to family. It also recognises how family in this moment 
is specifically related to other intimacies – home, household, marriage, 
heterosexual reproductivity and so on. Domestication is bound to the 
rise of the heteropatriarchal family that was increasingly viewed as the 
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model of social relations and civility from the middle of the eighteenth 
century. To speak of domesticity and domestication is already to invoke 
the role of family in the historical constitution of the properly domestic/
undomesticated.
What I am interested in is how domesticity emerged as a form of 
power which institutionalised the family as a key part of social order. 
I then want to ask what political work the family does in regards to 
colonialism. This matters because once we are able to appreciate the 
relationship between family, the colonial state and power, we can better 
understand the role family played in racial demarcations of civilised/
uncivilised, modernity/backwardness that were so central to empire 
and the management of movement. So, this leads me to ask: how is 
Bertha made (un)familial?
We might consider that the treatment of Bertha, her domestication 
within the home, is far from merely about maintaining order. It is 
instead concerned with need to discipline her body because of her 
proximity to family. This relates to the heteronormative impulse to 
protect and produce the sanctified space of the Victorian bourgeois 
family home. Bertha is presented as bereft of the appropriate sensibilities 
that would make her familial – she fails, for example, the normative 
gendered subjectivity of at first ‘wife’ and then ‘motherhood’. Just as 
many other subjects and populations are made ‘deviant’, ‘dangerous’, 
‘threatening’ because they fail to live up to or threaten the normative 
arrangement of family, Bertha is made unfamilial. To consider this, is 
to pay attention to the way that ‘family’ emerged as a normative set of 
social and affective relations and the role it plays in colonial/imperial 
government.
As we know from a long history of feminist and queer scholarship, 
the family is far from a natural entity, although it has been naturalised 
(Barrett and McIntosh 1991; Federici 2004). Instead, a dominant 
understanding of family – universalised around the world through 
imperialism and apparently neutral claims to the humanness of love 
– is a historically contingent, particularist set of social relations. To 
speak of family is not free of power; it is bound to particular European 
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ideas about familial, heterosexual, Christian marriage, intimacy and 
liberal claims to romantic love and empowerment. To refer to family 
as I do, is to speak to this history. The provenance and dominance of 
this notion of ‘family’ and its relationship to government and the state 
is worth lingering upon.
Whilst I refer to the dominant idea of family and domesticity as 
‘European’, the emergence of the nuclear family as the dominant mode of 
intimate and affective relations is historically tied to both the expansion 
of the modern capitalist state and imperial encounters. Against more 
diffuse domestic and kinship practices, the family was heterosexualised 
and increasingly promoted by state and church authorities across much 
of Northern Europe (Stevens 1999: 218–227; McKeon 2005). Foucault 
(1991) views this as a central aspect of the shift towards biopolitical 
governance and liberal capitalist social relations, intensified from the 
mid-eighteenth century. In his words, at this moment ‘biopower bestowed 
a regulatory function on the one type of sexuality that was capable 
of reproducing labour power and the form of family’ (Foucault 1991: 
47). What this means is that the family emerged and was fostered as 
the ‘natural’ unit of human intimacy because it was networked into 
social reproduction and could form an important role in governing. 
Governing, that is, both desires and sensibilities but also the wider life 
of populations.
One reason that authorities invested in ‘family’, through legal regimes 
of marriage for instance, was because this allowed the organisation of 
national and imperial inheritance (Neti 2014). The heterosexual family 
was viewed as the properly domestic and morally superior form of 
intimate relations – including procreative sex, child care, socialisation 
– because it was networked into the broader management of the health, 
vitality and wealth of the population (Berlant 1997). The family could 
reproduce labour, maintain capital relations and (elite) citizenship through 
private property, legal inheritance and birth rights (Federici 2004). But 
natal reproduction (and the gendered labour this entailed) was also 
concerned with more ambiguous biological inheritance. Older notions 
of kinship ‘bloodlines’ were racialised through eugenic science in the 
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nineteenth century (Davin 1978). Reproductive sex, and with it family, 
was treated as a site for the maintenance of pure racial heritage against 
threats of ‘impurity’ such as through miscegenation. To recall how Bertha 
Mason is racialised in Jane Eyre reflects this eugenic logic – her madness 
is not only inherited but also a product of the dangers of racial ‘mixing’ 
(see Stoler 2002).
Within this history, the family emerged as a transit point for concerns 
about racial health, control and national/imperial inheritance (Cott 
2000). Here we can consider how not fitting into the normative intimacies 
of familial domesticity was enough to be cast as deviant or threatening 
(Alexander 2006). To be familial, that is to say following the path of 
heteronormative life and progress, was to be maintained as a moral 
and social good; against this, to be unfamilial was to be deemed abnormal, 
threatening and a risk (see Feder 2007; Taylor 2012). This played out 
differently within metropoles and across European colonies (as I will 
discuss in more detail below), where people could be deemed ‘sexualised 
threats’ (homosexuals, deviants, the diseased) or ‘racialised threats’ 
(colonised peoples, slaves, aliens) to family.
Race, family and empire
Working with a Foucauldian inspired account of the family can help 
us connect its historical emergence to questions of power, the expan-
sion of the liberal domesticating state and demarcations of familial/
unfamilial. This is important because we need to recognise how the 
institutionalisation of the family has been central to the management 
of populations, and with this life and death (also see Repo 2013). We 
should appreciate here how the will to domesticate, and the organ-
ised violence this often entails, is bound up with both the normative 
appeal of ‘family’ as the dominant unit of not only social reproduction 
but also intimacy (i.e. wider proximate and socio-sexual relations 
of ‘being together’). However, we cannot stop here. Not only is the 
conception and history of family that I have begun to tease out here 
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largely Eurocentric but it also relies on an underdeveloped formulation 
of race.
Stoler’s work, particularly The Education of Desire (1995), resituates 
Foucault’s account of the sexualisation and racialisation of the family 
within a more accurate imperial and colonial history. Against Foucault 
she shows how ideas around the bourgeois family crystallised and were 
intensified in colonial settings and how this circulated back into European 
metropoles (also see Stoler 2002, 2016). Intimacy was networked into 
colonial power and the management of intimacy, and with it the codifica-
tion of familial/unfamilial subjects, was played out in colonies as much 
as within Europe. Stoler (2002) shows how the management of the 
‘innermost’ was exemplified in colonies, for example in formal and 
informal rules over sexual partners, cohabitation and marriage laws, 
institutional practices which delineated the coloniser and colonised. 
Rather than viewing family as primarily linked to national concerns 
about population, the role of family is better understood in the context 
of imperial ideas about the future of white colonisers and the future of 
maintaining, settling and controlling empire.
Stoler’s work is wonderfully illustrative of elements of the imperial/
colonial coordinates of ‘family’. However, her work is primarily focused 
on expanding and nuancing Foucault’s account of sexuality and race, 
and with this she replicates some of the omissions found in his account 
of family. Whilst questions of intimacy are transferred to a colonial 
setting in Stoler’s account, race is still often reduced to sexuality. By 
this I mean that race is often about the threat to heterosexual reproduction 
and is framed in terms of racial (im)purity. For Foucault, race was about 
the distinction or ‘break’ between who could live and who could die 
within a population. And many scholars influenced by Foucault remain 
wedded to this rather narrow theorisation (including, I might also add, 
my own previous work). For example, in Foucault’s genealogies of race, 
‘internal’ racial threats (madness, the insane, diseased, deviants) often 
flatten out what he calls ‘external’ racial threats – those of foreigners 
and the colonised (McWhorter 2009; Venn 2009). In Foucault’s slightly 
reductive analysis of race as the ‘death function’, any form of abandonment 
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or reduction in the sustenance of life can be equated with racism (see 
Reid and Dillon 2009; Turner 2017; for a critique see Howell and 
Richter-Montpetit 2019). So, whilst acknowledging that phenomena 
such as the anxiety caused by eugenics around vitality and racial health 
was formative of colonial rule, I want to go further and argue that this 
does not fully get at the longer historical pattern of racial hierarchies, 
cultural imaginaries and embodied histories of violence that colonialism 
enacted and that ‘family’ is equally wrapped up in.
To put it more simply, we need to recognise the role that family 
played in empire as European and white. In order to get at this, I turn 
to other postcolonial, decolonial and black studies accounts of race and 
family to tease out how appeals to family, as a European construct, 
continue to form part of the processes of race-making, and with this 
tease out what is at stake in my assertion that Bertha Mason is made 
unfamilial.
The human and the familial
We are better able to grasp the power relations of modernity and 
domesticating power once we examine the manner through which 
racialisation as dehumanisation was made possible. Decolonial and black 
studies scholars have argued that we should examine who has historically 
been brought into the social calculus of ‘human life’ (Quijano 2007; 
Wilderson 2010; Weheliye 2014) – that is, the socio-political relations 
that have disciplined humanity into ‘full humans’, ‘not-quite-humans’ and 
‘non-humans’ (Weheliye 2014: 5). To understand how dehumanisation is 
constitutive of modernity, is to recognise that modernity – and with it, 
liberal state power, capital accumulation and humanism – rests on the 
active denial and dispossession of personhood for colonised peoples. 
Here colonised peoples’ ways of being in the world, systems of knowledge, 
spiritualism, bodies, cultures were rendered incomplete, worthless and 
absent by European colonial practice and ideology. Decolonial scholars 
such as Walter Mignolo (2011) point to the legacy of violent acquisition 
Bordering intimacy46
of territory and resources by Iberian states from the fifteenth century 
to elaborate on this – five hundred years of violence leaves its mark. 
European colonial science discovered ‘Man’ in the Enlightenment at 
the same time it discovered its partial and non-human others (Wynter 
2003). These processes relied upon and set in place racial distinctions 
that did not just view non-European peoples as subservient or as 
potential resources but also as eradicable and unworthy of subjectivity 
and personhood. They were denied a place in the family of ‘Man’ that 
grew out of humanist and enlightenment ideas of society and politics 
(Wynter 2003; Lorde 2007).
Ramon Grosfoguel et al. (2015), drawing upon Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos’s (2007) notion of the ‘abyssal line’, argue that race must 
be understood as the fundamental demarcation between human/not-
quite/non-human (although they leave out the middle category). Race 
was productive of particular spatial and temporal logics maintained 
by colonialism and its afterlife in coloniality and neo-imperialism. 
Not only were non-humans ‘discovered’ through European colonisa-
tion but they were presented (and remain presented) as lost and stuck 
in time – as backwards and undeveloped peoples and geographic 
zones (Fanon 1961). This is exemplified in the treatment of colonies, 
which are spaces of endless arrested development and zones of the 
‘non-human’.
Importantly for us, this spatial distinction between human/non-human 
worlds is complicated by mobility and bordering. When non-modern 
and once-colonised people move to the Global North, they remain 
treated as not-quite/non-humans as we see today. Borders (more of 
which below) continue to delineate and reproduce these distinctions 
within metropolitan spaces such as in policing tactics, housing policy 
and the creation of ghettos, camps and detention centres. Just as in 
formal colonies, the not-quite/non-human continues to be treated as 
undeveloped; once in the Global North non-humans are cast as those 
who ‘refuse’ to modernise because their culture and kinship practices 
‘hold them back’. The divide between human/not-quite/non-human is 
not about citizenship but about who has access to colonially conditioned 
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forms of modernity and humanity. As Grosfoguel et al. (2015: 647) 
argue:
The zones of being and non-being are not specific geographical places, 
but rather positions within racial power relations that operate at a global 
scale between centres and peripheries, but that are also manifested at a 
national and local scale against diverse racially ‘inferior’ groups. Zones 
of being and non-being exist at a global scale between Westernised centres 
and non-Western peripheries.
What then defines the racial demarcation between human/not-quite/
non-human is not geography to Fanon and to Grosfoguel and his col-
leagues, but instead a relationship to violence. Inferiorised populations, 
demarcated as non-human, can be subject to structural and arbitrary 
forms of violence as the norm. Think again of how this is justified in 
the case of Bertha: violence sticks to her body as it moves across the 
British Empire rather than being bound within the space of the colony.
Those people defined as human can be subject to violence, but this 
is rare and exceptional. This structure of violence is so normalised and 
pervasive that it is barely noticeable to those who occupy the position 
of the human. Whilst oppression does take place within zones of the 
human, this often takes the form of struggles over rights (e.g. the labour 
movement, gender equality, LGBTQ rights). In contrast, within spaces 
of the non-human (such as the colony, ghetto, plantation, detention 
centre, refugee camp) oppression more often than not is conducted 
through systematic and unaccountable violence (also see Mbembe 2003). 
We might consider here the experience of slavery or the genocide of 
indigenous peoples structured empire. For contemporary examples, we 
might instead ruminate on how colonial warfare conducted in the Middle 
East occurs without accounting for civilian deaths (Gregory 2004), or 
how refugees, rather than being ‘saved’, are left to flounder and drown 
in the Mediterranean on a daily basis as rich European countries and 
governments watch on (Saucier and Woods 2014).
To Frank Wilderson (2010) what underpins this violence and the 
hierarchies of the human is the defining experience of ‘anti-blackness’. 
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Chattel slavery, Wilderson argues, was the ultimate form of ‘social death’ 
(Patterson 1982), which denied Africans any access to humanity. 
Importantly, this continues to structure the experience and dispossession 
of people and communities racialised as black today. We should remember 
how ‘Africans went onto the ships and came out black’, argues Wilderson 
(2010: 38). What defines anti-black racism is the propensity for gratuitous 
violence and suffering, which structures the zone of the not-quite/
non-human. To Weheliye (2014), an analysis of anti-blackness tells us 
about the bodied character of colonial racism and who succumbs to 
normalised and unexceptional violence. This is because anti-blackness 
also structures all aspects of dispossession – it shapes who has access 
to humanity (those who are not-quite and non-humans).
Whilst Wilderson (2010: 38) is hesitant to show the contingency of 
this racialised violence, Grosfoguel et al. (2015) suggest that demarca-
tions between human/not-quite/non-human are relatively flexible 
and rely upon prior histories of racialisation and shifting relations of 
force. For instance, we could point to the flexibility of anti-Muslim 
racism that has intensified and expanded after 9/11. Or look at the 
treatment of Roma citizens throughout the EU who were never ‘colo-
nised’ formally but are frequently subject to racialised (and with this 
often gratuitous) violence. If whiteness is bound to the position of the 
human, blackness remains bound to the position of the non-human; 
people are racialised between these structural positions (see Mbembe  
2017: 4).
So, in examining the rise of domestication we need to stay attuned 
to how slavery and colonial dispossession continues to shape who has 
access to humanity and thus what drives distinctions between life and 
death, rights and violence. Equally, we need to historically situate where 
practices of government emerged from in the global-colonial order, in 
experiments of colonial rule, in the management of mobility, in appeals 
to intimacy that worked across metroimperial space and organised 
around the movement of inferiorised people. Domestication must be 
understood to work differently based upon historical and shifting racial 
markers of the human. This has implications for how we should approach 
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questions of the role of family and the production of ‘unfamilial’ subjects 
and populations.
Being attuned to the historical experiences of colonialism, imperialism 
and their contemporary manifestations helps us better understand the 
role of family in these ongoing processes. Arguably, the family plays 
a powerful and constitutive role in the racial markers and delineation 
around who is human/not-quite/non-human. Rather than a site where 
preconceived ideas about race are played out (i.e. as contagion through 
reproduction), ideas about family were hardened in colonial encoun-
ters. In turn, the family held together an unstable set of claims about 
who was civilised/uncivilised, modern/backwards, which rationalised 
and sometimes constituted the treatment of colonised people as not-
quite/non-human. To put this more simply, the emergent model of the 
European family, and with it, what McClintock (1995) calls the ‘cult of 
domesticity’, worked as a means of denying humanity to colonised popula-
tions. It was constitutive of racial power as much as it is a container of 
racist ideas.
In this next section I want to elaborate more on this point and bring 
us back to the question of Bertha as unfamilial. Below I sketch out how 
I see the relationship between family, race and colonialism, which is 
typified with three overlapping but distinct processes: 1) development: 
the equation of family with progress or development; 2) dispossession: 
the dispossession of colonised populations from structures of family/
inheritance/social and economic capital; and 3) control: the destruction 
of pre-colonial kinship structures and the imposition of European models 
of family as a mechanism of pacification and control.
Family as development
As I have previously set out, ‘family’ is bound not only to bourgeois 
heterosexuality, but European and white heteronormativity. The presence 
and conduct of socio-sexual, affective and kinship relations that appeared 
‘outside’ of this mode of domesticity have consistently been cast as 
incomplete, deviant or absent. Populations were judged on whether 
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Europeans considered them (in)capable of demonstrating or practising 
elements of this model of domesticity. This placed people and cultures 
within a hierarchy of developmentalism based on the codification of 
family/domesticity (Hoad 2000). Whilst deviant others were constantly 
discovered within Europe (i.e. the failure of working-class mothers or 
homosexuals), what structured this hierarchy was discovering whole 
populations that appeared bereft of ‘family life’ in non-European and 
colonised lands. This structured claims around who was to be domes-
ticated and how.
Goody (1990) shows how colonised peoples were categorised as more 
or less human through what she calls ‘marriage taxonomies’ (similar 
to Ferguson’s taxonomies of perversion), which compared ‘races’ by 
how they related to a template of Christian marriage. African tribal 
structures, for instance, were long considered incompatible with European 
marriage (thus colonial administrators developed the legal category of 
‘tribal’ or ‘custom’ marriage in much of West Africa); Indian castes were 
often differentiated through an apparent propensity for nuclear family 
relations (with Brahmins at the top). Alongside this, Eastern Islamic 
cultures were viewed as particularly deviant, with polygamy and incest 
thought to be rife.
Such categories were not merely abstract anthropological distinctions 
or examinations of ‘cultural difference’. Discovery of the apparent absence 
of ‘proper family life’ often propelled and justified colonial expansion 
and, with it, violence. In Sex and Conquest, Trexler (1995) shows how 
heteronormativity was at the heart of Spanish and Portuguese material 
conquest in the Americas. He argues that the apparent ‘sodomy of male 
homosexuality’ witnessed by colonialists ‘bestowed a right to conquer’ 
on the Iberians. Here, ‘Missionaries proclaimed to the Aztecs, Maya 
and the Incas that sodomy was their downfall and the myth of Christian 
God had decided to send the Iberians to conquer the Americas because 
they engaged in homosexual behaviour’ (Trexler 1995: 89). Such appeals 
to deviancy and perversity were performances around which appropria-
tion and violence became legitimated in colonial encounters. Equally, 
as Rifkin (2015) has illustrated, indigenous American kinship practices 
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were cast as proof of their existence in a ‘state of nature’ – polygamy, 
matrilineal, matrilocal residence and pre-marital sex were taken as signs 
of ‘absolute foreignness’ to European modernity (Cott 2000: 25). Greg 
Thomas (2007) makes a similar case for what he calls the sexual conquest 
of Africa.
Signs of family were equally taken as notes of progress and the 
possibility of redemption. James Mill (1817: 135) would justify the 
paternal British colonial project by alluding to the immorality of both 
Chinese and Indian peoples through the racial marker of dirt and their 
incapacity for domestic care and labour: they were, he argued, ‘both in 
the physical sense, disgustingly unclean in their persons and houses’. 
But in the building of the colonial state in India, signs of habitation, of 
domestic dwellings or ‘retarded’ family structures shaped how British 
colonialism was arranged around paternal logics of domestication and 
the spreading of capitalist social relations (Semple 2013) – that is, 
compared to the genocidal violence targeted at indigenous populations, 
or African slavery. Who was considered more or less familial marked 
out developmental distinctions between not-quite/non-humans, as well 
as with humans – such as the promotion of white European settlers 
across empire.
Family as dispossession
Family did not merely create hierarchies of development but also worked 
as a central aspect of the dispossession of colonised peoples. Perhaps 
the most notable example of how family emerged as an organising 
principle of dispossession is how the enslaved and slavery were rendered 
in relation to ideals of family life. In the constitution and legitimation 
of slavery, normative claims to family played a vital part of both the 
conversion of African bodies to chattel and the contestation of freedoms 
under settler colonialism (Burnham 1987). Not only did the violence 
of the Middle Passage and the orchestration of the slave trade in the 
West Indies, America and the ports of England destroy forms of kinship 
and intimacy but slaves were understood as being incapable of ‘family’ 
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and through such claims of immorality were subsequently written out 
of family law and its claims to ‘humanity’ (Dayan 2011).
Under settler colonialism in America, Burnham (1987) argues that 
courts declared slaves:
To be a different kind of human being – innately and immutably immoral 
(therefore not legally ‘marriageable’), too dumb and childish to themselves 
parent (therefore incapable of childrearing), and sexually licentious 
(therefore unsuited to ‘marriage’ and family bonds).
The day-to-day violence of the plantation was often structured around 
the mutual denial and management of intimacies – between slaves, 
freed slaves, white workers and plantation masters (Sharpe 2010). Whilst 
slave women were deemed sexual property and often suffered agonising 
forms of sexual violence, slave masters sought to promote restricted 
forms of ‘slave family’ but often only to complement the extractive 
system of labour, production and chattel (and satisfying Christian claims 
to the ‘proper treatment’ of slaves) (Hartman 1997). Ritualised slave 
‘marriage’ was viewed as having a ‘quieting effect on restive slaves’ 
(Burnham 1987) and could be economically profitable through the 
potential for reproduction. As slaves were written out of family law, 
they could never legally be parents or hold rights of family unity and 
so children were the property of the master. This system was shored 
up by settler colonial law, which identified slave ownership through 
the very organisation of patriarchal family. As Thomas Cobb argued in 
1858:
Southern slavery is a patriarchal, social system. The master is the head 
of his family. Next to wife and children, he cares for his slaves. He avenges 
their injuries, protects their persons, provides for their wants, and guides 
their labors. In return, he is revered and held as protector and master. 
(Quoted in Burnham 1987: 194)
‘Family life’ was legally and normatively coded through white bourgeois 
domesticity – as a ‘moral good’ only achievable to some. ‘Family’ was 
denied in the precise moment of black dehumanisation because it was 
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already etched around claims to whiteness and European superiority. 
To Hortense Spillers (1987), this means that ‘black family’ is not even 
thinkable within the dominant social calculus; it was rendered an 
impossibility. This has lasting consequences for how we theorise anti-black 
and colonial racism (with it gender and sexuality), because the historical 
formation of the family, which emerges as a naturalised social unit, is 
made possible through the dispossession and denial of affective relations 
and kinship to specific populations.
Family as control
Spillers’s point about the unthinkability of the ‘black family’ rests on 
the evisceration of markers of identity that Europeans used to organise 
social relations, such as gender and sexuality. Such markers of European 
personhood (being a ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘mother’ or ‘father’, etc.) were actively 
denied through colonial violence and slavery, which again is replicated 
and legitimated through colonial science and enlightenment thought 
(Shilliam 2014). To Maria Lugones (2011), colonialism (or what she 
calls coloniality) is both an evisceration of pre-colonial social and cultural 
structures and the hegemonic dominance of European forms of intimacy. 
By this we should consider how European ideas of personhood were 
used to describe colonised populations as both deviant and/or ‘incom-
plete’. For example, to Lugones, gender and sexuality were imposed on 
colonised people as forms of European ideology and social relations. 
To consider how family worked as a form of control, we should recognise 
that colonised people began to learn of, and perform, themselves as 
gendered and sexualised. But equally, because of race, this process of 
subjectification was always viewed as ‘incomplete’. It was cast as a deviant 
version of the European ideal type.
This reveals a double violence: pre-colonial socio-relations were and 
continue to be constituted as backwards and often violently destroyed 
or intervened in, just as European modes of social relations were/are 
imposed through legal codes, colonial administration and inclusion 
within imperial capitalist markets, production and labour relations. 
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Here a model of family could be used as a means to reveal the backwards 
nature and underdevelopment of societies but also as a means to force 
change on colonised populations imagined to be in need of emulating 
codes of domesticity.
Debates over how to domesticate colonial populations through forms 
of developmental violence thus faltered around this vision of heterosexual/
human progress. In parallel to this, colonial rule was often performed 
through acts of social engineering, such as we see with experiments in 
social work in colonies (working with some parallels to such interventions 
in metropoles). Marriage and domesticity schools provided one particular 
site in the ‘civilisation’ of underdeveloped societies (see, for example, 
Mair 1944). Here we can think of the family as relating to particular 
forms and practices of control.
These different aspects of the role that family played in the construction 
of colonial rule (development/dispossession/control) are significant 
because they reveal how the family is both a tool of government and 
a means of disciplining and delimiting access to humanity. Far from 
being an internal European process, dominant ideas of who was 
(un)familial emerged through and out of colonial encounters. In this 
way, family became a key aspect of racial thought.
Here we consider how the contemporary politics of the family, and 
with it, heteronormative codes of the ‘good life’ and ‘love’, remain bound 
to this history. The family is tied up with distributions of the human 
which are constantly recast in modern liberal government. The family 
is not only bound to modern rule through reproduction but as a cultural 
configuration which sustains and fosters claims of the human, and with 
it the centrality of whiteness. Just as decolonial and black studies 
scholarship demonstrates the continuity of anti-black and colonial racism 
into the current moment, we need to stay attuned to how this functions 
through appeals to the family. Family can work as an energising force 
of colonial rule into the present, precisely because it appears to work 
freely of its racialised and colonial past. In postcolonial societies that 
appear to disavow ‘racism’ as prejudice, such as Britain, family plays a 
significant role in the reinvention and persistence of modes of colonial 
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dispossession. Family is naturalised as love, care, comfort and thus 
hides its relationship to past or present violence.
We might turn back to the figure of Bertha Mason, confined to 
Rochester’s attic, to think through how family works here. Rather than 
as untamed or mad, it is how Bertha is translated in terms of colonial 
blackness that define her condition and legitimise the suffering she 
is subject to. This reveals how anti-black racism was anchored across 
metroimperial space, tied as this was to depictions of evil, corruption 
and otherworldly deviancy. Bertha, like the swathes of darker-skinned 
people she is connected to in the colonies and plantations of Jamaica, 
is precisely without God, beyond the terms of the human. Even if she 
is ‘privileged’ in Jamaica (as not-quite-human), she is transformed into 
non-human on her arrival in the metropole, where she is darkened 
and presented as a danger. This dehumanisation is organised around 
biological depictions of darkness which constantly focus on her body 
and sensuality, against that of the reasoned and objective characters of 
her white ‘superiors’.
However, the racialisation of Bertha is bound to the family home. 
She is corrupting the white domestic space that Victorian England 
fetishised. She is already viewed as bereft of family because of her kinship 
connections to Jamaica, which are cast as not properly domestic but 
merely a bloodline of toxicity and degeneracy. We might remember, for 
instance, Rochester’s declaration that Bertha’s family was ‘three genera-
tions of idiots and maniacs’. Her mother is presented as a ‘drunkard’. 
Rochester eventually declares to his peers that he should be allowed to 
‘seek sympathy with something at least human’ (Bronte [1846] 1992: 
246). As with Burnham’s and Spillers’s examples of black slaves above, 
Bertha is depicted as incapable of proper familial intimacy. To this end, 
Foucauldian accounts of family can only give us part of Bertha’s story. 
They can only help us explain her death as surplus to the reproduction 
of English society – that is, as a figure of ‘abnormality’ or ‘contagion’. 
This fails to explain how her body and subjectivity is already rendered 
impossible and killable through her connection to colonial racism, 
the suffering of slavery and her incapability of European patriarchal 
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intimacy and family life. Instead, it is important to understand how 
she has already been racialised through these prior attachments as 
not-quite-human.
Borders and bordering
In considering how domestication functions, it is also important to 
explore the role that borders and bordering played in this form of 
government and in colonial expansion. One of the key provocations I 
began with is that Bertha is ‘bordered’; she is subject to bordering such 
as being locked in the attic and contained by the patriarchal and racialised 
governance of the household. In this last section I want to linger on 
the relationship to borders/bordering and the part that they have played 
in colonial rule, family and race-making. This helps us tease out a 
particular way of approaching borders/bordering in the book, but it 
also helps us situate both the changing nature of colonial rule in our 
current moment and the spatial complexity of colonialism – that is, 
the intimate connections of colony and metropole, which are central 
to the analysis of contemporary postcolonial Britain. I thus ask, what 
does it mean to say that Bertha is subject to borders/bordering?
Bronte illustrates how Bertha is confined to the attic through physical 
barriers. And yet her enclosure works in parallel with other forms of 
bordering that target her body, that tie her to the domestic space of 
Rochester’s household and that also facilitate particular forms of move-
ment which are paralleled across metroimperial space. We are introduced 
to a catalogue of techniques and practices of bordering. Bertha cannot 
move as a free subject; she is bound to the rule of her husband, who 
is her warden. Here, symbolically, but as I have argued above also 
materially, Bertha is bound (unevenly) to the plantation slavery of 
Jamaica, a mode of dispossession and accumulation which was structured 
around enclosure, confinement but also the facilitation of movement 
(the Middle Passage, chain gangs, the enclosure of the plantation) (Browne 
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2015). Mobility and violence are intimately entangled here. Whilst Bertha 
could only move to England from Jamaica as the wife of Rochester, 
equally her only way to escape the confines of the household, her mar-
riage, England, is through her self-immolation.
This helps us think about what borders are and where they go. Borders 
work as physical barriers and enclosures. Borders work through and 
on the body, capturing, producing, differentiating people as ‘out of 
place’, ‘strange’, ‘uncanny’. Borders work as the dispossession of rights, 
subjectivity and personhood. Borders work through the socio-sexual 
relations of the intimate ‘couple’, where (im)mobility is made possible 
and restrained though the family. Borders work in multiple scales that 
rely upon and foster different sites of social authority – the settler state, 
colonial law, immigration practice, citizenship, the household. Borders 
do not only work to capture but also to facilitate moving bodies.
Reading Bertha in this way contributes to disrupting the idea of 
borders as fixed territorial entities, tied to the policing of immigration 
and sovereign national territory. Here we can consider how borders 
follow and surveil bodies as part of the domesticating state. However, 
despite a complex and highly developed conception of the border, studies 
of borders, both from within migration studies and even from critical 
border studies, still broadly remain fixated on the evolving and con-
temporary nature of borders – and in doing so deny their colonial 
histories and orientations.
Whilst the ‘line-in-the-sand’ definition of borders has long been 
disputed and transformed, borders are still largely equated with state 
sovereignty, the nation state and practices of immigration (Parker and 
Vaughan-Williams 2009). This work is often necessary because of the 
dramatic shift in the reach and complexity of sovereign borders in 
northern states, for instance the extra-territorial character of EU borders 
(Tazzioli 2014; Vaughan-Williams 2015; Burridge et al. 2017); or the 
outsourcing of border control to private companies (Walters 2016); or 
the means through which immigration practice has proliferated within 
and across social government agencies in states such as the UK under 
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polices such as the hostile environment (Yuval-Davis et al. 2018; also 
see Bigo 2006). These all deserve analytical and theoretical attention. 
Whilst I want to pay attention to contemporary shifts in immigration 
policy, I also want to treat borders/bordering as part of a longer and 
evolving process of imperial governance and domestication.
Imperial rule – that is to say the management of empire – and 
individual colonial administrations were both fixated on mobility long 
before the invention of immigration law (which we can date to the late 
nineteenth century in white settler states, and the early twentieth century 
in Britain; see Ballantyne 2005). Mobility, we should remember, was 
an important component of domestication. Bordering shaped primitive 
accumulation and was central to acquisition of territory (Gidwani and 
Reddy 2011). Following Simone Browne (2015), we need to recognise 
how the structure of slavery produced lasting experiments in racial 
surveillance, containment and expulsion, for example in detailed 
identity documentation, insurance policies and incarceration. Lest 
we forget that the mass movement of African people to the Americas 
through slavery represents the greatest forced migration in human 
history.
These practices to regulate movement under empire not only predate 
but condition the regulation of movement today. This means recognising 
two overlapping points:
1) The management of movement evolved out of the concerns of 
hierarchising and mapping people based on racial categories (whether 
‘useful’, ‘valued’ or ‘dangerous’ movement). So, there has been an 
imperial and colonial logic and orientation which has underpinned 
bordering/borders – that is to say who can or cannot move. We 
might call this the ideological dimension of bordering.
2) As well as a historic and ideological orientation towards managing 
what Lake and Reynolds (2008, referencing W. E. B. Du Bois) 
call the ‘global colour line’, bordering practices themselves were 
honed under colonialism – that is, the techniques and strategies 
of managing, categorising and regulating who could move and 
Domestication 59
who could not – and were often born out of the direct control 
of colonised people (i.e. indentured labourers, slaves, colonial 
criminals). Even when practices such as vagrancy laws were used 
in the metropole, they were often experimented with and refined in 
colonies. We might call this the practical dimension of bordering. 
In the context of the British Empire, many of the strategies and 
practices that would become UK immigration policy and the role of 
border agents/agencies were already honed in (settler) colonies before 
being transferred back into the metropole (more of this in the next 
chapter).
Here I want to further elaborate on the conceptual distinction I 
introduced earlier between borders and bordering, which I use in tension 
throughout the book. This is to both recognise the longue durée of 
colonial history of the management of movement and also the contem-
porary power of immigration practices and law. When I speak of borders, 
I refer to practices which have a specific connection to immigration 
policy – that is to say the sovereign law of a particular state with regard 
to migration, settlement and citizenship. When I speak of bordering, 
I refer to the broader process through which people are made ‘out of 
place’. This is attuned to how bordering was and is constitutive of the 
broader push to domesticate through colonisation and draw distinctions 
around people who are familial/unfamilial. Bordering is concerned with 
the broader means through which movement has been managed and 
hierarchised through racial categories – human/not-quite/non-human. 
Borders, to my mind, are a specific subset of bordering which rework, 
integrate and re-energise bordering strategies.
This distinction is of course contingent, and bordering practices can 
often become border practices, and vice versa. For example, we might 
consider how housing policy in the UK has long been an area for the 
governance of racialised populations. Not only are black, Asian and 
migrant communities often denied social housing, they are also confined, 
through intersecting inequalities, to certain parts of urban spaces (such 
as the top floors of high-rise apartment buildings; see Danewid 2019). 
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In the Immigration Act 2014, housing law was joined more forcefully 
to immigration law as it obliged all housing providers and landlords 
to check the immigration status of their tenants. Here bordering (the 
spatial governance of racialised populations) becomes institutionalised 
in the border – that is to say immigration control. Bordering begets 
borders.
By linking borders/bordering to the duress of colonial rule, it is 
important to recognise that borders and bordering do not affect all 
people equally. Borders emerged around the management of racialised 
mobility, not mobility of people per se. Here categories of citizenship 
and the division between migrant and citizen are not particularly helpful 
(although I use these distinctions empirically). Whilst many migrants 
(i.e. non-citizens) are regarded as unproblematic and ‘valued’, many 
subjects with citizenship remain a continual problem – they remain 
‘unfamilial’ and not of ‘value’ (more of this in chapters 3 and 5). In 
Britain, long-standing black and Asian communities and postcolonial 
diaspora remain viewed (and often treated by the state) as migrants, 
even though they have formal citizenship and have been settled for 
generations (more of this in chapter 4). Their relationship to the state 
refracts many of the violent tactics of bordering that we see experi-
mented with on migrant groups such as asylum seekers or irregularised 
migrants.
What is important here is how bordering is attuned towards making 
people ‘out of place’ in ways that reassert colonial categories of the 
not-quite/non-human, including distinctions about how they do family 
or how much they have progressed towards familial domesticity. This 
racialisation can target those who move as subjects of empire – from 
former British colonies such as Jamaica, Nigeria, Pakistan – but also 
people who move from peripheral spaces (not only former British 
colonies) and who are treated akin to subjects of empire (e.g. those 
from Turkey, Algeria or Central Asian republics) (see Grosfoguel et al. 
2015). Whilst borders/bordering may affect other populations (i.e. 
predominantly white migrants or citizens), those populations are rarely 
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the initial target of these practices even if they are pulled into the dragnet 
of domestication.
Bordering the family
So, finally, what of the relationship between bordering and family? I 
have teased out some subtle connections above but there are some 
concrete ties that are worth demonstrating briefly. Put simply, bordering 
and borders work to both discover and regulate those who become 
deemed unfamilial. But they also work towards promoting and fostering 
family. I noted before how the bordering of Bertha Mason tells us of 
both the embodied dimension of bordering – how it is felt, experienced 
and targeted on bodies – and also how this is energised by claims to 
protect or foster family where it is absent. Equally, the claim to hetero-
sexual intimacy and marriage that initially binds Bertha to Rochester 
allows a certain limited form of movement from Jamaica to England. 
This is important.
As I explore throughout the rest of this book, bordering can work 
to protect and foster but also delimit affective relations and family. 
Bertha, we should remember, is bordered into the attic as a threat to 
the family (the wild, untamed element within). Bordering regulates 
population health, filtering and managing those who may be threatening. 
This could be through anxiety over what particular bodies are understood 
to carry and bring with them when they enter or move across a territory 
– disease, criminality, immorality or, equally, labour power, resources 
and skills. Bordering can be targeted to manage who can be intimate 
with whom in a particular (imperial, colonial and then national) space. 
We can find this, for example, in rules on ‘family migration’, which 
dictate which forms of intimacy, kinships or dependencies can move 
for family life (see chapter 3).
So, bordering can be initiated in the name of family – for its production 
or protection – but family can be promoted both to make possible and 
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to curb movement. Borders/bordering can emerge as a way of capturing 
and containing the perils of other modes of sexuality and intimacy, for 
example in promoting certain family dependencies to domesticate and 
contain the sexual threat of groups. In the context of the movement of 
people after formal decolonisation, who was counted as family often 
dictated and continues to shape inheritance of rights and who can 
move, who can settle and who can claim rights in Britain. As citizenship 
is often inherited (such a model has dominated in the UK since 1981), 
who is considered a family, through appropriate relations of intimacy, 
is guided by histories of racialised sexuality. But this is not only symbolic. 
It also works to structure people’s material life chances – their access 
to resources, capital and labour power – by organising who can inherit 
what, who can gain rights of settlement. Who can be a family is one 
key site through which inequality is reproduced.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have set out a particular approach to family and borders 
through an exploration of domestication. By drawing on theories of 
domesticity I have demonstrated how the modern state is a domesticating 
state and that domesticity played a central role in empire-making. Using 
different readings of the treatment of Bertha Mason in Jane Eyre I 
sketched out how domestication is constantly energised by a historical 
appeal to family. ‘Family’ was not only gendered and sexualised, I argue, 
but was a central force in patterns of racialisation across European 
empires. This means understanding how family played into the constitu-
tion of some people as modern and civilised (human) and others as 
uncivilised and backwards (thus not-quite/non-human). It is my 
provocation that such appeals to family remain central to racialised 
governance today, often expressed in forms of bordering within post-
colonial societies such as Britain. Appeals to family recode and remake 
racialised distinctions born out of colonial rule, and in doing so energise 
often-violent practices of authoritarian and disciplinary borders and 
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bordering. I offer that ‘family’, as a site of racial and heteronormative 
power, continues to work as a means of development, dispossession 
and control into our contemporary moment.
Departing from the example of Bertha Mason that I drew upon 
throughout this chapter, I now look to evidence the role of family in 
colonial rule and bordering across the British Empire. In the next chapter, 
I examine a more detailed history of these relationships across metro-
imperial space. I look to evidence and nuance my claims about the 
historical role of family and race-making, and how this was central to 
the governance of mobility across the Empire and was then brought 
into immigration practice and policy in the British metropole.
On 19 April 1899 a troupe of South African ‘tribal’ groups landed at 
Southampton docks on the South Coast of England. Later that month 
they were due to perform a central role in the Earl’s Court exhibition 
Savage South Africa. Local reports claimed that ‘among the effects were 
over 200 natives of South African tribes, a number of Boer families, 
representatives of the mounted police, and a number of animals’ 
(Shephard 1986: 97). Early film footage, archived by the Colonial Film 
Project, shows the apparent moment when the groups disembarked. 
One reel shows a group of ‘Zulu’ men, clad in ‘tribal dress’ and clutching 
spears, performing a choreographed dance for the camera and bystanders 
(Colonial Film Project 2018). The film shows the group striking an 
imposing presence, with the merchant docks foggy in the background. 
Thirty seconds into the reel, a white man in a top hat and dark overcoat 
stumbles into the frame, stares at the troupe and then leads some of 
the men further forward towards the camera.
This moment captures a significant imperial encounter. It represents 
the overlapping of colonial technologies – the camera lens, the white 
man’s instruction, the coherence of the performance – all situated within 
the wider context of the imperial exhibition (see chapter 7 for more on 
this, and also Mitchell 2000: 7–13). The arrival of Savage South Africa 
in London tells us how empire was constantly remade not only in 
‘overseas’ colonies but also in encounters within the urban metropole. 
London is constituted here as part of ‘imperial terrain’ (Burton 1998: 
5) – the site of rebounding and contingent colonising processes (Lowe 
2015). The event also stands as a particular encounter in the racialised 
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and sexualised logics of colonialism. It stands, I argue, as an example 
of the way that mobility, intimacy and claims to family played a central 
role in both energising and organising colonial rule.
After the opening of the exhibit, newspaper stories circulated regarding 
the effect of the presence of the ‘savages’ in London. Exoticised and 
eroticised accounts of ‘savage’ behaviour spread as far as the Los Angeles-
based Pall Mall paper. White women, it was said, were seen disappearing 
into the tribal tents which constituted the ‘Kaffir kraal’ section of the 
exhibition to partake in the ‘vilest orgies’. The Daily Mail described how 
‘women of gentle birth, crowd round the near-naked blacks, give them 
money, shake hands with them, and even go down on their hands and 
knees in order that they may further investigate the interior of the 
overcrowded huts’ (quoted in Shephard 1986: 101).
Alongside familiar representations of hypersexualised black masculin-
ity (or the ‘black peril’), complaints were raised in South Africa on 
‘racial grounds’ (Colonial Film Project 2018) that these ‘well-policed 
natives’ posed a significant threat. This was framed as a threat not only 
to British society but also imperial rule more broadly. The South African 
press feared that ‘nothing but vice in a white skin would satisfy [the 
‘savages’] thereafter’ (Shephard 1986: 97). The exhibition threatened to 
trouble the sexual demarcations of the ‘colour line’. By August 1899 the 
‘Kaffir kraal’ was officially closed to women.
Whilst the press initially raised concerns over interracial sex and 
the spectre of the ‘black peril’ (which I return to below), focus began 
to fall on the coupling and engagement of ‘Prince’ Lobengula of Mata-
beleland, with a local white woman, Miss Florence ‘Kitty’ Jewel. The 
couple had met in 1898 in Bloemfontein, South Africa, and continued 
their romance on Lobengula’s arrival in London with the exhibition. 
The Galveston Daily News concluded the grave news that ‘this little 
band of savages has brought home to the English people for the first 
time the seriousness of mixed marriages’ (Colonial Film Project 2018). 
The prospected marriage revealed broader concerns about ‘miscegenation’, 
which the Spectator argued ‘has long been regarded by the Anglo-Saxon 
race as a curse against civilisation’ (quoted in Shepard 1986: 101).
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Stoler (2002) reminds us how managing intimacy was central to the 
power relations of empire. Appropriate behaviours, sexual conduct, 
proximity and touching all worked as sites of struggle over race, gender, 
class. As developed in the case of the ‘savages’ of South Africa, orientalist 
imaginaries of feverish sexuality, immorality and virility conditioned 
both the racialisation of colonised men but also the parameters over 
the acceptable conduct of white women. We can read the crisis sur-
rounding the exhibition as a constellation of fears over miscegenation 
and racialised ‘others’ penetrating the white (national) body (Yuval-Davis 
1997). But this misses out on the complex ways that claims to family 
were already bound to the architecture of imperialism and with it the 
regulation of movement.
It is important to recognise how the fear of interracial intimacy 
described here was specifically translated into familial and imperial 
terms. What worried commentators more than interracial sex per se 
was the promise of interracial marriage proposed by ‘Prince’ Lobengula 
and Miss Jewell. Such a union was viewed as ‘degrading’ the moral and 
racial claim to white superiority, as well as practices of inheritance and 
patriarchal rule that structured empire. It equally focused on the impos-
sibility of non-European family and the deviancy of uncivilised kinship 
practices. The press worried what would happen to Miss Jewell if she 
wed with this ‘dusky savage’ (Shepard 1986: 99). Lobengula and Jewell’s 
marriage was not so much presented here as a threat to national integrity 
as to white colonial power – a power that was ‘dissipated by daily familiar 
intercourses at Earl’s Court’ (Shepard 1986: 101). The fear was that if 
such unions were given the blessing of the church and state in the 
metropole, this promised to weaken the racialised-sexualised power of 
colonial administration, and weaken violent practices that apparently 
held native passions at bay all over the British Empire.
In this context, we need to consider how the arrival of ‘savages’ in 
London was constituted as a problem of movement across empire – how 
the movement of certain racialised bodies to the metropole challenged 
apparently stabilised hierarchies arranged around the (white) family. 
The closing of the exhibition to women thus became a key governmental 
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move to stabilise fluid boundaries and reimpose a dominant set of ideas 
around racial intimacy, as did attempts by the management of the 
exhibition, the local vicar and the Chancellor of the Diocese of London 
to stop Lobengula and Jewell’s wedding. These strategies acted to contain 
threatening mobility, bodies and intimacy. They were thus acts of border-
ing. To recognise this is to begin to flesh out how ‘family’ energised 
forms of imperial rule, including the regulation of movement.
Making empire
This brief detour through the Savage South Africa affair introduces 
several themes explored in this chapter, which examines how ‘family’ 
and ‘borders’ were entangled and made across the British Empire. Whilst 
intersecting analyses of race, sexuality and gender which focus on 
‘perversity’ or ‘feminisation’ are useful tools for critiquing how colonialism 
was arranged through intimacy, I want to stress how heteronormative 
family was central to empire-making across metroimperial space 
(Mendoza 2016). As I outline above, it is the family that energises the 
spectacle of Savage South Africa – the fear of coupledom, reproduction 
and domesticity. Bearing in mind the relationship between family, 
domestication and borders I sketched out in the last chapter, I turn in 
this chapter in more detail to the political work family performed in 
British imperial and colonial projects (and then into the present). I 
examine how family worked and still works to energise colonial domes-
ticating power, in terms of making decisions over what bodies and 
populations are protected, fostered and sustained, and who is abandoned, 
who is deemed dangerous and who can be stamped out.
Central to questions of life and death under colonial rule were 
questions of mobility. Sustaining and expanding the British Empire 
relied on the emergence of borders as a way of managing racialised 
populations, extracting profit and labour, and with this, forms of socio-
sexual relations, intimacy and kinship. This was not only about controlling 
movement but at some moments enforcing movement, at other times 
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facilitating sedentarism and the active promotion of heterosexual, 
single-household bourgeois domesticity as the template of ‘civilisation’ 
(Rifkin 2015). I extend the argument in this chapter, that ‘family’ was 
not only useful as an ideological tool of moral and civilisational judgement 
(which it was) but also a technology which shaped who could move 
where, with who and under what conditions.
Drawing on the position I briefly introduced with the example of 
Savage South Africa, I make a further contribution to debates on borders. 
I propose, against so much of the common sense in migration studies, 
that bordering practices are imperial in orientation, not national (also 
see Lake and Reynolds 2008; Bhambra 2017b). Bordering, I argue, 
emerged not to manage national populations but to manage imperial 
movement (see El-Enany 2020). Or, to be more specific, it was racialised 
mobility that was of concern to modern states (Mongia 2018). Disparate 
bordering practices increased in scale from the eighteenth century to 
regulate colonised populations who needed to be moved, resettled and 
enclosed in line with the evolving logic and needs of imperial racialised 
capitalism, and a dominant liberal heteropatriarchal order which fet-
ishised the European nuclear family. What I propose in this chapter is 
that the birth of what we come to call immigration law in Britain was 
already conceived through both an imperial vision of the world and by 
drawing upon key practices of colonial rule – that is, the practical tools, 
strategies and knowledge of racialised governance. Immigration law is 
the institutionalisation of older forms of bordering and the innovation 
and expansion of borders by postcolonial states. It has thus become a 
key site through which colonial mandated ideas of family are resuscitated 
and reimagined. This chapter thus sets the scene for the more contem-
porary analysis that follows it.1
The chapter is split into three parts. Off the back of the Savage South 
Africa case, the first section traces the way that ‘family’ functioned 
across different sites of the British Empire: from a means of distributing 
racial bloodline and inheritance, to the organisation of violent suppres-
sion, to the management of movement. This explores how slavery was 
organised around the absence of family and how black communities 
Making love, making empire 69
were equally seen as a threat to the white imperial order in the mid-
nineteenth century, particularly with the Morant Bay revolution in 
Jamaica. I take up the emergence of bordering practices here and suggest 
that regulating the movement of indentured labourers after the abolition 
of slavery became a prime concern of British authorities and settler 
states alike. This ultimately led to the innovation of bordering and 
nascent forms of immigration control in the late 1900s.
The second section of the chapter focuses on the developmental 
promise of ‘marriage’ and ‘family’. Anthropology was central in drawing 
up global ‘family taxonomies’ which hierarchised colonised populations 
based on kinship structures and ideas of perversions. As well as showing 
how colonial states ‘developed’ populations through the family, I reveal 
how ideas around what or who could be family became increasingly 
important in emergent immigration regimes in white settler states.
The final section brings the discussion full circle by showing how 
imperial bordering circulated through the metropole. This explores the 
emergence of British immigration law, which I demonstrate was born out 
of the push to manage racialised mobility, orientated as this was around 
the colour line of empire. Whilst bordering practices were developed to 
protect and sustain the white (or in British imperial language, ‘Anglo-
Saxon’) family, they were also experimented with to surveil the intimate 
relations of citizens of colour. I end by considering the significance of 
the British Nationality Act 1981, which ended the imperial definition 
of British citizenship and bound it to bloodline and kinship.
Blood, inheritance and the family
If the incident of imperial intimacies I began this chapter with raises 
the question of inheritance and bloodline in relation to British imperial 
rule, then this is only because this was key to how racial order was 
constituted across the Empire (Neti 2014). As Robbie Shilliam (2018) 
has demonstrated, British common law (from the sixteenth century) 
was organised around patriarchal descent. However, commercial law 
Bordering intimacy70
dominated in colonies. Whilst colonised people were seen as anthro-
pologically bereft of proper family relations, they were equally denied 
methods of inheritance that were key to legal authority in Britain and 
the reproduction of social relations. Slaves were denied the right to 
family law across the British Empire – throughout American colonies, 
the West Indies and then under American settler colonialism after 
independence (Patterson 1982: 56–57). As Burnham (1987) argues, 
under the extensive plantation system that emerged in the eighteenth 
century, slaves could reproduce but could never be parents in the legally 
recognised sense. Instead, slaves were rendered commercial property 
and inherited slave status through their mother (i.e. the mother’s master 
owned her children). Here slavery functioned as an inherited commercial 
bloodline rather than as a unit of kinship.
Tellingly, from the late eighteenth century, abolitionist critiques of 
slavery focused on how commercial law and slavery denied patriarchy 
lineage and posed an ‘internal’ danger to British moral authority and 
the ‘family of man’ that liberal empire was supposed to cultivate (Shilliam 
2018: 35). To abolitionists such as William Burke, slavery was not 
necessarily dehumanising or racist. It instead threatened the proper 
gendered and sexualised relations of Christian marriage, family and 
patrilineal inheritance that were so central to British order (Shilliam 
2018: 17). The promise of abolition in 1834 rested on the idea that 
newly freed slaves could be contained and governed by European codes 
of domesticity and labour in order to rid themselves of the essence of 
slavery (a point I return to below).
If bloodline organised the structure of chattel slavery and the dehu-
manisation of enslaved Africans (cutting them out of family law and 
the possibility of kinship), filial blood also arranged ideas of ‘racial 
types’ under British law. Satnam Virdee (2019: 12) describes this legal 
evacuation of black subjects from family as central to the early founda-
tions of racial categorisation in American colonies from 1607. Not only 
were slaves and black subjects defined by descent but colonial law 
punished ‘fornications’ between slaves, black labourers and white 
colonialists, with the heaviest measures targeted at relations between 
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white women and men of African descent (Virdee 2019: 12). As Colin 
Dayan (2011) demonstrates, being categorised closer to ‘white’ or ‘black’ 
was done on parental genealogy (a template that would be copied and 
refined in white supremacist regimes from the American South to South 
Africa). The transmission of ‘black blood’ was viewed as a ‘stain’ (Dayan 
2011: 49). In turn, this decided whether a subject could be born into 
slavery or could inherit ‘freedom’. Under West Indian law, for example, 
being classed as only having one-eighth ‘black blood’ made someone 
legally white and thus ‘free’ (Dayan 2011: 52). Just as subjects were born 
into slavery, the children of mixed unions (often free or white men and 
slave women) could inherit freedom from their father. In fact, the 
transmission of freedom grew so worrying that in the late eighteenth 
century in Jamaica, laws were brought in restricting ‘mixed’ or ‘coloured’ 
children from inheriting wealth (Patterson 1982: 146). Under imperial 
hierarchies of ‘humanity’, personhood was thus gained or eviscerated 
through a patriarchal connection to whiteness.
If imperial law shaped both who could be a family and in turn who 
could be fully human, this worked in relation to how imperial subjects 
were recognised as familial. Whilst populations within all British ter-
ritories were conceived of as ‘subjects of the Crown’ this obscured how 
personhood was stratified in relation to whiteness, with black slaves at 
the bottom of this hierarchy. After the Indian War of Independence in 
1857, colonial projects were increasingly conceived in terms of the 
protection and sustenance of an ‘Anglo-Saxon family’ (Metcalfe 1998; 
Shilliam 2018: 35–36). The task of colonial power in this period was 
directed at fostering this family through often-violent forms of capital 
accumulation and authoritarian government. This intensified already 
violent racial demarcations around a more explicit protection and 
fostering of capital interests in colonies and in further linking the 
metropole with white settler interests.
‘Family’ here functioned as more than a metaphor; it was an integral 
aspect of empire-making. Threats to family order could shape and justify 
how populations were governed. In 1865, black communities in Morant 
Bay, Jamaica, began an anti-colonial insurrection against the colonial 
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settler authorities and local elites. The violent suppression of the revolu-
tion was later used to debate both liberal and conservative ideologies of 
empire in Britain (Hall 2002), but it equally revealed the stark realities 
of colonial-racial hierarchies and violence. In a letter to Edward Eyre 
(the governor of the colony), Major General Jackson (1865) outlined 
the visceral disgust he felt when witnessing ‘black labourers’ harassing a 
‘White Lady’ during the uprising. Such a moral outcry, which replicated 
ideas of the sexualised ‘black peril’, was central to Jackson’s justification 
for the extension of martial law and bloody repression over parts of the 
colony. It was ‘extremely regrettable that the opportunity was not seized 
to set an example … with a severe flogging’, he argued (Jackson 1865).
The suppression of the Morant Bay insurrection by Eyre and his 
generals would become synonymous with the most violent excesses of 
colonial violence. Eyre attempted to justify the suspension of the law, 
the deployment of troops and the systematic murder of hundreds of 
black men and women and the burning of their homes as being necessary 
to save ‘decency’ and ‘Anglo-Saxon’ ‘democratic rule’ (also see Hall 
2002). Eyre (1865) argued to the House of Assembly a week after Jackson’s 
letter that the ‘peasantry of Jamaica have nothing to complain of ’; 
‘rebellion, arson, murder’ were merely the products of an ‘ignorant, 
uncivilised, excitable population’ easily persuaded by ‘anti-English 
rhetoric’. As demonstrated by these connections, intimate domestic order 
and the white woman’s body were used to configure the dangers of 
black rebellion and ‘mob rule’ (Head 2017). Whilst ‘family’ provided 
an organising principle for categories of humanity and personhood, 
colonial power was also orientated towards acts of violent domestication 
and dehumanisation in order to protect the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ family (in 
Jackson’s case embodied by the lone white woman).
Borders and mobility
One of the key features of Eyre’s violent domestication of revolutionaries 
in Jamaica was the curbing of mobility of black communities who were 
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rendered a permanent risk to white settlers under martial law (Hussain 
1999; Head 2017). However, such ‘emergency’ tactics were hardly 
exceptional and instead indicative of a more long-standing push to 
regulate movement by colonial states, plantation owners and private 
companies alike. As I began describing in the last chapter, managing 
settler and colonial projects across the British Empire was constantly 
bound to the need to manage movement. The increasing capitalisation 
and centralisation of the English state in the seventeenth century was 
built on practices of enclosure and the promotion and restriction of 
(im)proper movement (Federici 2004; Papadopoulos et al. 2008). Equally, 
experiments to domesticate colonised populations relied heavily on 
experiments in bordering. Key to strategies of accumulation and the 
reproduction of labour across the British Empire was the push to discover 
and categorise disorderly movement – those ‘out of place’ and ‘worthless’. 
As colonies were more tightly networked into the imperial economy, 
this bordering worked to the particular demands of racialised capitalism, 
which demanded often contradictory processes of settlement, contain-
ment and identification. As we shall see, this provided a continued site 
for ideas of inheritance and family to be sustained and reimagined.
Radhika Singha (2000) argues that the East India Company consoli-
dated control over India in the eighteenth century primarily through 
the regulation of movement. This process necessitated experimentation 
in colonial government and the birth of many modern policing and 
border methods. The emergent colonial state began to intensify forms 
of sedentarism with the hope of controlling forms of ‘risky’ movement 
across the Indian subcontinent (see Sleeman 1839 as a key architect of 
this). Here pilgrim throngs, hunting bands, daciots and ‘bandits’, itinerant 
communities who travelled without sufficient scrutiny such as religious 
mendicants, prostitutes and slave traders, increasingly became subject 
to experiments in enclosure, containment and monitoring (also see 
Legg 2007). As Singha (2000: 152) highlights, administrators were 
particularly anxious about the apparent absence of visible social hier-
archies and ‘verified social antecedents’ which allowed colonial subjects 
to ‘conceal or misrepresent their true identity’ whilst they moved. 
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Authorities went to great lengths to capture moving bodies through 
innovations in policing tactics and the formation of modes of identity 
capture, categorisation and visual techniques. Browne (2015) argues 
that the formative modes of identity capture which were initially 
experimented with in plantation economies – slave ledgers and ‘wanted’ 
posters for escaped slaves – provided powerful forms of racial control 
and forms of proto-visual surveillance (see chapter 6 for more on this). 
We can see how emergent bordering practices such as these relied on 
producing stabilised identities that could be categorised, inscribed and 
made seemingly ‘permanent’, for example by physically marking risky 
bodies with tattoos, branding or finding ‘unique’ markers such as fin-
gerprints, signatures and eventually DNA testing. This push to inscribe 
identity both on bodies and through the categorisation of mobility 
underpinned the development of passport technology (see Mongia 1999, 
or for a different account Torpey 2009).
Managing indentured labour
Bordering worked at key nodal points across both colonies and the 
metropole to allow some people to move freely and to restrain others 
(Mongia 2018: 56–85). The control of mobility was networked through 
the trade and movement of first slaves, then after abolition, indentured 
labour and convicts.2 Bordering practices emerged in the context of a 
variety of spaces, from cotton production in the West Indies and the 
spice plantations of South India, to English industrial cities and Australian 
penal colonies. Port inspections, medical examinations, censuses and 
enclosures during pilgrimages all sought to regulate movement around 
the dictates of the evolving forms of imperial capitalism and the promo-
tion of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ family. Whilst all subjects of the Crown were 
technically entitled to move across the British Empire, these flows were 
managed in line with anxiety around the permanent settlement of black 
and Asian labourers, and hierarchised principles of citizenship (see 
Harrington 2012; Nahaboo 2018). This was crystallised in the context 
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of white settler immigration policy developed in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century.
Mobility was equally facilitated and restricted within colonial states 
with the opening up of new markets such as the tea plantation system 
in North India, facilitated through the Assam Labour and Registration 
Act 1901, or in the plantation system in Guyana. Indentured labourers, 
as with slaves before them, could never move freely into or out of the 
plantation (or the state) (Mohapatra 2004). Without a pass and the 
relevant identity documents they could be arrested, beaten and even 
deported. Whilst the management of mobility was organised through 
the use of vagrancy laws that emerged in England from the seventeenth 
century, these laws were invariably applied to colonies but with a renewed 
racialised function.
Regulating movement across the British Empire also necessitated 
experimenting with more systematic control than vagrancy laws provided. 
In 1875, for example, the Indian Ports Act was introduced to regulate 
the flow of indentured labourers out of ports such as Mumbai and 
Chennai. Further acts were brought in to manage the use of cheap 
labour in the plantations of the West Indies, on the South African 
railways and the expanding agricultural sector along the West Coast 
of America (Shah 2012; Madhwi 2015). Indentured labourers were used 
by colonial authorities to shore up the cheap supply of labour across 
the Empire (often as a replacement for slave labour after abolition). 
Indian subjects were often coerced into signing indentured contracts 
which meant being shipped to the far reaches of the British Empire in 
almost slave-like conditions (see Dei 2017: 26; for Chinese indentured 
labour see Lowe 2015). The management of these subjects created 
networks of borders from the state of origin through ports and transit 
points to the receiving territory. It is here, Radhika Mongia (2018) 
argues, that we need to view the move towards the state’s monopolisation 
and centralisation of bordering and the creation of state-delimited 
borders.
State bordering took the form of different practices working across 
dispersed sites, from the administration of labour camps, the legal texts 
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of indentured labour contracts and private shipping company manifests, 
to the regulation of tropical and venereal diseases, the criminalisation 
and expulsion of labourers after contracts expired and naturalisation 
practices (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2018). Whilst this bordering went against 
the promise of imperial citizenship and the right to mobility, British 
authorities often worked in collusion with white settler states to curb 
and manage ‘Asiatic’ or ‘coloured’ mobility – such as the introduction 
of ‘continuous journey’ legislation, which restricted entry to Canada 
for passengers who did not travel on a direct route from their country 
of birth (for more on how this shaped migration from India see Shah 
2012: 198, and Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2018: 22). This reveals how citizenship 
itself was structured around the ideal of white subjects belonging to 
Britain and European states (Nahaboo 2018). Bordering might have 
been increasingly monopolised by states but this was orientated around 
imperial concerns and the hierarchies of racialised mobility, which were 
still global rather than national.
Whilst the movement of ‘productive’ groups such as indentured 
labourers was viewed as necessary for the extraction of profit, borders 
worked to maintain the temporality of labourers and to manage socio-
sexual relations. In colonies from South Africa and Australia to the 
Caribbean and Pacific Island states such as Fiji, missionaries and colonial 
administrators alike continuously raised concerns about the immorality, 
promiscuity and litigious behaviour of indentured labourers. Reports 
increasingly circulated in the 1870s and again in the 1900s regarding 
the behaviour and moral conduct of Indian labourers in labour camps 
and on plantations (Emmer 1986). This led to the 1875 Indian Ports 
Act, and later the 1883 Indian Emigration Act and the monitoring of 
Indian ports of exit, as well as more localised forms of containment 
(i.e. the pass system, strict laws on movement, punishments for contraven-
ing contracts) that were intensified in colonies receiving indentured 
labour. As Mongia (2018) argues, whilst indentured labourers were 
viewed as more disciplined, it was those whose contracts had ended or 
who had escaped, or labourers who were non-indentured that authorities 
became concerned with. Labourers were presented as a particular type 
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of masculinised-sexualised threat. The focus often fell on the imbalance 
of male over female indentured and non-indentured labourers on 
plantations and in camps. This was said to lead to an absence of ‘stable’ 
heterosexual unions and was explicitly linked with prostitution, promiscu-
ity and homosexuality.
Here we find an early construction of the single male migrant who 
would later haunt the racialised imaginaries of nationalist discourse in 
white metropoles and settler societies throughout the twentieth and early 
twenty-first century. In a letter to Austin Chamberlain, the Secretary 
of State for India, Commander-in-Chief Beauchamp Duff (1915: 4) 
wrote that the ‘moral conditions of the India Coolie lines in Fiji are 
indescribable’, and that ‘women emigrants are all too often living a life 
of immorality at the free disposition of their fellow recruits and even the 
subordinate managing staff ’. In response, colonial administrators toyed 
with promoting the increased influx of Indian women to certain parts 
of the British Empire to actively promote forms of heterosexual family 
(Duff 1915: 5). Further laws stressed the need to forcibly repatriate and 
expel labourers on mass, following the Chinese exclusion laws in America 
(Tichenor 2002: 87–114). In South Africa suggestions were made for 
the drawing in of ‘local’ labour to protect the degrees of racial-sexual 
segregation that the colonial state was anxious to maintain. In Australia 
after 1905 any ‘Asiatic’ (even if a subject of the British Crown) found 
without the correct identity papers and proof of a contract could be 
subject to first imprisonment and then deportation. Such bordering 
was concerned with sustaining the global colour line arranged by the 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ family by making mobile racialised-sexualised labour 
‘temporary’, surveilled and disciplined, and ultimately expendable.
It is important to stress here how bordering was networked across 
metroimperial space and how claims to family energised bordering. 
Whilst ‘family’ was central to the organisation of racial order, bordering 
equally functioned to quell bodies deemed ‘out of place’ and disorderly, 
and to facilitate the mobility of those who possessed ‘value’ or who needed 
to be expelled (such as convicts, escaped slaves and non-indentured 
labourers). This worked across dispersed nodal points all over the 
Bordering intimacy78
British Empire and was managed by a host of authorities – medics, 
police, plantation owners, labour camp managers, shipping companies, 
port authorities. It involved the collusion of imperial as well as local 
authorities to manage and expand these sets of practices. Bordering 
practices attempted to regulate movement but this was networked not 
only through the extraction of profit but through appeals to forms of 
racialised-sexualised order and the challenge posed in the intimate 
and affective proximity of certain bodies. Whilst family and kinship 
could be violently denied in the terms of contracts of indenture, in the 
foundations of slavery or in the lives of ‘black rebels’, ‘family’ could 
emerge as a technique for taming ‘strange intimacies’ through moral 
correction, or in the planned and regulated promotion of Indian women 
to serve as potential wives for labourers. The sustaining and fostering 
of imperial inheritance relied on governmental and symbolic power of 
‘family’ (Neti 2014). Not only does this reflect increasingly hardening 
views about the appropriate limits of interracial intimacy throughout 
the nineteenth century, but also the way that worthy/unworthy life was 
encoded around appeals to heteronormative domesticity.
This reflects an emergent and multivariate role for practices which 
regulated movement: borders could maintain European socio-sexual 
order (in this case the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ family). Borders could sustain 
production, the opening of markets and the extraction of profit. Borders 
could suppress, capture or expel the disorderly, the dangerous or deviant 
(such as black rebels or the non-indentured or escaped labourer). Borders 
could also work to promote the heterosexual family as a means of 
developing or controlling colonised populations. It is this last point 
that I return to in the next section.
Family taxonomies, marriage and immigration control
For the features of primitive life, we must look, not to tribes of kirghiz 
type, but to those of Central Africa, the wilds of America, the hills of 
India, and the islands of the Pacific; with some of whom we find marriage 
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laws unknown, the family system undeveloped, and even the only 
acknowledged blood-relationship through the mother.
McLennan (1865: 8)
In a series of letters and reports sent to the Colonial Office in 1872, the 
Bishop of the African Mission in the colony of Mauritius pleaded with 
church authorities and British officials to intervene in the problems 
posed by freed and ‘landed’ slaves. In Mauritius the black community 
had steadily grown since abolition, and with the criminalisation of the 
slave trade, boats and their human cargo were often intercepted and 
landed on the islands of the Seychelles (Allen 2008).3 Equally, black 
indentured labourers were brought to the islands and used to force 
down wages. Significantly, Bishop William George Tozer (1872) described 
the population on the islands as being only ‘freed in law’ but not in 
essence or spirit: they were ‘Heathen Negros’ in a state of ‘moral, physical 
and spiritual’ arrested development, he argued. Despite the clear historical 
context of slavery and its abolition, which left these communities first 
reduced to chattel and then abandoned, the Civil Commissioner’s 
inspection and report that accompanied his outcry focused on the 
domestic arrangements of the community (McGregor 1873). It placed 
attention on idleness, consumption of alcohol, and the half-naked and 
half-feral children running malnourished through encampments. It 
focused on the non-normative intimacies practised within the community 
and the condition of their huts that were ‘dark with no ventilation’ 
(McGregor 1873). ‘Whilst mild and easily manageable’, missionaries 
and civil authorities alike complained of the lack of spiritual uplift 
needed to ‘elevate Africans into humanity’ (Tozer 1872). Tellingly, one 
of the proposed practices of this ‘uplift’ was visualised in the absence 
of ‘legitimate’ (i.e. Christian) marriage.
Tellingly, domesticity and with it, ‘marriage’ were used as central 
tools in the management of black communities in Mauritius, as was 
true of large swathes of the British Empire. This provided several func-
tions. The apparent absence of normative kinship (in this case Christian 
marriage and single-household monogamy) performed a racialising 
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function to reveal the ‘absences’ of black and African people. The absence 
of proper domesticity was seen as reflective of their inability to throw 
off the ‘essence of slavery’ (Shilliam 2018: 55). Furthermore, the uptake 
of Christian marriage worked as a domesticating tool. Firstly, it was 
used to explain the precise spiritual and moral failure of their condition 
(such as idleness and the malnourishment of their children); secondly, 
Christian marriage was proposed as a solution to their predicament 
and a means of ‘humanisation’. Domesticity here was viewed as a way 
of finally throwing off backwards kinship structures and ‘developing’ 
towards European modernity.
This reveals the varied role that marriage (and with it, normative 
claims to family) had in shaping and maintaining colonial order and 
with this imperial movement. Marriage categorised state-sanctioned 
forms of kinship, inheritance and access to citizenship. But in doing so 
it produced claims to civilisation and social development (Peterson 
2014b). State investment in marriage was often carved out in a European 
setting alongside Christian authorities who committed to monogamous 
legal and spiritual forms of partnership and heterosexual family life 
(Cott 2000). In overseas colonies, Christian marriage served as a norma-
tive template against which other intimacies were judged (Neti 2014). 
Whilst liberals claimed that marriage was universal, this always worked 
to frame Christian marriage as an ideal against which other intimacies 
were viewed invariably as partial, deviant or threatening (Attorney 
General Dar Es Salaam 1951).
In this setting, anthropologists attempted to ‘discover’ whether local 
cultures practised ‘marriage-like’ rituals (Goody 1990) which could be 
sanctioned by the colonial state, thus conferring varying degrees of 
legitimacy and, with it, personhood. In this sense, they provided a 
taxonomy of family forms and perversions. Debates over the status of 
marriage became increasingly important in the early twentieth century 
as the scripting of who was or could be married was central to decisions 
over what constituted ‘family’ and with this an array of potential rights 
to British imperial citizenship and movement across the Empire.
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Family as dehumanisation
It is important to recognise the afterlife of slavery that drives the 
encounter in Mauritius and in the role of marriage and family 
more broadly. As noted earlier, claims to family worked to organise, 
rationalise and challenge slavery. As I noted in the last chapter, this 
means recognising, as Spillers (1987) argues, that dominant claims to 
family were central to the dispossession of Africans in reducing them 
to chattel. Here the organisation of gender relations and domesticity 
was not so much imposed upon African people through colonisation 
and enslavement but worked to eviscerate their personhood and 
claims to humanity (see Thomas 2007: 31). Spillers (1987) famously 
argues that, black (women) slaves were not so much gendered as 
ungendered. The categories of heteronormative family used to explain 
non-European people and their status as (in)human merely produced 
black women as a series of absences – (failed) women, (failed) mother, 
(failed) body.
It is important to see the (un)gendering that Spillers talks of as 
working alongside the creation of taxonomies of family and marriage 
across European empires. In many respects, the (un)gendering of 
black slaves is bound to and structures the hierarchy of who could 
be familial and thus properly human. It was this unfamilial ‘essence 
of slavery’ that black communities in Mauritius were unable to shake 
off. This anti-blackness connects to the way that nineteenth-century 
anthropologists sought to investigate and categorise non-European 
peoples. Colonial anthropologists such as John McLennan (1865) and 
Lewis H. Morgan (1877: 186–275) mapped and taxonomised marriage 
and family forms, which served to instruct colonial authorities on the 
legitimacy and desirability of non-European kinship structures. The 
categorisation of marriage and kinship forms was nearly always linked 
to temporalities of bourgeois European modernity. Eastern marriage 
forms could be windows into Europe’s past (see Goody 1990) or, as 
with the native population of America, reveal the perverse and deviant 
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social practices which could threaten to degenerate human ‘progress’ 
and ‘development’ (Rifkin 2015). Here the (un)gendered black slave 
represented a key series of absences that other peoples were categorised in 
relation to.
This was increasingly viewed in stark evolutionary terms. From the 
mid-nineteenth century, racial science and particularly colonial anthro-
pology argued that marriage forms were suggestive of the evolutionary 
development of a society and its relative progress from ‘simple’ to 
‘complex’ patterns (Benedict 1935; Mead 1964). It was argued that 
evolutionary patterns rested on an evolving form of heterosexuality:
From an initial state of ‘promiscuous intercourse’, there had arisen, in 
sequence, the ‘Communal Family’ (founded on the intermarriage of 
brothers and sisters); the ‘Barbarian family’; … the ‘Patriarchal family’ 
(founded on the ‘marriage’ of one man to several wives); and the ‘Civilized 
Family’. (Hoad 2000: 140)
Deviant, perverse and decadent forms of intimacy – ‘traditional’ kinship, 
polygamy, promiscuity, same-sex intimacy – became aligned with pre-
modern savagery. This was depicted as threatening the linear development 
of humanity towards its blossoming under the civilised family of European 
modernity (also see Benedict 1935: 189–191). To McLennan (1865: 8), 
particular bonds of legal intimacy could only be a product of a mod-
ernised society as ‘marriage laws, agnatic relationship, and kingly 
government, belong, in the order of development, to recent times’. The 
most primitive of societies, argued McLennan (1865: 9), were those 
that could only recognise blood relationship through the mother – 
challenging or ignoring the template of European (and particularly 
British) patriarchal lineage. This temporalisation and spatialisation of 
family forms, from ‘savage’ to ‘civilised’, did not just replicate pre-existing 
racial categorisations but was also part of the ongoing process of colonial 
race-making. Here the ‘discovery’ of kinship forms that replicated 
European Christian marriage could be used as a sign of the potential 
for development of a society or its retardation (again see Amadiume 
1987; Thomas 2007).
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Family as development
Hierarchical family taxonomies were central to the geopolitics of empire. 
In the same way that the absence of family in the enslaved was used to 
organise their dehumanisation, anthropologists focused on matrilineal, 
polygamous and tribal structures to reveal how African society remained 
‘undomesticated’ and primitive (McLennan 1865: 10; Amadiume 1987). 
Goody (1990) demonstrates how ‘Near Eastern marriage’ was placed 
in this hierarchy, defined as it was by strong and often violently imposed 
communal ties. As with African ‘bride pricing’, Near Eastern marriage 
was viewed as a means of financial exchange and formative of an 
overzealous and ‘cruel’ patriarchal culture. Orientalist interpretations 
of Islamic law also pointed to the apparent feature of forced or intra-
family marriage where ‘universal taboos’ such as ‘incest marriages’ were 
actively promoted (Goody 1990: 321). The ‘Asiatic marriage’ form was 
recognised as a deeply religious and ancient series of rites. Certain 
religions and castes were labelled as emulating nascent forms of European 
domesticity such as Sikhs and Brahmins (Goody 1990: 17; on the role 
of religion and sexuality in colonial India see Nandy 1988 and Chatterjee 
2010). Against this, ‘traditional’ practices such as polygamy, child marriage 
and purdah were viewed as a sign of backwards and uncivilised tendencies 
in other lower caste Hindu and Islamic communities (Gowans 2003).
As marriage was increasingly desecularised by liberal authorities 
throughout the twentieth century, what remained of these hierarchical 
taxonomies were distinctions between what Povinelli (2006) calls 
‘genealogical communities’, where family forms were bound to tradition 
and ritual, and those forward-facing ‘autonomous subjects’ who practised 
marriage as a symbol of romantic love, choice and contractual exchange. 
This was used to explain the relative (under)development of societies 
globally and the resistance to progress that lay hidden in intimate relations 
(see chapter 3 for more on this).
The alignment of ‘family’ with a particular evolutionary geography 
meant that colonial projects either worked to contain deviant familial 
forms (through their rejection in law) or to promote normative 
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alternatives. This was demonstrated in the promise of abolitionists and 
missionaries in Mauritius that black populations could alleviate their 
position or be redeemed through marriage and domesticity. Debates 
over how to domesticate colonial populations through forms of devel-
opmental violence thus faltered around this vision of heteronormative 
progress. To some administrators such as Henry Maine, progress would 
occur organically as ‘marriages arranged by caste and kinship would 
give way to marriages based on individual contract’ (Mody 2002: 228). 
However, at the beginning of the twentieth century more interventionist 
approaches became viewed as necessary. Acts such as the Concubine 
Act 1911 and the Child Marriage Restraint Act and Age of Marriage 
Act 1929 were developed to criminalise and punish non-normative 
intimacies across the British Empire. Other domesticating strategies 
were crafted in welfare and social work projects of home-making, such 
as in the construction of ‘marriage schools’ where Ugandan women 
were taught how to sustain patriarchal gender relations (see Mair 1944), 
or in the creation of model villages in India that were designed to teach 
‘backwards’ populations proper forms of domestic governance and rituals 
of hygiene.
The shift towards the active promotion of marriage and family forms 
in the early twentieth century reflects broader imperial strategies of 
domestication and a push by British authorities to develop colonies as 
decolonial movements agitated for independence and were violently 
pacified. As with welfare programmes in Britain, the production of 
domesticated households, patriarchal monogamy and childrearing were 
viewed as central to economic development and producing desirable 
workers, as well as quelling revolutionary fervour (Owens 2015). 
Heterosexual, monogamous sex within marriage and the rearing of 
children were viewed as vital aspects of moral uplift and taking up wage 
labour.
In the Colonial Office’s 1959 report on the future of Commonwealth 
development, H. L. Elvin was resolute that economic prosperity was 
tied to developing civilised family structures and suppressing ‘traditional 
practices’ such as polygamous marriage. ‘These things will go’, he argued, 
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‘just as certainly as Africa will move forward to participation in full 
modern life’ (Elvin 1959: 12). Such ideas echoed the logic of the 1942 
Moye Report on development in the Caribbean. The Colonial Office’s 
welfare strategy proposed the creation of an entrepreneurial agricultural 
sector which relied on Caribbean women taking up patriarchal domestic-
ity and rejecting the more extended kinship structures that sustained 
many communities.
In the push to develop and ‘modernise’ colonies, a key site for the 
promotion of (as well as hierarchisation of) family forms was also found 
in increasingly centralised border practices, especially those that pertained 
to the movement of racialised labour.
Intimate borders
Whilst technically all subjects of the British Crown had the right to 
travel across the Empire, as I described above this right was increasingly 
delimited by border practices from the 1870s, often in parallel with 
rising white nationalism in settler colonies. Immigration law increasingly 
restricted the movement of Asian labourers to settler colonies, but once 
contracted and registered, indentured labourers still held the right to 
travel with their families. This meant that at various points across imperial 
space border agents, medical inspectors, law makers, ship crews, ticketing 
agencies and so forth made decisions about whether subjects could 
move, or settle, based upon the proof of family ties to registered labourers 
and ‘settled persons’. In doing so, this provided colonial states with the 
opportunity to monitor and shape what cultural forms of kinship and 
intimacies were legally and culturally recognisable as ‘marriage’ or ‘family’. 
At the same time this created a site to make certain intimate relationships 
possible over others.
In South Africa the Immigration Regulation Act 1913 made provision 
to limit and regulate subjects at entry points such as major ports but 
also made provisions to detain labourers travelling without an official 
registration (i.e. a valid labour contract or official papers). Registered 
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labourers and merchants could travel with their families. However, what 
complicated this right was the struggle over whether polygamous mar-
riage could be included as ‘family’ (Mongia 2018). The normative idea 
of ‘family’ in South Africa was explicitly codified in the Immigration 
Regulation Act 1913 as Christian, monogamous, heterosexual marriage 
and included biological parentage of children under 16. And yet, imperial 
law upheld the right to polygamous marriage. What this produced was 
a complex network through which border agents in South Africa and 
other settler states tried to limit and deny the right of passage for Asian 
labourers and their kin on the basis of the suspicion that they were not 
‘real families’ (see Shah 2012). Following the 1913 Act, officials in the 
Transvaal were given increased powers to inspect the papers of suspect 
aliens and take fingerprint and biographical records at transit points 
such as train stations (see Chamney 1915). Although family members 
were allowed to travel with registered labourers, colonial administrators 
were anxious about the true identities of subjects travelling and working 
under the guise of ‘children’ or ‘spouse’ status.
Communiques during the 1910s reveal the extent to which immi-
gration officers, medical inspectors and port authorities were tasked 
with judging the validity of these embodied family claims (Chamney 
1915; Horsfall 1915). Unaccompanied Indian youth were the target of 
particularly intense scrutiny. M. Chamney, the principal immigration 
officer in the Transvaal, recollects in a letter to the Colonial Office 
his experience of interrogating ‘hindoo minors’ crossing the province. 
They were, he recounts, well versed in performing the ‘lies’ needed to 
escape detention by claiming particular parentage or using communal 
ties to secure registration and documentation (Chamney 1915; also see 
MacDonald 2012). In another account, ‘children’ waiting to be inter-
rogated by port police in Cape Town were deemed ‘suspect’ because 
of an inability to speak English and because they provided ambiguous 
claims about who their fathers were. In such contexts, administrators 
consistently stressed the logistical nightmare of the ‘family’ loophole 
and the problem of disproving parentage of ‘Asiatic’ children ‘who often 
did not look to be related’ (Chamney 1915), particularly where formal 
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records of Indian marriage rites and parentage were not consistently 
available or documented.
In an early rendition of border inspections and the struggle over 
family immigration law that would follow, we can consider here how 
particular cultural imaginaries coalesced in the categorisation of who 
was a ‘genuine’ family, and in the bureaucratic process to categorise 
and authenticate ‘suspicious’ intimacies. The white colonial gaze was 
confounded by linguistic differences and apparent physiological char-
acteristics of ‘biological family members’ (Immigration Regulation Act, 
SA 1913, Chapter 2, 4.1). It was similarly perplexed when confronted 
with intimate relationships that were not codified by state registration 
such as marriage and polygamous marriage rituals. Such doubt over 
the legitimacy of Hindu and Islamic marriage rites feed into other 
orientalist imaginaries of Indians as sneaky, disguised and possessing 
communal ties which confounded the policing of the colonial state (see 
Sleeman 1839). To officials, the complex kinship structures that they 
were asked to adjudicate on were indicative of a more general moral 
and cultural malaise. This reflected how ‘the Indian community does 
not desire finality’ – ‘finality’, that is, in the clear categorisation and 
appropriate parental and gendered relationship of bourgeois (white) 
domesticity (Chamney 1915: 12).
Border decisions over who could be family were shaped by what a 
family was supposed to look like, but they equally conditioned who 
could move with whom. As we see with the above cases, non-adherence 
to normative kinship meant exclusion from the rights of imperial citizen-
ship and settlement based on family life. But equally, bordering shaped 
who could be familial through historical frames of intelligibility – in 
their affective relations, movement and behaviours, people could be 
judged to be familial or not.
Such heteronormative ordering was an inherently violent project. 
Negotiations over what ‘family’ could be were sites of disciplinary violence 
(including deportation, imprisonment, abandonment, separation of 
kinships and family members). This was not merely reflective of the 
fumbling of administrators and the absence of appropriate means of 
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paper identity but part of micro, everyday practices through which 
questions over personhood were continually arranged by normative 
ideas of family. In the end it is only the corporeal intimacies privileged 
as white that could be offered sustenance, protection and public legiti-
mately through imperial citizenship. It is significant here to note that 
whilst the imperial state temporally and formally granted polygamous 
marriages legal status across the Empire, this was short lived and was 
radically overturned by the British state in the 1960s with the increase 
of Asian subjects moving to the UK.
Whilst family taxonomies provided colonial administrators with 
knowledge of population development, this was always arranged, as I 
proposed above, around the absences of the figure of the black slave 
who was without family. This was always contrasted against the idealised 
patriarchal domesticity of white coupledom. Other intimacies were 
deemed to be ‘imitations’ or ‘shams’ which were stuck in time. Heter-
onormative family not only configured the colonised as living in a 
‘European past’ but often as inhabiting a separate time from humanity 
proper (Agathangelou and Killian 2016: 8). Scrutinising these sham 
intimacies and the potential for developmental progress would be a 
task for border practices over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries (see chapter 3). This happened as bordering was intensified 
in northern states, which were increasingly focused on the movement 
and settlement of people from colonies to the European metropoles. 
In the next section I turn to how the different bordering tactics of the 
British Empire ‘came home’ and were domesticated within the metropole 
and postcolonial Britain.
Revolt(ing) intimacy and empire ‘coming home’
In June 1919 a string of violent mob attacks on black communities 
living in Liverpool became termed a ‘race riot’ (May and Cohen 1974). 
Over the course of the month, numerous clashes between white and 
black sailors took place across the English city. This unrest further 
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extended into August when the police themselves went on strike and 
set forth a series of violent protests which were eventually quashed by 
the deployment of three army battalions, several naval destroyers and 
a battleship on the River Mersey. In the aftermath of the so-called race 
riot, commentators sought to place the event in the spiralling unrest 
that was growing across the British Empire, with the rise of pan-African 
consciousness, decolonial social movements and the Bolshevik revolution 
(May and Cohen 1974). The causes of this unrest were also put into a 
now common logic of colonial racism: the ‘black peril’ – the apparent 
threat that black men posed to white women in the port city. White 
men (both local and alien) were seen as defending, in the words of The 
Times newspaper, their race and the ‘instinctive certainly that sexual 
relations between white women and coloured men revolts our very 
nature’ (quoted in May and Cohen 1974: 114).
In a bid to suppress further violence and regain order, the police 
instituted a series of mass arrests and the detention of seven hundred 
black subjects ‘for their own safety’ (May and Cohen 1974: 114). The 
Superintending Officer of Liverpool’s port then introduced special 
registration cards and fingerprinting of ‘alien’ seamen. In doing so, 
authorities appropriated technologies of criminalisation and identity 
capture that had been experimented with in colonial India and across 
settler plantain economies. As with previous restrictions on ‘aliens’ 
this did not legally affect British subjects. However, black sailors were 
frequently defined as ‘alien seamen’ by the local authorities until they 
could prove otherwise (a task that was nearly impossible, as carrying a 
passport was not a requirement of travel from colonies to Britain). Despite 
outcry against this policy by black community leaders, immigration 
orders increasingly became viewed as a useful device for suppressing 
racial disorder in the UK’s port cities, and in turn disciplining black 
bodies. In the Aliens Order 1920, deportation of ‘aliens’ was formalised 
and streamlined, and then in the Special Restriction (Coloured Alien 
Seamen) Order 1925 specifically targeted people of colour for expul-
sion. Deportation of black British subjects again worked by proxy, as 
anyone suspected of being a ‘coloured alien seaman’ could be deported. 
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Given the arbitrary nature of these powers, they were frequently used to 
police, harass and punish black communities living in port cities across 
Britain.
Colonial domestication was again at the heart of this encounter, as 
the bordering practices that had been honed across the British Empire 
found new uses in the metropole. Here the racialised distinctions that 
made up imperial citizenship were reformed as black and Asian subjects 
were deemed ‘unworthy’ of the right to settlement and movement. 
Internment, detention and deportation, tools that were experimented 
with across the Empire, were reasserted to both police and expel racialised 
communities within Britain in the name of white supremacy. In the 
face of decolonising movements and the unravelling of order in certain 
parts of the Empire, emergent immigration laws (alongside older modes 
of policing and social government) were increasingly viewed as vital 
to reassert the appropriate sentiments of white intimacy and racial 
segregation ‘at home’. Whilst this was not the first time that bordering 
practices had targeted black and other racialised communities in the 
metropole (see Wemyss 2009), the Special Restriction Order set a 
precedent for immigration law that would intensify across the twentieth 
century and through formal decolonisation.
Immigration and the colour line
From 1905, centralised British immigration law drew upon border tactics 
and logics that had been experimented with across imperial space, in 
the formation of a ‘national’ border regime. Imperial in history and in 
orientation, immigration law began to focus on the cultivation of white 
Britishness – whilst remaining tied to wider claims of the imperial 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ family. Whilst initially orientated towards the policing 
of ‘aliens’, particularly Jewish refugees arriving from Russia and Eastern 
Europe after the succession of pogroms in the 1890s, the state border 
regime began increasingly to focus on British subjects of colour.
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As colonial practices were turned further ‘inwards’ to refocus on 
Britain and racialised communities within the metropole, claims to 
family played a powerful role in this re-alignment. Debates over the 
limits of race relations, national identity, social and economic order, 
welfare and policing were played out in debates over appropriate forms 
of intimacy, sexuality and domesticity of people of colour. For instance, 
in the eugenics-inspired ‘Report on an investigation into the colour 
problem in Liverpool and other ports’ in 1930 the authors argued that 
‘black seamen were twice as likely to carry venereal diseases, and that 
mixed race or “half caste” children were more likely to be sickly’ (Eddo-
Lodge 2017: 20). In the categorisation of ‘English’ or ‘Negroid’ children, 
the report drew on colonial ideas surrounding bloodline and inheritance 
as well as facial measurements from eugenics to warn against both the 
risk of ‘colour’ and ‘racial mixing’.
Anxiety about the racial composition of Britain was configured in 
the scrutiny placed on colonised people arriving in the UK. Immigration 
management increasingly became a site to play out the protection of 
white patriarchal domesticity by restricting mobility based on race. 
This did not begin with the larger scale movements of people from the 
Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent, and the now famous arrival 
of HMT Empire Windrush to Britain in 1945 (see, for example, Wemyss 
2009). However, bordering was certainly scaled up and intensified in 
post-war Britain. Family immigration law worked with other bordering 
mechanisms, such as policing, health, education and welfare, to establish 
a template for the type of intimate relations that could be tolerated 
within and that could move to Britain (see Jackson 2015: 161). In 1947 
the British government, in a bid to consolidate imperial ambitions against 
decolonising movements, changed citizenship law so that any subject 
within a British territory was promised the right to move to, work, 
settle and claim full citizenship rights in the UK.4 The structure of 
various immigration laws from the 1960s onwards, and forwarded by 
all the main political parties, was to dismantle these rights until they 
were eventually overturned in 1981. Gurminder Bhambra (2017b) argues 
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that this process was one of converting ‘citizens’ into ‘migrants’ (also 
see Karatani 2002).
As with the movement of racialised labour across the British Empire, 
bordering in the UK worked to support demands for an influx of a 
cheap and exploitable work force, at the same time as restrictions were 
increasingly imposed because of the fear of chaotic ‘race relations’ brought 
about by ‘coloured immigration’ (Hansen 2000). It is worth remembering 
that it was not movement per se in this period that led to the introduction 
of extensive immigration restrictions. For example, some two hundred 
thousand people settled in the UK from Southern Europe between 1945 
and 1948, and this led to no overhaul of the immigration system (Bhambra 
2017b). Such large-scale resettlement is almost entirely forgotten in 
dominant histories of immigration because it was predominantly white. 
Instead, it was the movement of those racialised as non-white that 
needed to be managed (Gilroy 1992).
From the 1960s, bordering practices fluctuated from facilitating the 
movement of family members of Commonwealth citizens, to delimiting 
the mobility of family members because of raised anxiety about the 
‘unfamilial’ character of black and Asian communities (Webster 1998). 
Whilst patriarchal family structure was viewed as producing a compliant, 
orderly workforce and containing racial disorder (through the ‘threat’ 
that black and Asian men posed to white women), alternative kinship 
structures were viewed as the remnants of underdevelopment, ‘primitive’ 
culture and ‘savagery’ (Turner 2014).
The Immigration Act 1962, for instance, restricted Commonwealth 
citizens’ right to move by making employment a mandatory requirement 
of entry into the UK. However, ‘family members’ were guaranteed special 
status and could reportedly move ‘freely’ (until this was ended in 1968). 
As I have already demonstrated above, evidencing who was family to 
claim the right to settle replayed distinctions over who was properly 
familial within imperial and evolutionary hierarchies. Debates in Parlia-
ment circulated around how Caribbean families could provide evidence 
of family connections because of the frequent absence of proper marriage 
or evidence of kinship (Hansard 1961). Fears that polygamous marriages 
Making love, making empire 93
would allow multiple partners and dependents into the country were 
equally recycled (see also Foreign Office 1933). In the 1962 legislation, 
‘dependent’ family members were overtly classed as married wives and 
children (Home Office 1962: 7–8) or dependent elderly relatives, making 
the entry of husbands or male fiancés more difficult (a practice which 
would later be intensified in the now infamous ‘primary purpose rule’; 
see chapter 3) (Smith and Marmo 2014). This essentially led to the 
outlawing of non-normative family structures from imperial/British 
citizenship.
Equally, border agents working at airports and ports were given 
discretionary powers to decide whether a person had a ‘reasonable’ 
family relationship to a settled person (Home Office 1962: 8). Replaying 
the restrictions placed across the British Empire, such strategies provided 
new tools for surveillance over the intimate relations of colonised subjects. 
These border practices also worked to produce certain types of family, 
that is by making heterosexual kinship and marriage a mandate of citizen-
ship and settled rights.
Citizenship, bloodline and inheritance
Whilst family immigration law worked to surveil intimacies (a point I 
take up in more depth in chapter 3), citizenship was increasingly 
organised throughout the mid-twentieth century around the defence 
and promotion of the white ‘Anglo-Saxon’ family. This family had both 
a national (i.e. British, or more specifically English) and imperial white 
constituent (i.e. tied to settler states or ‘dominions’).
In order to dismantle the rights claims of Commonwealth citizens 
of colour, successive British governments from 1968 to 1980 pushed to 
define British citizenship in terms of biological inheritance. Firstly, in 
the 1968 and 1971 immigration acts, the right to abode was restricted 
to those who could prove a line of descent to a parent or grandparent 
born or naturalised in Britain. This was finally consolidated in the 
British Nationality Act 1981, which ended the (now much reduced) 
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rights of Commonwealth citizens to residency. After 1981, British citizen-
ship was defined by being born into citizenship through an ancestral 
connection to Britain (and not the Empire). Citizenship was thus actively 
reimagined as a structure of bloodline and kinship in line with key 
imperial claims about race. Whilst formally eviscerating the rights of 
millions of Commonwealth citizens, the Act preserved the connection 
of white subjects to British citizenship as they were more likely to be 
able to evidence an ancestral connection (i.e. to the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ family). 
The privileging of white mobility and the simultaneous containment 
of people racialised as non-white was managed through binding het-
erosexual family further into the codes of citizenship.
It is telling that after the Falklands War, Margaret Thatcher would 
in 1983 grant the Falkland Islanders ‘special citizenship status’. She did 
this whilst recalling that they were of ‘British stock’ (Thatcher 1982). 
It is worth dwelling on the how the inheritance of whiteness or blackness 
worked in this setting. Thinking through this racial claim to ‘British 
stock’, we should consider that the British Nationality Act was more 
than a reorganisation of citizenship as ‘national belonging’; it was the 
reimposition of an older patriarchal colour line which had sustained 
the British Empire. Just as inheritance worked to ‘pass on’ slave status, 
or encode people as white and ‘free’, reproduction was institutionalised 
as the site for the (non)transference of British citizenship and the 
organisation of inherited rights into the polity. Citizenship was legally 
bound to both the reproductive white family and the racial scientific 
fantasy of bloodline. Just as claims to family dispossessed colonised 
people of their personhood across the Empire (as undomesticated and 
‘deviant’), this worked to dispossess millions of former colonised people 
of their right to settlement in Britain.
As the British Nationality Act passed through Parliament in 1981, 
black protestors in London were actively railing against both police 
violence and the institutional racism of the British state in what became 
known as the Brixton Riots. Imogen Tyler (2010) argues that we should 
see a direct connection between the passing of the Act, which made 
Commonwealth subjects into second-class citizens, and revolts by black 
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political activists taking place in the London borough (also see Andrews 
2018). Just as immigration and citizenship law stripped people of their 
rights and managed racialised communities as ‘internal others’, the police 
functioned as an occupying colonial force to violently contain, suppress 
and punish resistance (Jackson 2015).
It is significant that in the aftermath of the Brixton Riots, the Scarman 
Report would eventually admit that the event revealed discriminatory 
policing tactics against black communities, for example in the use of 
colonial bordering tactics such as the ‘sus’ vagrancy laws to crush protests 
or in the mass incarcerations brought about by the authoritarian practices 
of Operation Swamp (Jackson 2015). However, Lord Scarman also laid 
the blame for the violence at the feet of the black community in Brixton. 
One of the causes of the riot, he argued, was the violent tendencies of 
black youth who grew up in ‘single parent families’ (Amos and Parmar 
1984). Violence, ultimately, was a product of a lack of domestication 
– the key to this being (failed) black motherhood. Not only would citizen-
ship now be inherited as a bloodline, but this faltered around the absence 
of black motherhood, a key factor in the inherited ‘essence of slavery’. 
It is telling that as the British government re-institutionalised the 
racialised sexuality of the Empire into citizenship law that (failed) black 
motherhood would be presented as the site for the reproduction of 
social ills.
The British Nationality Act 1981 was one of many examples of how 
the logic and orientation of bordering practices of the British Empire 
became nationalised and brought more closely in line with the British 
nation state. Whilst still locked to an imperial mapping of the world, 
bordering practices increasingly focused on both policing communities 
of colour within Britain and restricting the possibility of movement 
into the country. We must consider this process as a set of acts of 
colonial duress – the adaption and intensification of Britain as imperial 
terrain, and a process of internal colonisation reaffirming the racialised 
governance that structured colonial administrations globally (also see 
Turner 2018). Whilst colonial rule was further intensified and bound 
to the policing of once-colonised or peripherised communities within 
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Britain, the cultural and social landscape of Britain worked to deny 
such linkages, either through a disavowal of the Empire (as ‘past wrongs’), 
or a nostalgic harking back to the lost privileges of whiteness found in 
more explicit appeals to white nationalism. In such a context, as I shall 
argue over the next few chapters, appeals to family continued to work 
both to stratify people as modern or backwards, domesticated or 
undomesticated, and to hide the colonial and racialised coordinates of 
such work.
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated some of the intimate historical connections 
between family and bordering that circulated from British colonies to 
the metropole. ‘Family’ emerged as a key technology in sustaining and 
fostering colonial projects and in the nineteenth century became increas-
ing bound up with the regulation of movement. Family worked here 
as a governmental mechanism to shore up whiteness, but equally it was 
central to the domestication, surveillance and suppression of colonised 
people and the regulation of their mobility. Claims to family, as I have 
previously proposed, ultimately structured claims to humanity.
I have argued that bordering, as it expanded the regulation of move-
ment in the nineteenth century, rather than being a nationalistic project 
was in fact imperial in orientation. Bordering was both an imperial 
and colonial project. The regulation of movement was central to colonial 
states’ bid for order (as illustrated in India and Jamaica). Bordering 
functioned to facilitate and control the mobility of slaves, mobile people 
and indentured labourers through the shifting dictates of imperial 
capitalism and racialised sexuality. Bordering here must be seen as 
more disparate than state-sanctioned immigration law or the management 
of ‘migrants’ or ‘aliens’. It was forged in the management of escaped 
slaves, rebels, criminals, nomadic communities, prostitutes, indentured 
labourers – some who had legal status to travel, others who did not. 
Equally, bordering was practised by multiple social authorities, not only 
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the imperial, settler or colonial state, from shipping companies, medics, 
labour camp inspectors, to missionaries, police and plantation masters.
The regulation of mobility across the British Empire was orientated 
towards the management of the global colour line by discovering and 
controlling people ‘out of place’. This was institutionalised in the late 
nineteenth century by settler states in nascent immigration law, but 
imperial authorities colluded and supported such bordering (such as 
in the 1875 Indian Ports Act). Whilst concerned with containing, 
identifying and expelling ‘(un)productive’, ‘dangerous’ or ‘deviant’ subjects, 
bordering practices were frequently energised by appeals to heteronorma-
tive family, a key lynchpin of (settler) colonial order.
Fleshing out the approach to family and domestication I began in 
the last chapter, I have demonstrated that family – or more specifically 
the claim to a heteronormative, monogamous (white) nuclear family 
– energised colonial projects and, with this, bordering practices. Family 
took on multiple roles in empire-making; it functioned to dehumanise 
and dispossess. Personhood was arranged through bloodline, such as 
in the case of slave law. but people could also be judged as more or less 
human based on where they fell within family taxonomies. That is, 
whether they emulated Christian marriage and bourgeois domesticity. 
Family could also be developmental. Populations could be ‘brought into’ 
civilisation and be ‘developed’ by the facilitation of familial and patriarchal 
domesticity. Family could be control. Claims that the ‘true family’ was 
European and white led to the management of interracial intimacy, just 
as suspicious intimacies (such as polygamous marriage and extended 
kinship structures) were intervened in, suppressed and expelled by 
colonial states.
Throughout these processes, ‘family’ became key to how mobility 
was perceived and regulated. Bordering and then borders (immigration 
law) worked to protect and defend (white) family life, either to foster 
or protect it (such as the example of the masculine/sexualised threat 
of black sailors in Liverpool); borders worked to delimit and intervene 
in intimacies viewed as unfamilial (polygamous kinship, unmarried or 
same-sex couples); borders worked to shape and produce familial 
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relationships (such as promoting the movement of the wives of black 
and Asian Commonwealth citizens). By being attuned to different archives 
of bordering, I have illustrated how various forms of colonial knowledge 
and practice informed what we know as ‘family’ and its absences. Different 
claims to family were not merely a set of contingent and ‘culturally 
located’ ideas about kinship, but instead a site of racialised power where 
struggles over personhood, life and death, inclusion and abandonment 
were played out.
By ending with a focus on British immigration law, I have emphasised 
how colonial rule worked across metroimperial space but was contingent 
upon local struggles. In examining the codification of citizenship and 
immigration law in the UK, I have argued that this was a reinscription 
and adaption of imperial and colonial government to the particular 
demands of white supremacy and familial order. From the 1920s, 
centralised immigration became a key site for the ongoing domestication 
of colonised peoples. Immigration law and the bordering this entailed 
was orientated towards delimiting the right to settlement of Com-
monwealth citizens of colour. And equally, facilitating the mobility of 
white subjects of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ family (often from settler states). 
Furthermore, bordering practices, often bound up with but not exclusively 
driven by immigration law, were frequently drawn from experiments 
of colonial rule. Consider, here how practices of detention and deportation 
were tested and honed across the British Empire, such as in the control 
of indentured labourers, and then circulated back ‘home’ to manage 
growing racialised communities in the mid-twentieth century. Following 
the role of bordering and family across the Empire, immigration law 
became a key site for the rehearsal, reimagining and intervention into 
non-normative intimacies in the UK. In doing so it provided a means 
of controlling the movement of colonised subjects but also a means of 
producing and shaping what family could be.
As I will go on to explore in the next three chapters, the ongoing 
border regime in the UK continues to be forged through, and equally 
to reinvent, colonial rule as an intimate spectacle. This means recognising 
that the reasons why people move are intimately bound to empire, in 
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the same way that practices that regulate movement equally work along 
and resuscitate ‘imperial grooves’ (de Noronha 2018).
Notes
1 This chapter was based on archival work undertaken from 2016 to 2017 at the 
National Archives, Kew; the British Library, London; and the Bristol Archives.
2 I talk less about the role of convicts in the regulation of mobility in this chapter. 
The creation of penal colonies provides another fascinating history of movement, 
often arranged around ideas of failed whiteness and the regulation of ‘internal 
others’ within Britain, orientated as this was towards projects of settler colonialism 
(such as in Australia). For more on this see Walters (2002), Wolfe (2006) and 
even Turner (2016).
3 The British Crown Colony of Mauritius included the contemporary territory 
of the Republic of Mauritius, Rodrigues, the outer islands of Agaléga, St. Brandon, 
Chagos Archipelago and Seychelles.
4 Devising the newly titled Citizen of the UK and Commonwealth.
Sham marriages have for too long been an easy target for migrants seeking 
to circumvent our immigration rules, often assisted by organised criminals. 
Registrars are frustrated when they marry couples who are obviously 
sham; we need more effective tools to deal with it.
Immigration Minister Mark Harper  
(quoted in Home Office 2013a)
In 2014 the Home Affairs Select Committee convened for a special 
session on the issue of ‘sham marriages’. It aimed to explore those ‘in-
genuine’ marriages of ‘convenience’ imagined to be performed for the 
‘benefit of gaining immigration status/advantages’ (Home Office 2013b). 
In the Home Affairs session, expert witnesses were called to testify on 
the ‘threat’ that sham marriages posed in modern Britain. Within the 
session, Labour MP David Winnick suggested that ‘all of us are agreed 
upon the dangers of sham marriages and want to see an end to them’ 
(Home Affairs Select Committee 2014). Following this ‘common-sense’ 
logic, shams were presented as a dangerous practice that not only 
undermined the immigration system but created a mockery of marriage 
itself and those engaging in it ‘truthfully’. Immigration, the story goes, 
does not simply threaten British society but it does so by undermining 
the normative institutions of marriage and family.
So, what is so dangerous about sham marriage? And in turn, what 
is a ‘sham’? Who is a ‘sham’? And what do ‘shams’ do? In this chapter 
I trace the way that fears about shams have driven a style of government 




intimacies. Starting with immigration rules around family migration, 
I reveal how this has connected up with broader practices of domestica-
tion from social work to counter-terrorism. The sham, I go onto argue, 
has become a transit point for ongoing modes of colonial rule and the 
dispersal of what I call ‘intimate borders’.1
Built on the promise to protect heteronormative life, the right to 
family is enshrined in international law and historically in states’ 
immigration policy. However, as I proposed in the last chapter, wealthier 
northern metropoles and settler states have consistently used European 
ideas of family to regulate the movement of people – especially in the 
case of movement to Britain from ex-colonies. From the late 1990s 
family migration (in the main, people moving on the basis of familial 
dependencies) was increasingly viewed as a problem for European states 
because it promised a right to permanent settlement and citizenship. 
Following the practices of monitoring Commonwealth citizens’ familial 
relations that we saw in chapter 2, the emergence of concerns around 
sham marriage in the UK worked to bolster the state’s ability to restrict 
who counted as ‘family’ in immigration law. With the rise of the 
Conservative-led coalition government’s policy of the ‘hostile environ-
ment’ from 2011, this route was increasingly viewed as site for ‘illegal 
migration’ and ‘criminal activity’ (Home Office 2013a). It was increasingly 
presented as being akin to an existential security threat.
Whilst sham marriage has been increasingly criminalised, this equally 
rehearses concerns about what intimacies can be tolerated by the British 
postcolonial state. In the latest overhaul of the family migration route 
in 2011, then Home Secretary Theresa May led the reform of the family 
migration visa by arguing that the changes to the visa, which involved 
introducing a minimum income requirement for non-EU spouses/
partners, were about making sure couples were ‘genuine’ (Home Office 
2011a: 3). The visa focused on evidencing whether the affective and 
domestic bonds between a couple were both ‘genuine’ and ‘subsisting’. 
Being a sham was not only making an intentionally ‘fraudulent’ claim 
for the benefit of immigration status but falling short of moral and 
economic claims to bourgeois domesticity (see Turner 2014; Carver 2016).
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It is significant for our discussion that the reforms were preceded 
by a series of (perhaps now familiar) concerns that Bangladeshi and 
Pakistani communities were over-represented in family migration figures 
(Home Office 2011b). It was also thought that the practice of ‘international 
marriage’ could be used as a route for forced marriage, human trafficking 
and the reproduction of ‘unintegratable’ communities (Gill and Mitra-
Kahn 2012). In the 2014 Home Affairs Select Committee session that 
I began with above, it transpired that the real danger of sham marriages 
was non-EU subjects marrying EU citizens for the benefit of residency 
and settlement. Far from a technical issue about circumventing immigra-
tion law, the idea of the sham has been loaded with suspicion regarding 
the ‘backwards’ kinship practices of former colonised people and their 
mobility. This continues to drive bordering practices today.
Policing the sham
In this context, we need to consider the slipperiness of the sham and 
its appeals to danger; foremost, how it brings together different racialised-
sexualised markers concerning suspicious movement, suspicious kinship 
and suspicious communities. As we see above, the sham is not only 
sham marriage but also slowly reveals itself to be about ‘sham intimacy’. 
If the migrant is always suspicious – that is, a fraud or sham – intimacy 
is a particular site of danger (Ahmed 2016). The fraud of the migrant 
can be easily hidden (it is assumed) within the private confines of 
coupledom and the family. The job of the state becomes proving this 
fraud through the monitoring of the intimate relations of those claiming 
rights to see if they are ‘genuine’. But the sham is not only framed by a 
broad suspicion of the migrant. The sham is highly racialised. It mobilises 
a historical suspicion about the fraudulent and ‘backwards’ intimacies 
of non-European peoples born out of empire – foremost here, the 
(im)possibility of Asian and black family life. We thus need to be aware 
of how concerns about sham marriage bleed into sham intimacy, which 
translates into sham families.
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This chapter sets out to explore the different points of contact that 
the sham brings together. It does so by reading the sham as one site 
for the reworking and reforming of colonial modes of domestication 
in contemporary Britain. I argue that a key point for the transference 
of empire-making within Britain is through ‘intimate bordering’ – the 
fostering or abandonment of bodies and subjects made a sham or ‘out 
of place’ by their relations to ideals of the modern family. Tracing the 
work of the sham helps us get at some of this, in particular by revealing 
how heteronormative claims to family continue to draw lines around 
who is civilised or backwards; whose intimacies are suspect and subject 
to intervention, scrutiny and containment. This works to police not 
only migrant subjects on the move but also racialised communities 
with settled rights in Britain.
If, as I argued in the last chapter, family taxonomies were central to 
how colonial projects were justified and directed under formal empire, 
I argue that a hierarchy of ‘family forms’ are just as central to the racialised 
treatment of Asian and black communities today. Whilst heterosexual 
family units were viewed as necessary for the development of the colo-
nised population and the settlement of Commonwealth citizens in Britain 
during the mid- twentieth century, migrant families have been increas-
ingly viewed as troubling the national-civilisational order. ‘Family’ is 
treated as a site for the reproduction of cultural difference, in which 
Islam is made highly visible.
From the late 1990s policy makers became increasingly fixated on 
the ‘hyperpatriarchy’ of Muslim families – especially with regard to the 
treatment of women and in debates around forced marriage. Whilst 
these concerns still drive immigration policy and family visa regimes, 
as I will show, they have increasingly fed into the question of the 
‘integration’ of settled Muslim communities. After the onset of the Global 
War on Terror after 2001, the problem of suspicious intimacies has 
been increasingly bound into counter-terrorism strategy. Reworking 
the family taxonomies I presented in the last chapter, the markers of 
the modern or ‘genuine’ family are now found in appeals to liberal 
choice, romantic love and domestic governance. It is these seemingly 
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‘deracialised’ principles that are increasingly used to govern mobility 
and rights claims as well as the policing of settled communities within 
Britain.
In the first part of this chapter I explore the short history of intimate 
bordering in the UK, connecting this to the regulation of Commonwealth 
citizens through immigration law that I began in chapter 2. I then go 
on to demonstrate that what often drives this bordering is a particular 
gendered configuration of the unintegrated female migrant/citizen. 
Following Cynthia Weber’s (2016) proposal that we should examine the 
‘worlding’ that particular figurations perform, I trace how the figuration 
of the unintegrated woman dominates debates around the sham and 
thus immigration and integration more broadly. I show how suspicions 
about the sham intimacies of Muslim communities have been networked 
into social work and the UK’s counter-terrorism programme Prevent. 
This provides an emergent site for the reworking of colonial forms of 
rule which work through different forms of intimate bordering.
The (re)emergence of the ‘problem’ of  
family migration
In the UK what reignited the recent anxiety around sham marriages 
was the lifting in 1997 of the infamous ‘primary purpose’ rule, which 
governed the movement of married or unmarried partners into the UK 
from 1979 (Menski 1999). The primary purpose rule meant that couples 
had to prove that the move of a partner to the UK would not result in 
an economic benefit or advantage. This in effect created an explicit 
colour bar on family migration after 1979. It made it extremely difficult 
for non-white male partners from ex-colonies to secure settlement as 
they could nearly always be seen as ‘gaining a benefit’ (Wray 2015). As 
with the Immigration Act 1971 and British Nationality Act 1981, primary 
purpose was set up in a way so that it privileged the movement of white 
spouses from Anglo settler colonies and those within the European 
Economic Community.
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Whilst primary purpose was configured around the threat of male 
Commonwealth citizens, intimate scrutiny was still placed on feminised 
bodies. Smith and Marmo (2014) detail how border agents at Heathrow 
Airport during the late 1970s used their discretionary powers to inspect 
the ‘suitability’ of fiancées arriving from India by carrying out ‘virginity 
tests’, which took the form of the physical inspection of these women’s 
hymens. During this period, as we might remember from the last chapter, 
family dependents and fiancées could travel to live with a Commonwealth 
citizen settled in Britain. Border officials were tasked with disproving 
this relationship. The highly invasive inspection of women’s genitals 
reimposed orientalist notions of chaste and passive South Asian women; 
no Indian bride, the logic went, could marry without being a virgin 
(Levine 2007). Discovering who was a sham in this setting reduced 
South Asian women’s bodies to objects of flesh to be examined (Spillers 
1987). The mediocre attempts by British authorities to either apologise 
or rectify these wrongs reveal a broader normalised distain for the body 
of the colonised. It should be noted that in Enoch Powell’s now infamous 
‘Rivers of Blood’ speech (in 1968), whilst it was the figure of the sexualised 
and violent black man that Powell warned was a threat to British society, 
it was the female ‘migrant’ who was cast as the reproducer of unBritish-
ness. Just as it did across the Empire, the natal feminised body provided 
a key site for playing out concerns about ‘race relations’ and the 
reproduction of difference in Britain. And this continues today.
When the New Labour government withdrew the primary purpose 
rule in 1997, this heralded almost immediate calls to re-monitor the 
movement of migrant partners for settlement. This was in part precipi-
tated by the rise in the number of partner applications from former 
colonies. For example, applications from Pakistan went from 1,960 in 
1996 to 5,080 in 1998 (BBC 1999). What stimulated this anxiety was a 
series of interconnected fears regarding the social landscape of ‘multi-
cultural’ Britain. In this setting, sham marriages became fused to the 
regulation of immigration through issues of ‘integration’, the ‘problem’ 
of settled minorities communities and specifically ‘cultural practices’ 
of forced marriage.
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We can trace the emergence of the prominence of sham marriage 
to the Immigration Act 1999, which stressed the urgent need for closer 
scrutiny of migrants moving for ‘family life’. Whilst the New Labour 
government of this time was rhetorically invested in celebrating ‘mul-
ticultural Britain’ and supporting ethnic minority rights, this Act 
immediately worked to restrict the movement of subjects from outside 
of the EU. Border officials were tasked with monitoring whether a 
relationship was a marriage of ‘convenience’ by assessing whether a 
couple had an intention of living together. Civil registrars were also 
obligated to report ‘suspicious’ marriages to the Home Office.
These techniques were later supplemented with increasing scrutiny 
over the ‘genuine’ and ‘subsisting’ nature of the relationships of those 
claiming a right to settlement through the family migration route. After 
1999, sham marriages became a normalised concern across govern-
ments of all political leanings. To reflect some of these changes it is 
worth noting that in 1999 partners travelling for family unification (as 
partners of British citizens or those with leave to remain) had to prove 
their intention to live together and the nature of their ‘continuous’ 
relationship. By 2014, couples had to prove that they were participating 
in a ‘genuine’ and ‘subsisting’ relationship according to strictly regulated 
income, language and cohabitation requirements (Charsley and Benson  
2012).
What is a sham?
So, who is caught up in the sham? What cultural figurations energise 
it; give it ‘colour’ and fleshiness? How does this work to shape particular 
border strategies? During the re-emerge of the ‘problem’ of family 
migration in 1999, a BBC Newsnight report and subsequent article 
provided details of the emerging crisis around shams (BBC 1999). In 
doing so it exemplified the connections that were emulated across 
numerous policy documents, immigration acts and legislation over the 
next seventeen years. I read this report as a manifestation of the dominant 
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ideas that are attached to shams, which become enshrined by the legal 
apparatus of the British state during the 2000s.
The BBC report is described as an investigation into ‘Fighting arranged 
marriage abuse’. Its key task was in explaining to the British public how 
‘cultural practices’ of arranged marriages – linked in the report to Pakistan 
and Asian communities in Britain – were often ‘shams’ for the benefit 
of mobility and settlement. Quoting an official in the British High 
Commission in Islamabad, the report argued that: ‘There is no doubt 
that a lot of the girls are being forced to bring husbands into Britain 
against their will but we are powerless to do anything about it’ (BBC 
1999). Marriages, we are told, particularly in Asian and Muslim culture, 
are forced upon girls through family and community pressure and for 
the benefit of male patriarchs. It is worth quoting the article at length 
to reveal the connections it makes visible:
The ‘problem’ is that the present Labour government scrapped the hated 
‘primary purpose’ rule in one of its first initiatives after coming to power 
in 1997. Labour wanted to appease the sensitivities of Britain’s ethnic 
communities. Under the old system, officials at the High Commission 
could ask couples intimate questions about each other ranging from 
favourite toothpaste brands to preferred sleeping positions to determine 
whether the ‘primary purpose’ of the visa application was a marriage of 
convenience or based on true love. The change in rules had an immediate 
effect. In 1996, there were 1,960 applications for entry from Pakistan to 
Britain from would-be husbands. In 1998, after the law was changed, 
there were 5,080. (BBC 1999)
Here the rise in applications after the end of primary purpose is presented 
as evidence of the rise of sham marriages. Suspicion is cast over the 
family relations of anyone travelling from Pakistan. Colonial ideas of 
the ‘backwards’ kinship practices of colonised people are then bound 
to social problems within the UK, in particular the treatment of women 
in ‘ethnic communities’. We are told that ‘forced marriage’ (collapsed 
into ‘arranged marriage’) is an increasing risk to social order: ‘The police 
in Bradford, where the Asian community add up to 19% of local people, 
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are overwhelmed by appeals from Asian women for help’ (BBC 1999). 
The article voices concern regarding primary purpose; however, the 
overhaul of the policy is presented as merely an attempt to appease 
minorities (‘appease’ being a word that in the British context is frequently 
linked to the historical appeasement of Nazi Germany in the 1930s). 
Intimate bordering such as passing judgement on the right to mobility 
based on knowledge of toothpaste and sleeping positions is suddenly 
presented as entirely reasonable and necessary.
Importantly in this report, ‘marriages of convenience’, ‘arranged 
marriage’ and ‘forced marriage’ are frequently slipped together as if 
they are the same thing. Ann Cryer, MP for the northern English town 
of Keighley, is quoted in the report as arguing for the state to step in 
to immediately stop the ‘cruel practice of making their girls go back to 
Pakistan to marry first cousins or those to whom their family owe a 
favour’ (BBC 1999). Her remarks show how the sham was bound to 
the apparently ‘backwards’ practices of Asian communities. British Asian 
patriarchs, she argues, have such little respect for women’s rights that 
‘girls’ (always infantilised) are merely traded for ‘family favours’. Just as 
orientalist anthropologists sought to delineate the ‘Eastern’ marriage 
form (Goody 1990) – with its propensity for incest, hierarchy, honour 
and absence of love – Cryer discovers the modern expression of this 
orientalism. Most shockingly for her, the ‘Eastern family form’ is found 
alive and well in her constituency in West Yorkshire.
This report ties together various types of shams. The sham expands 
to more than the circumventing of immigration controls also to include 
forced marriage. Because of the cultural location of forced marriage, it 
became linked to the practice of intercontinental, diasporic and arranged 
marriage. As forced marriage was transformed into an issue of mobility 
and women’s rights, it shaped the family migration debate and the remit 
of policy-making. In this period, forced marriage came to exemplify 
the generalised oppression of women within so-called ‘ethnic com-
munities’ (Wilson 2007), both within Britain and in ‘backwards’ colonised 
spaces such as Pakistan. The sham became enlisted in a set of equivalences, 
putting the problem of the Asian and then (later) Muslimified body 
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and kinship practices front and centre (Razack 2008). Through the 
figuration of the deviant forced marriage, all other marriage forms 
conducted by these communities become shams.
Policing shams
How can you tell if a marriage is a sham, that is if it isn’t beauty and the 
beast?
Keith Vaz MP, Home Affairs Select Committee Meeting,  
24 June 2014
Ann Cryer’s warning in 1999 that the ‘cruel practice’ of forced marriage 
would lead to social and civil unrest foreshadowed future governments’ 
commitments to deal with sham marriage. Here the practice of inter-
national relationships and particularly arranged marriages were presented 
as always ‘risky’ to women (Gill and Mitra-Kahn 2012). A push to 
criminalise forced marriage was accompanied by bordering techniques 
which increasingly focused on scrutinising the intimate relations of 
those travelling for family unification. In the context of the War on 
Terror and the hypervisibility of the ‘problem’ Muslim, the debate around 
the improper intimacies of minority communities also began to energise 
wider imperial forms of violence. The reconstruction of anti-Muslim 
racism after 2001 made deviant intimacies and patriarchal violence a 
particular problem of Islam (Cowen and Gilbert 2008). The domesticating 
role of the colonial state was energised to reform and modernise such 
intimacies through the regulation of mobility, interventions into Muslimi-
fied households and, with this, the staging of a war of ‘civilisations’. All 
this coalesced in various ways around the paternalist role of ‘protecting 
women’s rights’ (Farris 2017).
In 2003 migrant partners were refused access to public funds of the 
welfare state and had to provide certification that their houses were not 
‘overcrowded’ (Gedalof 2007). English language proficiency became a 
requirement of partners in family unification cases by 2010. Such policy 
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changes were saturated with racialised logics of control. For instance, 
whilst justifying the new crackdown on sham marriages in 2002, Home 
Secretary David Blunkett argued that Asian communities practising 
arranged marriages should choose potential spouses from within the 
British Asian community, rather than risk putting their daughters in 
danger (BBC 2002a). Changing their ‘traditional’ practices was a fair 
demand, according to Blunkett, because ‘those who come into our home 
– for that is what it is – should accept those norms’ (quoted in Brown 
2011). Not only were Asian communities ‘guests’ – forever unwanted 
migrants – but they were undermining the ‘genuine’ family home of 
white Britons.
Whilst campaigners struggled to criminalise forced marriage in 
legislation (until 2014) – mainly because of resistance from black feminist 
groups (see Larasi et al. 2014; Wilson 2014) – depictions of forced 
marriage bolstered further immigration practices focused on shams. 
In 2008 the age at which someone could sponsor a migrant partner 
was raised to 21. The proposal was viewed as a way of limiting forced 
marriage as younger adults were viewed as overly susceptible to the 
pressure of both their family and community (Home Office 2007). In 
turn, it reminds us that communities practising intercontinental marriage 
will always remain immature. And furthermore, that forced marriage 
travels to Britain from former colonies.
The hypervisibility of forced marriage was greeted with thoughtful 
concern from many black and Asian women’s associations, many of 
whom argued against criminalisation and the conflation of forced 
marriage and immigration (see Southall Black Sisters 2001; Wilson 
2007; Razack 2008; Larasi et al. 2014). This was often ignored by law 
makers. Instead, paternalistic and often overtly colonial logics saturated 
discussion of shams in this period. For example, during the unveiling 
of civil legislation against forced marriage in the House of Lords, Lord 
Lester argued that the amendment was a direct continuity of reforms 
to eliminate the ‘barbaric’ practices of sati and child marriage in colonial 
India (Hansard 2007). Colonial nostalgia here begets contemporary 
coloniality.
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Family visa rule changes
In 2012, in a move that many commentators viewed as the return of 
primary purpose, the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition govern-
ment introduced a complete overhaul of the family migration route. 
Here the multiple delineations of the sham coalesced to re-energise 
further intimate bordering. Whilst Pakistani and Bangladeshi com-
munities were made hypervisible within Home Office reports (see Home 
Office 2011a; 2011b), the government made it explicitly clear that 
community practices of arranged marriage would be protected in future 
changes. Instead, policy makers focused on creating an ‘objective’ template 
of what a ‘family’ should and could be (Home Office 2011a: 7), so as to 
regulate marriages of convenience, forced marriage and ‘in-genuine’ 
and ‘un-subsisting’ relationships all at once. However, this ‘objective 
template’ of partnerships was informed by a particular white, bourgeois 
imaginary of liberal romantic love, household governance and equally 
energised through a fear of suspicious and deviant intimacies.
Changes to the family visa after 2012 meant that in order to live 
with a partner from outside the European Economic Area (EEA), British 
citizens and settled persons had to earn at least £18,600 a year, effectively 
barring 47  per  cent of those working in Britain from applying. The 
non-EEA partner also had to prove a higher standard level of English 
than previously accepted, and the couple was forced to evidence cohabita-
tion (or proof of intention of cohabitation). Theresa May, then Home 
Secretary, made it clear that this new visa system was about distinguishing 
between ‘genuine’ and ‘in-genuine’ relationships, and about providing 
a material and objective test that these relationships were ‘subsisting’ 
(Home Office 2011a). The changes to the visa were equally accompanied 
with more stringent reporting duties tasked to registrars administrating 
marriage; they were given a checklist to investigate whether the marriage 
they were due to perform was one of ‘convenience’ or ‘forced’ (Carver 
2016: 273).
The 2012 regime effectively works to regulate the possibility of a 
whole host of undomesticated intimacies moving for settlement. It does 
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so by testing household income as an ingredient of a ‘subsisting relation-
ship’. But it equally judges applicants on intimate histories of their lives 
together in ways that emulate specific norms of heterosexist ‘progress’, 
such as through evidencing marriage, sharing private property, cohabita-
tion, savings, reproduction, childrearing, shared language (see Turner 
and Vera Espinoza 2019). In this setting, the sham works to queer 
certain groups as outside of the ‘modern’ family and nation. Whilst 
same-sex couples can increasingly be included in legal rights to family 
life, if they emulate the domestic arrangements and progressive imprint 
of liberal consumption, monogamy and choice, this works to exclude 
a host of other intimacies and practices of kinship which are marked 
as unfamilial (for parallels see Puar 2008).
Because of the way that forced marriage conditioned the reforms 
and the apparent ‘over-representation’ of South Asian communities in 
histories of family migration (Sirriyeh 2015; also see Home Office 2011a: 
43–45), the Home Office’s ‘objective template’ needs to be seen as a site 
for producing and monitoring racialised-sexualised deviancy. The visa 
does this by also excluding other non-normative intimacies such as 
non-married homosexual couples, multiple-partner relationships, non-
cohabiting couples, the poor/workless, which are also managed by the 
distinction of the ‘genuine’ or ‘sham’ couple.
It is important to recognise that the push to discover shams through 
complex categories of domesticity has had a dramatic effect on visa 
application and refusal rates. Between 2007 and 2015 applications for 
all forms of migration for family life fell by 52 per cent. Family unification 
figures (i.e. those moving to be with a British citizen or settled person) 
also show a dramatic decrease of 41 per cent in the same period, from 
53,300 in 2006 to 21,600 in 2015 (Blinder 2017). With the introduction 
of high-income requirements in 2012, refusal rates for family unification 
rose from 16 per cent in 2011 to over 40 per cent in the last quarter of 
2012 (Blinder 2017). Such rates of refusal are seen as a success by the 
Home Office in both meeting targets to lower immigration and in the 
context of the government’s hostile environment to weed out scams 
and sham marriages.
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To appreciate the colonial racialised-sexualised logics at work here, 
it is worth noting how refusal rates for family unification visas differ 
starkly based on country of origin. For example, the refusal rates in 
2016 for family unification of partners from Pakistan was 40.6 per cent, 
Nigeria 49.1 per cent and India 31.8 per cent; meanwhile, the refusal 
rate for those from the US, Canada and Australia varied from 10 to 
14 per cent (Home Office 2016). If mobility was arranged around an 
explicit imperial colour line throughout the nineteenth and mid-twentieth 
centuries, this is reimposed starkly here. The imperial colour line 
regarding movement and settlement is organised around whether intimate 
relations are deemed ‘genuine’ or ‘sham’. Whilst appearing to be about 
economic and technical criteria, the visa is able to function as tool of 
racial governance, and it does so in classic neoliberal fashion by appearing 
to be ‘without race’ (Goldberg 2008). This is not about race, the story 
goes – merely about ‘genuine’ and ‘subsisting’ family forms (for an 
alternative reading see Kofman 2018).
The body and the border
The manner in which claims to family are increasingly evaluated and 
evidenced in this regime of intimate bordering is important. Just as 
previous border regimes focused on the body in order to read and 
assess shams, so does this one. ‘Proving’ that someone is not in a ‘genuine’ 
relationship involves a commitment to both an ideal of coupledom 
(culturally located) but also an assessment of the feelings of love which 
are viewed as innermost – that is, as embodied and affective (D’Aoust 
2018). The enhancement of registrars’ obligation to report suspected 
sham marriages and civil partnerships (from 2014) reflects the affective 
and embodied politics of assessing the ‘non-genuineness’ of couples. 
Civil registrars across Britain must now assess every couple who want 
to register a marriage or civil partnership. But of course, given the 
existing racialised-sexualised coordinates of the sham, this all is disin-
genuous. This assessment can occur during the interview conducted 
when applying for a ceremony or on the day of a ceremony itself (Home 
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Office 2014a). If reported to the Home Office, sham couples can have 
their ceremonies interrupted, their union revoked and face criminal 
prosecution and deportation. Since 2014, EU nationals involved in sham 
marriages can also be considered for deportation. This is significant, 
as prior to this such practices focused on non-EU nationals (Home 
Office 2015: 14).
The strategy of Home Office officials arriving to break up ceremonies 
is a reminder of how central the spectacular protection of heteronormative 
institutions alone is to the politics of shams (D’Aoust 2018; Wemyss et 
al. 2018). Just as border officials judge the embodied intimacy of the 
couple, eye contact, affection, body language, shared languages, caresses, 
handholding, kissing all become features of the ‘look of love’, which 
registrars now use to assess a couple who may be sitting in a municipal 
waiting area or embarking on a civil ceremony (Home Affairs Select 
Committee 2014). Here the ‘paper identity’ of a visa assessment slips 
over into judgements made about the deeper ‘truth’ of the migrant’s 
body and its relation to others (White 2014).
It is worth remembering how imperial regulation of movement often 
fixated on the racialised body to evidence and reveal inner and intimate 
‘truths’. Border officials in South Africa policing indentured labourers 
at the turn of the twentieth century relied upon judgements as to whether 
a child looked like they were related to an accompanying adult. Such 
judgements conditioned whether a child or dependent could be allowed 
to travel with a family member and claim the rights of a British subject. 
This was coded through skin, eye or hair colour, dress and their man-
nerisms towards each other. Shah (2012) reminds us of how disease 
screenings in North American ports from 1870 surveilled the migrants’ 
body for the inner truth of their productivity. Here urine and stool 
samples provided an ‘inherent truth’ of whether a migrant would be a 
burden on the state through disease, immoral practice or ‘unsuitability’ 
for labour (Shah 2012: 200). The invasive ‘virginity tests’ performed on 
South Asian fiancées at UK airports in the 1970s demonstrated how 
the colonised and feminised body is expected to reveal intimate truths 
that ‘paper reality’ (a passport or visa) obscures. In this context the 
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push to re-centre bodily relations in the assessment and evidencing of 
shams, in both the spectacle of the wedding ceremony and the registrar 
interview, follows a history of such bodily scrutiny and, with it, ways 
of seeing (see chapter 6 for more on this). Such intimate bordering is 
always about capturing but also permitting the ‘inner truth’ of the 
potentially devious body and its affective relations.
The sham in late liberalism
As I have set out above, the sham does a lot of work to energise intimate 
borders. It intensifies scrutiny over migrants’ bodies and the policing 
of racialised communities, limits the possibility of international intima-
cies, and it regulates an evolving colour line around family unification 
to the UK. It makes judgements on proximities and the potentiality of 
‘family’ within the now national space. This means breaking up, separating 
and intervening in kinship and intimate relationship that appear 
unfamilial. In the last chapter I discussed the centrality of taxonomies 
of marriage and family forms to colonial government, particularly the 
way that family forms were networked into legal systems of colonial 
states (private property, inheritance, marriage) and then into the regula-
tion of imperial mobility (through ports of exit, entry, labour camps, 
shipping mandates). The parallels to the function of the sham deserve 
teasing out, and in doing so they will help us think through a colonial 
and racial rather than only national orientation of intimate borders and 
the violence they reproduce.
Whilst the intimate bordering attached to shams is considered to be 
about fraud and the violence of forced marriage, it is equally energised 
by developmental logics of ‘liberal love’ and tenses of modernity and 
backwardness (Povinelli 2006). As I have previously discussed, nineteenth 
century family forms were organised around an evolutionary hierarchy 
of humanity, with the white heterosexual family at the top and black 
kinship patterns at the bottom (see Hoad 2007: 56; Sharpe 2010). 
Arguably, this template of heteronormative ‘progress’ continues under 
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the guise of the ‘modern family’, defined as it is by liberal notions of 
choice, consumptive domesticity and love. It is these colonial hierarchies 
of intimacy/family/humanity that are reasserted through the policing 
of the sham and UK visa rules.
Berlant (1997) argues that what is central to liberalism is the autono-
mous, bodied intimacy of the liberal subject, who through mythologies 
of private/public and inner sanctuary (see McKeon 2005) is presented 
as having a pre-political/social capacity for love. Romantic love (often 
heterosexualised) is viewed as the pillar of modern liberal subjectivity 
because it relies upon the festishising of ‘choice’ and the passion of 
‘intimate’ emotions (which are internal to the individual subject), as 
well as coalescing around heteronormative appeals to childrearing and 
parenthood. Here we should consider how liberal love becomes a 
particularly powerful way of reasserting secularised forms of Christian 
marriage as the template of domestic modernity and progress. Whilst 
these claims to liberal love are ‘universal’ (i.e. everyone has a capacity 
to love in the same way), this is built on distinctions between liberal/
progressive and backwards/illiberal intimacies, which equally replicate 
the distinctions between the white and black family (Collins 1998). To 
Povinelli (2006), ‘progressive’, forward-looking (autonomous) subjects 
choose their intimate relations and reproduce out of love. Against this, 
‘backwards’ cultures – what Povinelli calls ‘genealogical communities’ 
– are instead bound by tradition, obligation and duty. They are rendered 
underdeveloped, stuck in a distant past without ‘value’. Here who is 
backwards- or forwards-facing, who has value, is arranged around 
supposedly universal claims to intimacy (such as the claim that the UK 
visa is about ‘genuine couples’).
As we can witness with the above examples of the role the sham 
performs in UK immigration practices, who can access rights is organised 
around how they match up to the (white) ‘modern family’ – that is, how 
they emulate notions of genuine intimacy and domesticity. This is detailed 
in visa regimes where applicants must prove they are ‘genuinely’ intimate 
by evidencing that they are a ‘romantic couple’, with the particular affective 
and behavioural bonds this assumes, such as communicating and feeling 
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towards each other in ways that are intelligible to the state (D’Aoust 
2018). Evidence of appropriate domesticity is then judged on evidencing 
cohabitation, consumption, private property, economic productivity, 
wage labour. This became enshrined in legal and bureaucratic practice 
with the 2012 family unification visa changes with the new income 
requirement and tests of ‘genuineness’.
This system arguably provides a new taxonomy of family forms where 
people are placed in a hierarchy of worthy/suspect/unworthy intimacies. 
Here bodies and communities (such as South Asian and Muslim com-
munities) can be demarcated as ‘backwards’ because of an adherence 
to ‘tradition’ and ‘cultural practices’ which are viewed as working against 
the evolutionary empowerment of women, minority sexualities and 
apparently universal race-blind values of romantic ‘autonomy’ or ‘choice’. 
They are cast as always/already imminently suspect. These notions of 
the ‘modern family’ thus produce racialised effects without appealing 
to race. Because the modern family is naturalised as universal, against 
which everything else is a sham, people are racialised by their relationship 
to ‘backwards’ kinship practices. They are judged as to whether they 
have ‘developed’ towards the template of the modern family. Far from 
being objective, the current template of family within the UK visa system 
directly polices people moving from ex-colonies such as Nigeria, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan. This is the ongoing coordination of ‘family’ 
as racial governance.
In order to assess where people fit within this reworked taxonomy, 
authorities rely on further colonial practices of intimate bordering. 
Judgements are made concerning the ‘look of love’ by border agents, 
registrars, lawyers. Such judgements are networked through cultural 
notions of what is properly familial and appropriately intimate. This is 
colonial not only because of the continuity of orientalist representation. 
This form of liberal government shares a series of logics, knowledge 
and practices which are recalibrated and adapted across imperial time 
and space, and continues to shape who has access to modes of reproduc-
tion – that is, who is sustained and fostered and who is excluded or 
abandoned.
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Once we take the dynamics of where the majority of applications 
for family unification originate from into account, we need to see this 
within a history of imperial citizenship. We should remember here that 
the revoking of imperial citizenship in 1981 turned Commonwealth 
citizens into migrants without rights to settlement in the UK, which 
they had held, up until this point, through historical birth right. The 
movement of people for family life is in part driven by the necessity of 
diasporas (created by empire) to sustain themselves. What the discourse 
of the sham does is obscure the fact that until 1981 and prior immigration 
acts, these communities had a right to move and settle in the UK. And 
that bonds of kinship, histories of mobility, the material grooves of 
dependencies across the structurally unequal ‘commonwealth’ continue 
to shape who moves where.
The emergence of the discourse of shams energises the racial-sexualised 
hierarchies of empire (by deciding who is genuine/sham). It equally 
hides the way that colonised peoples have been dispossessed of legal 
heritage and rights, and the unequal structure of racialised/imperial 
capitalism which enriched the metropole at the expense and dispossession 
of colonies, which remain impoverished (for a parallel argument see 
Andrews 2018: 28–33). Think for a moment why many of the poorest 
former colonies, such as Bangladesh, remain such large contributors 
to family unification. This is no accident.
The imperilled and unintegrated woman
‘Liberal love’ plays a significant role in how hierarchies of civilisation 
are readdressed in contemporary government. But what equally drives 
the bordering process around shams is a particular racialised-gendered 
figuration of feminised victimhood. This is the figure of the unintegrated 
female migrant. This figuration does a huge amount of political and 
cultural work to sustain the domesticating force of colonial government 
– it gives bordering life and flesh.
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To Weber (2016: 28), ‘figurations’ are repeated tropes, images 
and imaginaries that come to dominate social meaning and produce 
common-sense understandings about political phenomena. As Razack 
(2008) has argued, it is the ‘imperilled Muslim woman’ who propels 
so much of the debate surrounding forced marriage across Europe. In 
this section, I want to sketch out how variations of this figuration are 
located within the bordering moves attached to the sham, but also in 
the wider cultural and political landscape of late liberal Britain. I show 
how the unintegrated woman was increasingly Muslimified post-2001, 
and became known as a victim of traditional patriarchal culture. After 
the 7/7 bombings in London and the growth of ‘homegrown’ radi-
calisation, this passivity has been translated into complicity and active 
engagement with the reproduction of terrorism. This shows the extent 
to which intimate borders not only shape immigration policy around 
shams but also wider forms of rule such as integration and security 
strategies.
The imperilled brown woman holds a significant place in the annals 
of colonial government, often rehearsed in the axiom of ‘white men 
(and women) saving brown women from brown men’ (Spivak 1988). 
If the figuration of black womanhood was haunted by the afterlife of 
slavery, oversexualised and unchangeable, the ‘brown woman’ was known 
as underdeveloped but often ‘saveable’ – invariably not-quite rather than 
non-human. The reformist agenda of imperial feminism focused on the 
particular predicament of colonised women who were viewed as an 
un-emancipated and underdeveloped form of femininity in places such 
as India (Mohanty 1984; Grewal 1996). As Mohanty (1984) argues, the 
figure of the colonised and underdeveloped woman has historically 
worked to shore up white, feminine subjecthood as ‘progressive’ (also 
see Lorde 2007). In this context, white femininity is viewed as supported 
and sustained by the ‘modern family’ (as a less patriarchal and eman-
cipated sexual arrangement); against this, underdeveloped femininity 
is presented as trapped within the structures of backwards kinship, 
patriarchal violence and the third-world home.
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Sham marriage is depicted as working at the expense of women. 
Women can be at risk of importing patriarchal husbands from abroad. 
However, the more dominant figuration of the ‘at-risk’ woman is as the 
newly arrived migrant-housewife. To MP Ann Cryer, defending the 
push to criminalise forced marriage, the problem is that ‘Asian girls 
who are brought in as wives are frequently abandoned by their husbands 
and their in-laws’ (BBC 2002b, my emphasis). Here the feminised subject 
is coerced and passive to demands of patriarchal culture. She is only 
ever a wife and only ever ‘brought in’. But she is also risky because she 
is assumed to be unintegratable.
From 1999 this at-risk femininity shaped bordering strategies which 
were intensified after the onset of the War on Terror. Reflecting the 
higher percentage of women who apply through the family migration 
route (Blinder 2017), borders increasingly focused on the need for female 
migrants to ‘integrate’ and ‘partake’ in British society. It was assumed 
that as male migrants were expected to work, they would learn English. 
Against this, the female migrant was assumed to be housebound – 
removed from the labour market, unable to speak English or learn 
‘British values’. The removal of welfare benefits in 2002 for non-EEA 
partners focused on this ‘problem’, as did the requirement to speak 
English and take the British citizenship test prior to naturalisation (see 
Turner 2014). Such strategies were viewed as ‘supporting’ the figure of 
the non-English-speaking housewife into the labour market and out 
of the ghettoisation of minority communities (Home Office 2011a). 
Deploying ideas of ‘undeserving’ welfare scroungers, the female migrant 
was viewed as needing coercive support to reach her ‘potential’ and 
‘contribute to British society’. To Theresa May, this was why an objective 
test of intimacy was needed for family migrants (Home Office 2011a). 
Just as testing migrants’ knowledge of British society became a require-
ment of citizenship, emulating practices of intimacy and cohabitation 
became a requirement for settlement and proof of a potentiality for 
harbouring ‘(un)British values’.
The gendered character of these bordering practices has been shared in 
other areas of social government, particularly with regard to integration. 
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In 2016 the ‘Integration Tsar’ Louise Casey authored a government 
report which mirrored the concerns of previous immigration policies 
but focused on settled communities of racialised citizens. In the report 
the ‘dangers’ of communities living ‘separate’ or ‘ghettoised’ lives was 
viewed as a failed strategy of a too-generous family migration regime 
(Casey 2016). What made this problem worse was that ‘minority’ women, 
it was supposed, were failing to integrate into British society (also see 
Cantle 2002). Muslim women, the report argued, exemplified this trend. 
They were presented as lacking opportunities in the job market, bound 
to domestic duties, rarely speaking adequate English and tied to the 
demands of reproductive labour.
We can thus place Casey’s report in a tradition of both imperial 
feminism but also an example of what Farris calls ‘femonationalism’, 
where the discourse of feminist works to energise white nationalist 
stigmatisation of ‘unprogressive’ and ‘anti-women’ cultures (Farris 2017). 
To Casey, the oppression of women is structured by the Muslim com-
munity and household where ‘women are treated as second-class citizens’ 
(Casey 2016: 120). Whilst women themselves were to blame for this 
social breakdown and tasked with their own emancipation, the ultimate 
responsibility for this lagging behind was the patriarchy, misogyny and 
homophobia of Islam.2
What is significant about the Casey report is that it works to silence 
the patriarchal structures of contemporary liberal capitalism, forces 
which often push women into precarious and reproductive labour and 
the way that immigration practices enhance this gendered and raced 
precarity and vulnerability (Anderson 2013; Tepe-Belfrage and Mont-
gomerie 2016). Instead, oppression is deemed cultural (Razack 2008). 
To Casey, this is about ‘cultural values’ and behaviour: ‘The harms and 
inequalities [of non-integration] are often a result of practices and 
behaviours that are out of step with modern British values and in many 
cases the law’ (Casey 2016: 120). What Casey views as the fault of 
patriarchal Islam in creating ‘unintegrated’ and ‘unlawful’ bodies and 
spaces (the urban ghetto and the immigrant household) also became 
tied to the risk of terrorism, as ‘unintegrated’ communities and failed 
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households create a further risk of ‘radicalisation’ (Casey 2016: 46). The 
unintegrated (Muslim) woman is described here, as she is more widely, 
as both ‘at risk’ and ‘risky’.
Haunting these depictions of the unintegrated (Muslim) woman are 
past colonial figurations which join up and reveal her predicament. 
The unintegrated (Muslim) woman is spatialised within the confines 
of the household – that is, hidden away from the proper public space 
of the labour market, civil value and emancipated (white) femininity. 
Shades of light and dark become important metaphors of civility here, 
just as they did with debates concerning purdah, the harem and sati in 
British India (Grewal 1996). The murky space of the unintegrated 
household is a site of cultural dangers – where English is not spoken, 
where ‘tradition’ rules, where claustrophobic patriarchy oppresses 
expression, individuality and eventually love. The path to modernity is 
throwing open the shutters and letting the light in.
Just as failed black motherhood was defined by an absence of 
patriarchy, the suspicious intimacy of the Muslim family is too much 
patriarchy. As her relations are only ever a sham, the Muslim woman 
is unable to experience (or is held back from) progressive intimacy and 
the choice of liberal romantic love – linked to both the financial autonomy 
of work and ‘breaking free’ of her community bonds. She is unable to 
contribute to the value of the nation and liberal progress. The task of 
authorities is rationalised by intervening in these intimate relations and 
modernising them.
As Razack (2008) argues, the unintegrated (Muslim) woman can 
be ‘saved’ and offered shelter in the national ‘home’ but only if she 
renounces her community and reforms. This paternalistic dynamic 
dominated during the early 2000s, promising ‘inclusion’ and support 
to modernise (Wilson 2007). However, with the extension and expansion 
of counter-terrorism logics across numerous areas of social government, 
the Muslim woman is increasingly cast as dangerous and in need of 
more disciplinary domestication. Tactics of ‘integration’ found in the 
Casey report increasingly mirror the concerns of the security services 
and the production of the British Muslim community into a ‘suspicious 
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community’ after 9/11 and the London bombings of 2007. The notions 
of women not speaking English or no English being spoken in the home 
fixate on fears about the socialisation of children as future citizens (Casey 
2016: 55, 58, 117); getting women into the labour market is a battle of 
values to get minorities to ‘contribute’ to the nation; learning British 
values is viewed as essential for containing and battling ‘radicalisation’ 
within the home.
This heterosexual futurism increasingly locates (Muslim) motherhood 
as a socio-biological threat to the civilised nation. With the ‘rise of 
Islam’ figured as an existential threat to white European and British 
order, this has connected to an increased interest in Malthusian demo-
graphic science where European Muslims are presented as ‘taking over’ 
other settled communities (see Sherwood 2017).
Casey (2016: 9) poses this threat in terms of how ‘international 
marriage’ brings in new and ‘unintegrated’ migrant bodies who fail to 
adapt to British ways of life (bound as they are to backwards spaces):
Rates of integration in some communities may have been undermined 
by high levels of transnational marriage – with subsequent generations 
being joined by a foreign-born partner, creating a ‘first generation in 
every generation’ phenomenon in which each new generation grows up 
with a foreign-born parent. This seems particularly prevalent in South 
Asian communities. We were told on one visit to a northern town that 
all except one of the Asian councillors had married a wife from Pakistan. 
And in a cohort study at the Bradford Royal Infirmary, 80% of babies 
of Pakistani ethnicity in the area had at least one parent born outside  
the UK.
The social problem here is directly presented as a cycle of reproductive 
takeover. Geographies of race (those ‘strangers’ coming from elsewhere) 
meet the push to whiten and civilise (‘integrate’) existing minority com-
munities. The resistance of citizens of colour to integration into the nation 
is revealed in the will to sustain their strangeness through intercontinental 
marriage and reproduction – symbolised in the ‘wife from Pakistan’. 
The sham is less about these marriages being ‘of convenience’ or even 
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‘in-genuine’ or ‘forced’. The sham here is the reproduction of racialised 
bodies birthed by the ‘unintegrated’ (Muslim) woman.
Here what underpins questions of shams in immigration policy 
are not only concerns about marriages of convenience but also about 
the maintenance of a broader domestic order. The undomesticated/
unintegrated Muslim woman is central to the restrictive immigration 
policies and changes to family migration visas. But this equally ener-
gises and drives broader racialised concerns about the demography of 
contemporary Britain, and the reproduction of settled citizens with 
questions of security. From being ‘at risk’, and a subject of interventionist 
tactics to ‘save’ her, the unintegrated woman is increasingly viewed as 
‘risky’, a threat to be managed. This reveals how intimate bordering 
joins up across different areas of government, affecting migrants and 
racialised, settled communities in connected ways.
Counter-terrorism and intimate borders
Logics of reproduction, natalism and heteronormative intimacy that I 
began to uncover above have played an increasingly vocal role in the 
contemporary deployment of counter-terrorism in Britain. This connects 
up with the way that the War on Terror has been fought through the 
enforcement of heteronormativity (and homonormativity) globally (Puar 
2008). For instance, it has long been suggested by security services and 
the judiciary that incidents of forced marriage could provide information 
on the whereabouts of Islamic extremism and terrorist activity (Wilson 
2014). Crown Prosecutor Nazir Afzal argued in 2014 that there was a 
distinct correlation between ‘hotspots of radicalism and hotspots of 
honour-based violence’:
If you went in the Special Branch of the Terrorist Unit and looked at 
their map, you would see significant links, significant correlation [to 
incidents of forced marriage]. So, maybe there is something about … 
extremism, the way people think around those issues, that links in with 
what happens with women in their families too. (Quoted in Wilson 2014)
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Through this logic, ‘extreme’ beliefs which lead to terrorism are born 
out of what happens in families. If you follow the treatment and body of 
the unintegrated woman – at risk of forced marriage – you will eventu-
ally find extremists/terrorists, so the narrative goes. Of course, such a 
bonding together of concerns about the treatment of women to questions 
of terrorism is hardly novel. Feminist and postcolonial scholars have 
shown how the feminisation and sexualisation of ‘others’ has structured 
the Global War on Terror, driving imperialist ‘saviour complexes’ and 
the wider grammar of suffering/violence (Rao 2014; Richter-Montpetit 
2014; Welland 2015; Weber 2016). UK counter-terrorism has reproduced 
these global dynamics. However, since 2010 and the extension of the 
Prevent strategy, ‘family values’ have been increasingly weaponised as a 
means of finding and combating terrorists (Puar and Rai 2002; Cowen 
and Gilbert 2008). Here the figure of the unintegrated (Muslim) woman 
is not only constituted through victimhood but also as an alive and 
present danger.
Prevent and sham families
Over the course of the late 2000s the development of UK counter-
terrorism, working in tandem with the deployment of counter-insurgency 
practice in the colonial wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, would begin to 
focus on preventing threats of ‘extremism’. In various evolutions of the 
project, this has meant focusing attention on Muslimified households 
and the intimacies within them for signs of ‘radicalisation’. After the 
7/7 attacks in London, counter-terrorism authorities stepped up their 
implementation of the anti-radicalisation programme known as the 
Prevent strategy. Originally conceived to promote a form of self-
governance over Muslim communities and organisations in the UK, 
after 2010 Prevent increasingly drew upon the recent experiences of 
counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq (and Northern Ireland, 
Kenya and Malaysia) (Sabir 2017). Prevent focused on extending 
responsibilities for reporting extremism and radicalisation, seen as the 
underlying cause of violence, onto a host of social government bodies. 
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From 2015 any public-facing organisation in the UK has had a legal 
duty to report possible incidences of radicalisation, defined as espousing 
or being socialised into ‘extreme views’. As I have argued elsewhere, if 
counter-insurgency is known as ‘armed social work’, then in the UK 
social work has become a natural ally of counter-terrorism (Turner 
2018; also see Owens 2015). With new reporting obligations, social 
work (alongside health, educational, welfare service) became a key tool 
in monitoring radicalisation born out of suspicious intimacies.
In 2015 Birmingham City Council became the first authority in 
Britain to add the risk of radicalisation to their categorisation for assessing 
‘troubled families’. Troubled families are families that can be subject to 
disciplinary interventions by the state based on a number of socio-
economic and behavioural factors, from intergenerational worklessness 
to child truancy (see Casey 2012; Crossley 2016; Turner 2018). This 
inclusion, it should be noted, came in the wake of the ‘Trojan Horse’ 
scandal, in which reports claimed that certain schools in the city were 
teaching and practising ‘radical’ forms of Islam (even if the reports 
were later discredited). The inclusion of radicalisation into the definition 
of troubled families reflects how social workers nationally are now 
expected to monitor the familial relations of households for signs of 
radicalisation. Issues of child protection and safeguarding vulnerable 
individuals are now built into the official guidance on how to spot ‘those 
being drawn into terrorism’. As Prevent duty guidance reveals:
The Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 places a duty on local 
authorities to give due regard to support people from being drawn into 
terrorism. This includes identifying individuals at risk of being drawn 
into terrorism, assessing risk and developing appropriate support to 
address that risk. The government states that this needs to be incorporated 
into existing policies and procedures; in particular the need to do this 
within local authority safeguarding is highlighted. (HM Government 
2015)
The ‘assessment of risk’ as to whether someone is being radicalised is 
thus networked into the existing logics and practices of social work. 
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Social workers are seen as a key resource here because of the way that 
they can access the ‘private’ interior of households and observe the 
function of the family. Child safeguarding is a particular focus in 
counter-terrorism practice because young children are viewed as distinctly 
at risk of being radicalised and taking up ‘unBritish values’. This has 
been intensified through elite claims linking terrorism with child abuse, 
as demonstrated in an article in the Telegraph in 2014 where Boris 
Johnson, then Mayor of London, argued that the radicalisation of children 
urgently needed to be treated as a form of such. Following this, in 2015 
a UK court ruled that that the parents of a 16-year-old girl were emotion-
ally abusing her through exposure to ‘ISIS propaganda’ (McKendrick 
and Finch 2015).
As with the risk of forced marriage, terrorism is continually presented 
as a cultural problem in which Muslim parents teach their children the 
dangerous practices of Islam and intimately socialise them into deviant/
terroristic activities. Here the take-up of terrorism is not cast solely in 
terms of dangerous masculinity (see chapter 4) but as a feminised process 
of socialisation within the family, in which motherhood is made highly 
visible. Practitioners’ training guides for Prevent make this fear of 
proximity and reproduction explicit (see Smitherson and White 2017). 
It is suggested that ‘high-risk indicators of radicalisation’ are not neces-
sarily holding or expressing ‘extreme views’ but living in proximity to 
someone expressing extreme views (Smitherson and White 2017: 10).3 
Further emphasising the socio-sexual and affective dimension of child 
radicalisation, it is often viewed as a form of ‘grooming’ (for more on 
this see London Safeguarding Children Board 2018 and the next chapter).
Social workers are supposed to jointly assess ‘risk of extremism’ as 
they identify other risks such as child abuse, absence of care, domestic 
violence. Here factors which may be used to assess radicalisation or the 
potential for radicalisation in the bodies of children are often linked to 
existing imaginaries of the intolerable (familial) practices of Muslim 
communities. For example, ‘medium risk indicators’ of radicalisation are 
whether a child is ‘at risk from harmful cultural practices … e.g. FGM 
[female genital mutilation], Forced Marriage, removal from education, 
Bordering intimacy128
honour based violence, abuse linked to faith or belief, etc.’ (Smitherson 
and White 2017: 11).
Radicalisation is constituted here as a ‘cultural process’ attached to 
Islam. Radicalisation emerges from other intolerable ‘cultural practices’ 
again symbolically attached to the ‘sham families’ of Muslim communities. 
Radicalisation is child abuse; radicalisation is born out of the milieu 
of the Muslim family; existing familial problems (family breakdown, 
alienation, generation conflict) become in this way translated into 
terrorism. This mirrors claims that littered the Casey report, in which 
the figure of the unintegrated (Muslim) woman provided a breeding 
ground for radicalisation. If the unintegrated woman migrant risked 
reproducing unBritish values in her home and through the body of her 
children, here the intimate space of the Muslimified home is a radicalising 
space. Just as sham marriage is presented as a danger of immigration 
that threatens ‘real’ marriage and family, the War on Terror becomes 
fought within the home of the sham family.
Unsurprisingly, whilst social work guidance notes stress that ‘extrem-
ism’ should be interpreted broadly as including far-right or even 
environmental extremism, 90 per cent of all referrals to Channel (the 
‘community’ arm of Prevent) in 2015 were of Muslims. The intimate 
bordering that social work now performs can be orientated towards 
intelligence gathering; it can lead to the targeting of subjects for anti-
radicalisation programmes, just as it can be about taking children into 
care. As radicalisation is treated as an issue of national security, the 
intimate surveillance of social work is bound to mundane and exceptional 
forms of security – arresting, imprisoning and even deporting subjects 
thought to be a threat (Kapoor 2018). Precisely because of the way that 
terrorism is viewed as secretly ‘bred’ within spaces of failed domesticity 
– such as the proximity of children to ‘extreme’ views – the Muslimified 
household becomes reconfigured as a space of (un)known dangers, but 
also as a site of preventative management and control.
As I have demonstrated over the course of the last section, the figure 
of the unintegrated (Muslim) woman is able to capture a host of related 
anxieties about the intimate family ‘problem’ of racialised communities, 
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of postcolonial British society, mobility and insecurity. As with the 
threat of sham marriage, the sham family and sham mother present 
multiple dangers which demand intervention by the state in ways that 
mirror past forms of control. The unintegrated woman is at risk and 
always risky. She must be ‘helped’ and protected but also protected 
against. Tied as she is the failure of the Muslim family, she (and her 
household) becomes a site to struggle over, domesticate and reform for 
the future of heteronormative order and the preservation of Britishness. 
In keeping with the global/imperial logics of the War on Terror, she is 
cast as a failure by not being part of the modern family and yet she is 
viewed as threatening it through her ‘backwardness’. In doing so she 
risks threatening not only British society but the order of (white) Western 
civilisation.
Conclusions
Discussions of sham marriages have had an increasing amount of 
attention in academic scholarship and within the media (for example 
see Wray et al. 2015; Kofman 2018; Wemyss et al. 2018). Much of this 
work and media attention has focused on how family migration policy 
has taken an evermore restrictive direction, leading to the break-up, 
detention, separation of international and migrant families. The deten-
tion of families in centres such as Yarl’s Wood and the separation of 
children and parents seeking asylum on entry to the United States 
under the Trump administration has brought such policies into starker 
focus. Liberal, pro-migrant rights activists and media campaigns have 
tended to focus their attention on repealing these laws and practices 
by highlighting how immigration rules break up and destroy ‘real’ 
families. Campaigns such as the ‘Divided Family Campaign’, ‘Bring 
them Home’ or ‘Love Letters to the Home Office’ constantly invoke 
heteronormative images of family life to demonstrate what is threat-
ened by these intimate borders.4 I approach this work with some 
caution.
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In this chapter I have instead shown how the sham has poured 
scrutiny on the intimate relations of migrant subjects and settled 
communities alike. In viewing ‘family’ as central to empire-making, 
both historically and within contemporary Britain, I have explored 
the political work that appeals to family (and in this case the modern 
family) make possible. For example, it is a claim to ‘genuine’ family life 
that continues to drive intimate bordering practices such as scrutiny of 
migrant families, or social work interventions regarding radicalisation. 
In light of this, it is of course important to recognise who is allowed 
access to family life and to map out where family rights are eviscerated 
(as many pro-migrant campaigns do). However, calling for a defence 
of family rights without scrutiny of the history of the Empire, fails to 
get at the heart of the problem we are dealing with in Britain and other 
northern states. By appealing to save ‘real’ families, this fails to appreciate 
the multiple subjects who are queered and racialised through an appeal 
to ‘real’ families. Instead, this chapter has explored how an appeal to 
protect ‘real’ families and cast others as shams already drives colonial 
power.
In tracing the multiple reincarnations of the sham – sham marriage, 
sham intimacy, sham family, sham motherhood – I have shown how 
demarcations around the ‘genuine’ or ‘sham’ family energise different 
intimate borders, from immigration and integration strategy, to social 
work and counter-terrorism. I have shown how the sham is concerned 
with delineations between ‘genuine’ families and suspicious intimacies. 
Whilst the idea of the sham emerged in relation to immigration practice 
and the mobility of people for family life, the idea that people can be 
distinguished into those who are properly familial and those who are 
shams has many manifestations. It is not only migrants that are policed 
here through scrutiny of sham intimacy. As I showed with the discussion 
of forced marriage, reforms surrounding the discovering and capturing 
of sham marriages not only concerned mobility but the domestication 
of settled racialised communities within the UK. Whilst immigration 
policies have produced evolving forms of intimate borders to regulate 
international marriage and partnerships, integration strategies, policing, 
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social work and counter-terrorism operations have coalesced to discover 
and monitor ‘sham’ families.
Whilst focused on protecting the nation from intolerable and unBritish 
intimacies, this domestication remains colonial in orientation. Orientalist 
representations of backward, savage and under/oversexualised peoples 
still drive the treatment of those moving to and living within Britain. 
Here ‘family’ remains a significant transit point for colonial power 
because of the way it disguises racialisation. Who is a sham is organised 
around a liberal and progressive notion of the ‘modern family’; defined 
as this is by autonomy, romantic love and consumptive domesticity, and 
‘contribution’. It is this liberal and outwardly deracialised account of family 
that arguably organises who is properly ‘familial’ or ‘unfamilial’ – that 
is, who is sustained and fostered and who is dangerous and subject 
to exclusion and abandonment. For example, it is the treatment of 
women that distinguishes Muslim communities as ‘backwards’, and their 
inability to ‘evolve’ their kinship practices that marks these communi-
ties as suspect. As with family taxonomies under the British Empire, 
this reworks a civilisational tense, where people are racialised as being 
‘underdeveloped’ based on supposedly universal claims to intimacy, 
romantic love and liberal values. This is then used to organise access to 
rights and citizenship of both migrants and settled communities alike.
The figure of the unintegrated (Muslim) woman continues to marshal 
the contemporary domesticating state, both in its push to police the 
movement of people and equally to integrate minorities. The constitution 
of feminised victimhood of course has a longer paternalist imperial 
history. However, what marks out the figuration of the unintegrated 
(Muslim) woman is how she is treated as both at risk and risky. If the 
passive Muslim housewife was once viewed as a victim, in need of 
saving, she has increasingly been constituted as a threat – that is, as a 
natal reproducer of terrorism within the sham family. Just as failed 
black motherhood occupied a site for the reproduction of social disorder 
throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the Muslim 
woman is increasingly viewed as someone to be contained. The Muslim 
woman can reproduce but increasingly cannot be a genuine mother. 
Bordering intimacy132
Thus, whilst we need to be attuned to questions of how families are 
separated, we must also be aware of how intervention, separation and 
violence is done in the name of family. If family was offered a means 
of developing the unintegrated woman, under counter-terrorism and 
renewed visa policies it is increasing used as a form of control.
We can consider here how claims to protect against shams continue 
to organise varying degrees of violence – the separation of international 
kinship structures, the deportation of those who fail to gain the correct 
visa or fail the application, the criminalisation of those who are deemed 
a sham. Alongside this we can place wider practices of the hostile 
environment, the joining up of immigration rules with housing policy 
and healthcare, for example, or the increased use of immigration raids 
on places of work and within homes to criminalise and push people 
into detention (Corporate Watch 2018: 65). Such hostility joins up with 
the increasingly intense policing and surveillance of Muslim communities 
and households through both the work of security officials and social 
workers. Not only does the surveillance of sham families lead to interven-
tion by social workers in cases of child protection (which can mean 
the removal of children from a home) but intelligence gathering and 
reporting by social workers can lead to criminal prosecution, counter-
terrorism raids, detention without trial, passport removal, the possibility 
of more state violence and even extradition (see Kapoor 2018). Here 
sham marriages are not only a danger but the sham family becomes 
extraordinarily dangerous.
Whilst intimate bordering attached to the sham concerned discovering 
and regulating suspicious intimacies, what I turn to in the next chapter 
is how the family is also tied to ‘monstrous intimacies’. Here I take up 
in more detail what is done in the name of protecting the ‘proper’ 
family. I do so by examining how the liberal and progressive appeals 
to the modern family are always/already bound to whiteness. I explore 
what is done in the name of protecting the white family, which is viewed 
as ‘under attack’ from racialised others. To do this I examine the increas-
ing trend of citizenship deprivation in Britain, a practice which I argue 
tells us much about the ‘sticky’ nature of contemporary borders.
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Notes
1 This chapter is based on archival research undertaken by the author at the 
National Archives in 2016 and 2017, as well as a discourse analysis of immigration 
policy documents, integration strategy documents and social work guidance 
between 1999 and 2018. In order to examine the material, I draw upon Weber’s 
(2016) work on ‘figuration’ to study how the sham is imagined and brought to 
life, attached as this is to a particular embodied gendered figuration of threat 
and ‘victimhood’. This pays attention to the performative and ‘worlding’ role 
that powerful imaginaries have in shaping state practice – such as immigration 
law. As Weber (2016: 28) argues, ‘figurations emerge out of discursive and 
material semiotic assemblages that condense diffuse imaginaries about the world 
into specific forms or images that bring specific worlds into being’. For further 
discussion of this methodological approach see Weber (2016: 28–29).
2 The hypervisibility of Islam in Casey’s report is striking. For example, in a 
four-page section on religious ‘regressive attitudes’, only two lines at the end 
of the text are devoted to the Jewish and Christian faiths – and even then, 
mostly in parentheses as an afterthought. Meanwhile, four pages of extensive 
detail outline the ‘regressive attitudes’ held by Islamic communities in the UK.
3 Revealing the flimsiness of the definition of ‘extreme’, an ‘extreme view’ is defined 
as even ‘[refusing] to acknowledge other viewpoints’ (Smitherson and White 
2017: 10).
4 Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants campaign ‘Bring Them Home’: 
www.bringthemhome.org.uk/; Love Letters to the Home Office: http://
lovelettershome.org/. Also see BBC (2018b) for another example.
In February 2016 the British news media doggedly reported on the 
conviction of five suspects charged with the sexual abuse of minors in 
the northern English town of Rotherham. Since revelations of child 
sexual exploitation (CSE) emerged in the press in 2012, the very word 
‘Rotherham’ (and to a similar extent the name of another northern 
town, Rochdale) had steadily become synonymous in the public imagina-
tion with CSE or ‘grooming’ scandals. The scale of the abuse transformed 
these convictions into a site of moral panic, with authorities suggesting 
that approximately 1,400 children in Rotherham alone could have been 
targets of exploitation over a fifteen-year period (Jay 2014). However, 
what framed this scandal and energised the parameters of the moral 
panic was a competing set of racialised and sexualised imaginaries and 
logics. This worked to make the scandal one that concerned multicultural-
ism, citizenship and ‘integration’.
Despite the fact that two of those convicted in Rotherham were 
white women, the news coverage focused almost exclusively on the 
background of the male perpetrators who, whilst all holding British 
citizenship, were described as ‘Asian’, ‘Muslim’, ‘British Pakistani’. The 
victims of such abuse were almost uniformly presented as ‘white 
girls’. As with previous cases of ‘street grooming’ this led to mass 
outpourings of anger, disgust, hate and revilement. Such emotional 
circulations coalesced around easily available tropes which relied upon 
codes of orientalist deviancy and the symbolic power of interracial 




the patriarchal, women-hating Muslim man. This took place alongside 
the steady whitening of the female victims, who were transformed 
from marginalised and dismissed ‘child prostitutes’ (a common 
category used by police and local authorities) into ‘daughters of the 
nation’.
Speaking after the trial in Rotherham, the victims’ solicitor David 
Greenwood made it clear that what happened in the town was not a 
unique case but one that was endlessly repeated throughout the whole 
of modern Britain:
This trial is just the first of many and is the tip of a very big iceberg. 
From the work I have done, it appears that gangs of Asian men have 
been operating to sexually abuse young white girls in Rotherham, Oxford, 
Keighley, Bradford and Rochdale. (Quoted in Cusick 2016)
This abuse was termed endemic and systematic. Unlike other examples 
of child abuse and paedophilia, which tend to be presented in terms 
of unique contexts and circumstances (Wilson 2018), what happened 
in Rotherham could act as stand in for Bradford or Oxford. Why? 
Because this involved ‘Asian’, ‘Muslim’, ‘British Pakistani’ men and the 
very presence of these racialised signifiers meant that we are already 
supposed to know why these tragic events happened. As former cabinet 
minister Jack Straw would argue, to many Pakistani men these white 
girls are merely ‘easy meat’ (BBC 2011).
Seizing the opportunity to capitalise on the public mood of outrage 
surrounding these convictions, then Home Secretary Theresa May 
immediately pledged that those convicted of CSE, but more specifically 
‘street grooming’, could and would be deprived of British citizenship 
and then deported. Through applying long-standing powers to deprive 
naturalised citizens of citizenship, renovated under successive counter-
terrorism and immigration acts (see Home Office 2002, 2014b; HM 
Government 2006), the Home Office (quoted in Chambre 2016) reminded 
the press that ‘citizenship is a privilege not a right. The Home Secretary 
can deprive an individual of their citizenship where it is believed it is 
conducive to the public good to do so.’
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From 2002 to 2016, eighty-one subjects were deprived of their 
citizenship. In 2017 it was reported that in that year alone a further 
104 were stripped of their rights. These figures also reflect the expanding 
number of people who have their passports removed by the state, and 
there are countless more who have had naturalisation and indefinite 
leave to remain applications refused, nearly all for issues relating 
(however loosely) to ‘terrorism’ (see Kapoor and Narkowicz 2019). The 
technical reasons for deprivation of citizenship are often linked to a 
clause regarding the ‘public good’ and/or charges of fraudulent claims 
(McGuiness and Gower 2017: 3). In 2018 the government continued to 
push for legislation which made it possible to strip anyone of citizenship, 
whether a naturalised citizen or born into citizenship, disregarding the 
international legal precedent over statelessness (Ross and Galey 2014; 
Anderson 2016; Javid 2019). In the context of this short history, the 
apparently exceptional acts of criminality relating to grooming became 
rendered as another form of terror. This justified the exceptional act of 
removing a subject’s citizenship and threatening to send the perpetrators, 
in the celebratory tone of one newspaper, ‘back to Pakistan’ (Scheerhout  
2017).
In the fall out from the convictions, we can begin to see how events 
in Rotherham (and other cases of grooming nationally) shaped and 
energised numerous bordering practices – imprisonment, deprivation 
of citizenship, potential deportation. What was significant about this 
event is how ‘exceptional’ powers of deprivation of citizenship were 
targeted at these criminal citizens. The expansion and intensification 
of deprivation of citizenship raises the question of the (im)possibility 
of British citizenship after empire.
Following the way that I discussed the practice of intimate bordering 
in the last chapter, here the border not only targets those with precarious 
migrant status but also those with settled rights and citizenship. Here 
we can see how borders transform the right of citizenship from a status 
of relative permanence into a different kind of temporal and bodied 
relationship to the state. From having settled rights, a citizen can become 
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subject to immigration law as a migrant. They can suddenly become 
akin to an ‘illegal’ migrant who can be subject to deportation. Through 
the threat of deprivation, the border can permeate and transform sup-
posedly settled rights and make certain populations deportable within 
modern Britain (De Genova 2002). Significantly, this practice does not 
affect everyone (it is not every criminal that is subject to deprivation). 
Deprivation ‘sticks’ (Ahmed 2004) to certain bodies and slides off  
others.
In this chapter I want to examine how the case of Rotherham (and 
the scandal of ‘grooming gangs’ more widely) reveals how borders stretch, 
follow and ‘stick’ to certain bodies and populations. In doing so, this 
tells us about the limits of citizenship and how the British state continues 
to administrate through colonial and authoritarian techniques when it 
comes to certain populations. It also tells us how such practices are 
equally rationalised and justified based on colonial claims to who is or 
is not properly familial. If intimate bordering was central to the manage-
ment of ‘suspicious intimacies’ that I examined in the last chapter, the 
‘sticky borders’ I explore here are bound to ‘monstrous intimacy’ – that 
is, intimacies that are energised by disgust, revilement and hate. As 
with the case of the grooming scandals in Rotherham, monstrous 
intimacies are cast as intolerable and used to justify the use of exceptional 
authoritarian measures, such as deprivation of citizenship, used primarily 
against Muslimified populations and racialised citizens deemed to be 
without ‘value’. As I go on to claim, monstrous intimacies are bound 
up with the endangering of the (white) family, which must be protected 
at all costs and through whatever means necessary.
In focusing on what the case of Rotherham tells us about contemporary 
citizenship, I ask what conditioned the promise to deprive CSE offenders 
of their citizenship, and in turn what allowed this to be celebrated with 
such glee. This follows into the next chapter where I examine where 
the power of deprivation came from and consider how this particular 
bordering ‘sticks’ through the shifting parameters of colonial notions 
of the (non)human.
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The case I chose to explore here is a difficult one because of the 
violent nature of the crimes committed. However, the scandal of grooming 
has been made to feel exceptional in ways that are not comparable with 
other cases of CSE and this deserves careful attention. The presentation 
of the exceptional nature of these crimes tells us important things about 
the character of race in contemporary Britain. Equally, it tells us about 
how both race and racial violence enacted by the state and white 
nationalist organisations is hidden as the logical consequence of ‘defend-
ing’ the (white) family.1
In the first section of the chapter, I examine how racialised masculinity 
plays a wider role in the contemporary political landscape in Britain 
and Europe, from the ‘refugee crisis’ to the war in Syria, to grooming 
gangs. I use these as examples to illustrate the relationship between 
monstrousness, violence and sticky borders. In the second part, I focus 
in more detail on the grooming scandal in Rotherham. Whilst detail-
ing how the scandal was constructed and responded to, I consider 
emotional attachments around grooming to be important, primarily 
because grooming was made to seem so scandalous and exceptional 
as an event of incomparable violence. In using Sara Ahmed’s (2004) 
work on affect I explore how the act of grooming was rendered so 
monstrous, and how the thinkability and feelability of this violence 
conditioned how bordering practices stuck to those who were convicted 
of grooming. In order to evidence this, I look at both the wider media 
and state treatment of ‘grooming gangs’ and the body of ‘confessional’ 
(non-)fiction literature and novels published in the immediate aftermath 
of the grooming scandals. I suggest that we can only understand why 
the deprivation of citizenship becomes an option in such cases once we 
understand how grooming is presented as a site for the sovereign and 
emotional protection of the white (national) family against perverse 
others. This is shaped by the place of the family at the heart of white 
nationalism and colonial racism. If heteronormative ideas of family 
organise who is ‘unfamilial’ and suspicious in modern Britain (as I 
argued in the last chapter), this equally organises who endangers the 
‘real’ family and how these dangers should be eradicated. Relating to the 
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historical use of ‘family’ under the British Empire, I demonstrate here 
how family is still wrapped up with dispossession (of rights and life).
Of violence and monsters
Before going into the specifics of the events in Rotherham, they deserve 
to be situated in the wider context of racialised masculinity and the 
part it plays in the social landscape of twenty-first-century liberal states. 
Asylum seekers crossing the Mediterranean, gang violence, knife crime, 
child refugee resettlement schemes continue to be framed through a 
narrative of dangerous black and brown men (across Europe, Australia 
and North America in particular). Just as with the examples of the 
‘black peril’ I explored in chapter 2, this relies on claims to sexual 
deviancy and the risk this poses to family life.
In 2016 the rise in the number of male asylum seekers in Cologne, 
Germany, was blamed for a spate of ‘sexually predatory’ attacks on 
women during New Year’s Eve celebrations (Smale 2016). Child refugees 
arriving in the UK as part of resettlement schemes have been consistently 
hounded by the British press who presented them as ‘burly lads’ rather 
than ‘real’ children (see chapter 6 for more on this). These reports went 
on to suggest that (child) refugees posed a sexual risk to ‘school girls’ 
and painted visions of such figures hanging around outside school gates 
(Greenhill 2016).
Equally, ‘gang culture’ has been blamed by London’s Metropolitan 
Police for a rise in knife crime in the city and for the civil unrest which 
broke out in 2011. Here black teenagers are rendered a particular type 
of masculinised danger. ‘Black culture’ as well as the reported absence 
of father figures and single-mother households are commonly cast as 
causal factors of this violence (see Starkey 2011).2 Powerful circulations 
of deviant sexuality and race are materialised through these examples: 
the lusty, over/under-sexed colonised subject of orientalist obsession, 
the impossibility of ‘childhood’ for brown and black subjects, the failure 
of the black household and family. Following my previous discussion 
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of figurations, it is worth thinking here of how the figure of the dangerous 
brown and black man does important political work in driving colonial 
domestication.
Such figurations of dangerous masculinity persist as easily available 
means of explaining complex societal relations. They are able to sustain 
racial hierarchies and work on fears of proximity. They also work in 
the context of the evolving dictates of racialised capitalism where once 
useful populations of cheap and expendable labour have been made 
redundant and causally viewed as replaceable, surplus and ‘undeserving’ 
(Shilliam 2018). Here figurations of dangerous masculinity work to 
make populations even more precarious and subject to coercion from 
the state. This enhances existing inequalities and maximises profitability 
through the dual function of precarity and control (Lewis et al. 2014).
This is continuously animated by how whiteness is bound to threatened 
innocence and blackness to sexual danger. Such attachments work to 
fuel disciplinary practices of incarceration, stop and search, and restrictive 
immigration policies based on delimiting the movement and freedom 
of black and Asian men (see Elliott-Cooper 2016). We might consider 
here how immigration detention rates reflect wider patterns of imprison-
ment in the UK, where black and Asian men are disproportionately 
represented by almost exactly double.3 Sexuality and renderings of 
deviancy play an important role here. It is worth remembering that the 
hardening of modern racial categorisation and its governance has nearly 
always taken place around fears of intimacy and proximity (Stoler 1995). 
It is in the possibility of affective relations and sexual conduct that 
racism finds life.
This appeal to dangerous deviancy does important work in organising 
scales of the human. The ‘bogus asylum seeker’, ‘black youth’, ‘Asian 
grooming gang’ and equally the ‘jihadi terrorist’ are figurations that 
can arguably transform subjects into ‘monsters’. The monster is a complex 
figure of modernity. Richard Kearney (2003) views the rise of the culture 
and aesthetic of monstrousness as a product of tensions and boundary-
forming in the Renaissance, which produced the monster as a thing 
which was neither human nor non-human. However, monsters play a 
Monsters 141
particular role in colonial governance. Monsters propel fear; they mark 
the difference between the human/not-quite/non-human and work to 
both demand but also silence exceptional violence against them. To 
Foucault:
The monster’s field of appearance is a juridico-biological domain. The 
figures of the half-human, half-animal being …, of double individualities 
…, of hermaphrodites … in turn represented that double violation; what 
makes a human monster a monster is not just its exceptionality relative 
to the species form; it is the disturbance it brings to juridical regularities 
(whether it is a question of marriage laws, canons of baptism, or rules 
of inheritance). The human monster combines the impossible and the 
forbidden. (Quoted in Puar and Rai 2002: 118)
Monsters are coded through particular sensibilities and emotional circula-
tions – fear, intrigue and repulsed fascination being key psychological 
phenomena (see Halberstam 1995: 8–10). The ‘double violation’ that 
Foucault speaks of is helpful for thinking through the contemporary 
colonial power of the monster. Monsters both disturb and sustain social 
order and necessitate the policing of boundaries. They threaten order but 
their eradication services its renewal. This codes violence into monstrous 
violence and then legitimate violence, which is called upon to protect 
against and destroy the monsters in the name of ‘normality’.
Missing from Foucault’s account is the explicit attachment of mon-
strousness to race and the ease through which racialised bodies can be 
transformed into monstrous bodies. To Puar and Rai (2002) the monster 
is always a sexualised monster. This is because they actively threaten 
the hetero-domestic order of nation, family, household, thus their 
sexuality is always known through violence. It is a violent and uncivilised 
sexuality. Halberstam (1995: 3) views the monster as ‘embodied violence’: 
‘The monster itself is an economic form in that it condenses various 
racial sexual threats to nation, capitalism and the bourgeoisie in one 
body.’ Tracing the contemporary racial codes of the monstrous, Christina 
Sharpe (2016) reminds us of how anti-black racism was constantly 
energised under slavery (and under Jim Crow and beyond) by depictions 
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of the unstoppable strength of the male slave, as an inherently violent 
and physical beast. The ‘lust’ of the black slave towards white women 
propelled both the eugenics obsession with miscegenation, and the 
depiction of all interracial intimacy as symbolic and physical rape. To 
invoke Fanon (1961: 32) here, we should remember that ‘the colonist 
turns the colonised into the quintessence of evil’. Monstrousness thus 
sticks to certain bodies over others and demands exceptional violence 
to contain and eradicate it. The monster can work to demarcate between 
the human, not-quite-human and non-human.
The monster and the drone
Monsters play a particular role in the machinery of contemporary war 
and the geographies of heteronormativity and racism that accompany 
this. Tracing some of the contours of these dynamics shows how groom-
ing is always/already networked into broader regimes of coloniality 
and violence. Just as the War on Terror has relied on policing of and 
intervention in ‘suspicious intimacies’, as I explored in the last chapter, 
the logic of this global ‘war’ has frequently relied upon invocations of 
the monster: from Al Qaeda and the Taliban through to the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as new and evolving visions of evil (Puar 
and Rai 2002; Friis 2017). Significantly, the movement of European 
citizens to fight in the war in Syria and to join ISIS has expedited much 
of the public discussion about citizenship deprivation in Britain from 
2010 onwards (BBC 2017; Guardian 2017; Hansard 2018). Fears that 
‘ISIS recruits’ with British citizenship would return to cause destruction 
in the UK (and in other EU states) led to high-profile calls to deprive 
those travelling to Syria of their passports and stop them returning. In 
2019, as the last strongholds of ISIS fell in Syria, the British government 
intensified the use of deprivation (for example, the case of Shamima 
Begum; see Javid 2019). Here affiliation with ISIS was to be rendered 
‘pathologically evil’, as within the popular imagination ISIS represents the 
return of medievalism, known through markers of extreme orientalist 
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savagery and illegitimate violence (such as decapitations and crucifixion; 
see Friis 2017).
In 2015 Reyaad Khan and Ruhul Amin were reported as the first 
British citizens to be assassinated by RAF drone strike whilst fighting 
for ISIS in Syria. After the attack it was revealed that in 2012 the British 
state had also killed Bilal al-Berjawi and Mohamed Sakr whilst they 
were in Somalia. Prior to the attack they both had their citizenship 
removed (Woods and Ross 2013). After Khan and Amin’s deaths, the 
Sun newspaper ran with the headline ‘Wham! Bam! Thank you Cam’, 
in response to Prime Minster David Cameron’s ordering of the strike. 
Against the monstrous violence of ‘jihadi terrorism’, this violence was 
felt to be not only appropriate but in fact worthy of being celebrated. 
The government (and their lawyers) argued that these subjects became 
enemy combatants, situated as they were within ‘war zones’ (see Webb 
2017). We learn here that the exceptional act of joining ISIS begets the 
exceptional act of removing citizenship, which is then accompanied by 
a spectacular yet normalised act of violence and death.
In 2017 Gavin Williamson, the secretary of state for defence, intensified 
the logic of this violence by arguing that all British citizens in Syria 
fighting for ISIS should be hunted down and killed: ‘I do not believe 
that any terrorist, whether they come from this country or any other, 
should ever be allowed back into this country,’ he said. ‘We should do 
everything we can do to destroy and eliminate that threat … A dead 
terrorist can’t cause any harm to Britain’ (quoted in Elgot 2017a). In 
this account of colonial war, the only good terrorist is a dead terrorist. 
The complexities of the Syrian civil war and the myriad of people involved 
in the conflict – humanitarian workers, theological converts, travellers 
– all become rendered ‘terrorists’. We might consider here how mon-
strousness ‘sticks’ and transforms one-time British citizens into drone 
targets and bodies that need to be eliminated.
Monstrous violence is accompanied (and makes possible) ‘legitimate’ 
state violence. This has particular gendered and racialised-sexualised 
codes. Staying with the subject of the war in Syria, it is telling that 
questions of citizenship deprivation, extreme violence and the monstrous 
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have been almost entirely absent from the discussion of white British 
citizens who have joined Kurdish or other non-ISIS militia in Syria. 
White ‘fighters’ or ‘amateur soldiers’ returning to the UK have faced 
prosecution in court (rather than deprivation of citizenship or state-
sanctioned death) and those who have died have been repatriated in 
ways that mimic that of the ‘fallen soldier’ (Murphy-Bates 2018). The 
parallel is significant: whilst for some subjects the rights of citizenship 
are eternal – not even deprivable in death – the removal of citizenship 
is a precursor to abandonment and then death for racialised others. 
How is it that some can experience social death in life whilst others do 
not experience social death in death?
War, the monster and grooming
Following these circulations of legitimate versus monstrous violence 
leads us eventually back to grooming scandals. In his preface to the 
book Easy Meat (McLoughlin 2016), self-confessed libertarian and 
far-right campaigner Gavin Boby offers a vignette which asks what a 
group of trained soldiers might do if they discovered the ‘truth’ about 
Asian grooming gangs in Britain.4 In answering, the vignette offers up 
connections between citizenship, violence and war in the UK, which 
plays to a particular constituency of white nationalism. Boby goes on 
to describe how disgruntled soldiers could begin to explore vigilante 
justice by violently murdering the ‘bearded thugs’ and ‘Asian perpetrators’ 
of crimes against white women (McLoughlin 2016). The book asks 
readers to consider the normality of this violence and its immanence. 
Boby’s account asks the reader to consider this martial violence as a 
necessary outcome of grooming. The argument presented is that this 
is only a natural reaction to state inaction and the real threat posed to 
white women (who are, of course, portrayed in patriarchy familial terms 
as ‘wives’, ‘mothers’, ‘sisters’) by ‘Asian men’. Violence is merely the 
protection of the white nation by its warrior sons. Boby’s martial fantasy 
of white supremacy ends with the breakdown of law and order and the 
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start of a ‘race war’ on Britain’s streets. War comes ‘home’ through the 
sexualised terror of the brown man and the just violence of the unmarked 
yet white ‘soldier’.
What is concerning is how Boby’s fantasy is actually far from extreme. 
In fact, it plays to a significant set of circulations that have become 
central to bordering practices in the UK and also connects up with 
many accepted narratives which have underpinned state policy towards 
grooming. Here the monstrousness of ISIS slides into the case of grooming 
in Rotherham through a continuum of racialised sexuality and violence. 
As a practice, the deprivation of citizenship binds together different 
monstrous bodies which blur the boundaries of colonial war from Syria 
and Somalia to Rotherham. They become linked together because of 
what is done to citizenship through bordering: deprivation is used to 
stop subjects returning to the UK, so they can be expelled and deported, 
so they can be killed with impunity. These sites are also joined together 
because of the way that they are rendered places of the monstrous. The 
‘Asian grooming gang’ and the ‘ISIS recruit’ are made knowable as 
cultural problems of Islam – rendered a monstrous threat to the West. 
These events elide and collide as they work to animate further racialised 
violence which is either condoned or enacted by the state. Here the 
figure of the monster walks the border between citizen/non-citizen, 
human/non-human, and life/death.
Grooming, affect and the white (national) body
If monstrousness makes particular circulations of colonial violence 
possible, I want to probe in this section what underpins particular figura-
tions of the monster. I do this by turning in more detail towards the 
way that grooming in Rotherham and beyond have been made sense 
of. By ‘made sense of ’, I am interested in how these events are made 
socially meaningful but also, working off the affective dimension of 
sense, how these events are made ‘feelable’ through particular atmospheres 
and emotional circulations. This traces the affective politics of grooming 
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by bearing in mind how the connection between events and their 
thinkability and feelability are historically produced. In following Ahmed, 
we should consider how emotions circulate to materialise particular 
political forces (Ahmed 2004: 11). I find this a productive way of exploring 
how the call to deprive convicted sex offenders of their citizenship was 
first made possible, and then welcomed with such glee. It helps us 
understand why, alongside monstrousness, borders follow and stick to 
certain bodies and not others.
From 2010, widespread media, public and policy debate in the UK 
began to focus on grooming as a new criminal act. As Cockbain (2013: 
23) argues, this was presented as a new form of ‘racial crime threat’, 
with what became known as ‘street grooming’ inextricably associated 
with ‘Asian sex gangs’ who were imagined to be deliberately seeking 
out white girls for repeated and horrific sexual abuse. In January 2011 
The Times carried a story titled ‘Revealed: conspiracy of silence on 
UK sex gangs’. The article claimed to have discovered the emerging 
crime of street grooming, a particular form of CSE where vulnerable 
girls (and to a lesser extent boys) were targeted by groups of people 
(The Times 2011). These ‘Asian gangs’ falsely befriended children and 
young women through the promise of access to alcohol and recrea-
tional drugs before raping and abusing them, often for a number of 
years.
Rotherham was presented as the centre of this new crime wave, 
which was described as a ‘plague on northern English towns’ (Cockbain 
2013). Part of the coding of the scandal was a focus on the lack of 
response by the authorities who, it was claimed, were failing to tackle 
widespread cases involving Asian male offenders sexually abusing 
white British girls for ‘fear of being branded racist’ (Cockbain 2013; 
Jay 2014; Casey 2015). The charge was made that ‘multiculturalism’ 
in Britain had caused this. Not only was this blamed on the perverse 
actions of ethnic minority men but it was ‘political correctness’ and 
‘respect for community difference’ that allowed such crimes to go 
unchallenged. Whilst evidence emerged describing the heterogeneous 
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character of victims, who were from variety of backgrounds (Peach 
et al. 2015), the dominant framing of the victims of grooming was as 
‘white girls’.
Whilst previous stories of sexual abuse and rape garnered much less 
public attention (Wilson 2018), this developed into a ‘scandal’ with 
the government launching several independent investigations into 
the abuse (Jay 2014) and the running of local government services in 
Rotherham (Casey 2015). Indeed, the push to deprive of citizenship those 
convicted of grooming is directly animated by how this was deemed 
so scandalous. Scandals here can be thought as a ‘moral panic’ or a 
crisis in a particular moral order – that is, the exceptional moment 
that breaks apparently settled norms (Johnson 2017: 705–706). This 
scandal had particular racial and gendered codes, into which ideas of 
monstrousness were animated – firstly, through the presentation of CSE 
and grooming as a crime against whiteness; secondly, as a crime which 
emerged out of an inferior and deviant culture and underdeveloped 
sexuality. This relied on the resuscitation of colonial imaginaries of 
the dangerous brown man lusting after white women, but also the 
‘backwards’ nature of Asian and particular Muslim family and communal 
structure, which was viewed as a causal factor underpinning sexual 
exploitation.
To appreciate the precise nature of how grooming became a 
monstrous crime is to understand the role that outrage and disgust 
play here. Outrage and disgust are particularly vital emotional states 
to study because of how they circulate and drive certain attachments 
of violence to particular bodies (how they make things ‘stick’). To 
Ahmed (2004: 11) it is vital that we appreciate how emotions stick 
and create attachments, and in doing so ‘create the very effect of the 
surfaces or boundaries of bodies and worlds’. Outrage and disgust at 
what happened in Rotherham can be seen to be mobilised by particular 
attachments to the ‘surfaces and boundaries’ of whiteness and white 
nationalism. Such attachments are only made possible through the way 
that perversity and deviancy are bound onto the body of racialised men 
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and wider racialised communities. Here the whitening and feminisa-
tion of the victims, the focus on childhood innocence, the darkening 
and pathologising of the perpetrators, the claims to white family, all 
become features which animated the particular bordering practice of 
deprivation.
The cultural politics of the white family
The far right in Britain has been particularly adept at seizing upon and 
mobilising the emotions of outrage and disgust around grooming. For 
instance, the white nationalist organisation the English Defence League 
(EDL) campaigned in many northern towns after 2011 under the mantra 
that authorities had failed to protect white girls from ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim 
men’. Here ‘white girls’ were presented as forever under attack by ‘rapist 
foreigners’ whose attacks on white female bodies were viewed as part 
of an attack on ‘British’ and ‘European’ culture. This was often presented 
as a ‘rape jihad’ (EDL 2019).
Whilst the EDL may be an extreme and relatively small organisa-
tion, their position is significant because of how it makes explicit the 
attachment between whiteness and abuse, which is repeated more 
broadly. Despite the liberal authorities’ condemnation of the actions 
of the EDL and their position, more mainstream media outlets and state 
authorities have in many ways shared with the EDL a familiar analysis 
of grooming. The mobilisation of the far right in Rotherham has been 
linked to numerous attacks on the local Muslim population. This has 
led to at least one reported death, that of 81-year-old Mushin Ahmed 
(Mitchinson 2015). South Yorkshire Police have often been complicit 
in failing to protect the local Muslim population, not only by allowing 
far-right marches by organisations like the EDL to go ahead but also 
by arresting anti-racist protestors defending their local community 
(Wilson 2018).
Such racialised violence has been justified by the EDL as a form of 
‘protection’ against ‘grooming gangs’ (akin to the ‘soldiers’ in Boby’s 
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account above). Speaking in Newcastle in 2016, one campaigner 
argued that:
I’ve seen the devastation in their eyes. And I look at them – and I try 
not to show pity. All of these girls who have suffered and are still suffering, 
they have brothers, they have sisters; they have mums, they have dads, 
they have aunties and uncles, grandparents; and a wider circle of friends 
who watch their friends decay and rot away into oblivion. (EDL 2016)
These sentiments alone appear to be concerned with the plight of vulner-
able women and may seem initially unproblematic. However, this 
suffering, pity and decay are bound to national rot in the EDL’s ideology 
– multiculturalism, political correctness, toleration of ‘others’ are all 
central to the emotions of ‘decay’ and ‘suffering’ attached to grooming. 
Rather than being concerned with violence done to women, this suffering 
is converted into the violence done to whiteness.
The emotional circulations around grooming are consistently bound 
to white nationalism and white femininity. It is significant that in this 
speech, ‘rot’ is witnessed and felt by or on the family. What is so central 
to the scandal of grooming is that these are white girls raped by Asian 
men. To Peter McLoughlin (2016), what is significant about ‘grooming 
gangs’ is that these perpetrators always come after ‘our girls’. As Yuval-
Davis (1997) has argued, feminised bodies constitute a symbolic and 
biological role in the reproduction of race and nationhood, and, as with 
colonial fears about ‘miscegenation’, remain pervasive sites of anxiety 
and control. Disgust over the rape of ‘our girls’ in such accounts is 
framed as a rape of white Britishness rather the violation of individual 
bodies. In this context the sexualised violence of grooming is also tied 
to anti-Muslim racism (such as in the articulation of ‘rape jihad’). White 
women must be ‘protected from Islam’ for the continuity of ‘us’ and 
sustaining the purity of the white family and national home.
This is significant for how wider nationalistic atmospheres abounded 
after the events in Rotherham. In this context, violation is made ‘feelable’ 
(made disgusting and outrageous) through the signifier of the ‘foreigner’ 
and the terroristic penetration of the white (national) body. Violation 
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is translated into the experience of men who must protect the family 
as the nation. Feeding into the wider logics of colonial warfare in the 
War on Terror, the response to such threats is martial. The EDL, for 
instance, are in the habit of calling themselves ‘footsoldiers’ (EDL 2019).
Writing the (white) family
Feminised whiteness drives these explicit white nationalist projects (such 
as the EDL) through strategies that connect up with anti-Muslim racism 
that is central to the contemporary War on Terror. But what is more 
significant is how feminised whiteness also saturates the affective mood 
of disgust and outrage surrounding grooming more broadly, and how 
this happens in sites that are not explicitly linked to projects of white 
nationalism. Whilst most analysis of grooming has tended to explore 
dynamics in the mainstream media (Cockbain 2013; Tufail 2015), I 
now want to examine how (non-)fiction has played a role in building 
and dismantling emotional attachments around the ‘grooming scandal’. 
One product of the attention on grooming has been the publication of 
an expanding body of confessional books on the subject. Since 2010 
thirteen novels concerning grooming have been published in the UK, as 
well as the release of one BAFTA award-winning television miniseries, 
Three Girls (Lowthorpe 2017). The rise of the confessional novel has 
a much older lineage (see Halberstam 1995) but we can view this as 
part of a cultural trend that emerged in the 1990s when books and 
television programmes on paedophilia began to dominate bookshelves 
and occupy schedules in both the UK and US. This reflected broader 
shifts, particularly in Anglo-American culture, where the ‘monstrous 
paedophile’ became a metaphor for the imagined threats to ‘family values’ 
posed by globalisation, immigration, demands for LGBT and minority 
rights and ‘excessive’ forms of consumer capitalism. The publications 
on grooming add a particularly racialised dimension to the existing 
figuration of the paedophile monster in works of (non-)fiction and, 
with it, shifting threats to the white nuclear family and childhood 
innocence.
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The creation of this body of work is in and of itself a significant 
cultural development. It begs questions of the role of the confessional 
novel in neoliberal societies, as well as the political economy of publish-
ing and programme commissioning. What is also significant is how 
cultural artefacts like this circulate affective moods (Closs Stephens 
2016), through images but also through thick, personalised description in 
autobiographical accounts of rape – including sights, smells and sounds 
of deeply violent acts.5 They thus provide a site of ‘truth-telling’ that is 
arranged through both the production of an ‘authentic’ voice but equally 
an affective relationship between narrative and reader. They thus deserve 
our attention for what they tell us about the wider scandal of grooming.
What is striking about this body of literature is its close-knit consist-
ency. After reading several of these books, the familiarity of the narrative 
becomes uncanny. Almost all of them mirror each other in tone, style, 
content, format and imagery. The majority function as autobiographical 
accounts (although a large proportion are ghost written), which makes 
the ‘personal’ experience of these narratives speak to a ‘deeper’ truth 
of the individualised confessional (Mills 1995). Despite how they are 
marketed as ‘autobiographical’, it remains important to approach these 
artefacts as sites of social narratives and as nodes in broader affective 
regimes. These books are commissioned, edited, made publishable within 
a particular economic and cultural domain where both sex and violence 
are commodified, made readable and profitable. To consider how affect 
functions in relation to these artefacts means exploring how sentiments 
and emotions circulate through this work to create particular types of 
attachments, boundaries and ‘surfaces’ (Ahmed 2004: 23–28). In asking 
how the violence is made thinkable and feelable, I am interested in how 
the books are aligned to particular ideological positions and how this 
produces emotive states and feelings towards ‘others’.
Innocence, whiteness and the child
What is, of course, politically significant is who is allowed to speak 
through these cultural artefacts – who they are speaking to and what 
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this does. The narrator in the majority of these books is depicted as a 
survivor of abuse. However, they speak from a position of both white 
feminised victimhood and also childhood innocence. Nearly every novel 
on the subject of grooming begins with detailed descriptions of the 
domesticity of the patriarchal family home. We are then introduced to 
the maturing of their body and sexual relationships through school, 
before the eventual encounter with abuse. This is always enabled through 
the presence or development of a relationship with a boy or man of 
colour. In most cases the author lingers on the ‘Asianess’ of this figure, 
which equally works to embolden the whiteness of the home and domestic 
space of protection the author emerges from. Significantly, even if this 
initial relationship is not abusive, it is often narrated as the facilitation 
of abuse. Thus, as a genre these books relay a particular failed heter-
onormative temporality attached to the white family. It is in life beyond 
the parameters of the paternal home that deviancy begins (whilst in 
fact most abuse takes place within the family home). It is the danger 
of both emergent female sexuality and interracial intimacy that leads 
(logically) to abuse.
The enlisting of the voice of the ‘child’ is a tactic of this genre which 
produces outrage through the ‘loss of innocence’. But it is worth exploring 
the racialised and gendered codes of both ‘childhood’ and ‘victimhood’ 
because they relate to how grooming is made intelligible. One of the 
many striking things about this genre are the front covers, which set 
up and bolster the already assumed positionality and bodied character 
of the narrator. Of the thirteen UK novels on grooming available through 
Amazon.co.uk, all are covered with an image of a young white woman 
or girl. The bodied placement of the cover image is important: some 
are of very young girls who would be socially known as ‘children’, others 
rely on more heavily sexualised images of young women, often with 
skin exposed, wearing full make up, staring into the camera, often with 
doe-like blue eyes. Not a single cover references a woman of colour 
(we should remember that some things are not feelable in the same 
way; some things do not stick). This vision of white innocence is then 
immediately juxtaposed with the title of the book, which bolsters the 
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immanence of violence. Such titles include Violated, Exploited, Broken 
and Betrayed and Girl for Sale.6
The authority of the narrative of abuse is thus made feelable through 
the affect dynamic of whiteness, which joins together ‘white girls’, 
‘innocence’ and ‘violation’. Abuse here is made recognisable through 
the fragility of the body of the ‘white child’ who, as Lee Edelman (2004) 
argues, is always cast as the defining symbol of ‘reproductive futurism’ 
and ‘social hope’. But this white childhood also works as a frame for 
the sexualised male gaze. Take, for example, the autobiographical book 
by Emma Jackson. In 2010 her account of sexual abuse was published 
as The End of My World. The front cover depicted a young girl of around 
10 years of age with her head in her hands. In 2012, as grooming was 
firmly placed in the public eye, the book was republished as Exploited. 
The new cover featured a soft-focus shot of a (partially) naked blonde 
adolescent, staring into the camera with dewy blue eyes. The framing 
of such images plays an important part in the politics of grooming. Not 
only does the violent sexualisation of the cover relate to the sensationalism 
of grooming (‘exploited’!), but it also works to equate sexual exploitation 
and rape, firstly with dangerous female sexuality (the more sensuous 
and nude position of the young women) and then with the penetration 
of purity, white, blonde femininity, by men of colour. Violence becomes 
recognisable and feelable as the body of the white girl is again made 
both risky and threatened.7
This construction invites the reader to adopt an emotional attachment 
to the young, feminised body in a way that relays rage and disgust 
towards the perverse other. This joins up with the broader logics of 
grooming scandals propagated by elites. For example, MP Jack Straw 
argued in 2011 that what drove Asian men to rape white girls was that 
they were ‘fizzing and popping with testosterone’ (BBC 2011). Here 
rape is presented as an outcome of Asian communities’ underdeveloped 
sexuality and kinship, where they are held back by arranged marriage 
and sexual conservatism (and the unavailability of their ‘own’ women). 
But it also renders rape and abuse a product of lust and unvanquished 
aberrant desire rather than an act of violence and power.
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Through these cultural artefacts, outrage and disgust are bolstered 
as affective moods which solidify attachments to the white nation and 
bind violence to other ‘perverse’ bodies. Readers are addressed to share 
in the experience of threatened white innocence (embodied in the figure 
of the ‘pure’ child and the sexualised adolescent). This becomes clear 
in the formatted ending of each book where, without fail, the author 
sets their story in the wider context of grooming and racial politics in 
the UK. Their experience is then rendered a ‘truth’ of the dangerous 
masculinity of brown men.
Whilst every novel pays lip service to an anti-racist stance, this is 
then logically denied by an assessment of the cultural motivations of 
the perpetrators. For example, in Girl for Sale (2015) the cause of abuse 
is the misogyny of Asian men who have no respect for women. In Stolen 
Girl (2013) the issue is the availability of white girls for Asian men and 
the heightened danger is that they can disappear to Pakistan at the drop 
of a hat. In Violated (2015), abuse and eventually murder are rendered 
products of a culture of honour attached to Islam. The authors approach 
these explanations as if they are self-evident truths. Here misogyny and 
hate of white women is located culturally; it is of ‘Asian’ and ‘Muslim’ 
communities, tied to religion, hyperpatriarchy, diasporic practices (just 
as with forced marriage). The borders of the white nation are brought 
to life here in an uncanny mirror to the mobilising energies of the far 
right, which again is conditioned by claims to the white family central 
to the organisation of the British Empire.
In describing acts of abuse and sexual violence, these narratives are 
almost always coded through epidemiological senses of race (Fanon 
1986). In one passage in Violated (Wilson 2015: 266) the victim walks 
through a ‘predominantly Asian area’ of a city and is physically sick at 
the smell of the environment. Another describes the stench of curry 
on the breath of her attacker and the way that perpetrators would speak 
in Urdu or Punjabi. It is here that disgust becomes an entangled affect 
regime. It is impossible to separate the racial demarcations of the 
perpetrators body and wider cultural environment, and wider Asian 
and Muslim community, from the act of abuse (on the politics of disgust 
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see Ahmed 2004: 82–100). Throughout these novels, sexual violence is 
not only rendered otherwise (it is of ‘Pakistan’, ‘West Africa’, the ‘Wild 
West’) but also specifically inhuman. Perpetrators are frequently ‘hunters’ 
or ‘lions of the Savannah’ who come to stalk their prey (Anonymous 
(Girl A) 2013: 329). They are beasts who live on white flesh. As with 
other energising forms of coloniality, animalism is again the crossing 
of the monstrous into the human world.
‘White girls’
What makes whiteness such an accomplice in the translation of criminals 
into monsters, and such a significant part of the story of grooming more 
broadly is its flexibility. What we witness in strategies which ‘make 
sense’ of grooming and sexual abuse (such as the artefacts above) is 
the transformation of victims into ‘white girls’. This first involves a 
social and institutional silencing and forgetting of abuse ‘within’ com-
munities and against women of colour (Thiara et al. 2015). Despite 
convincing evidence to the contrary (Gohir 2013), grooming is only 
rendered meaningful and feelable as an interracial crime which is done by 
‘Asian men’ on ‘white women’ or ‘girls’ (also see Apna Haq 2018; Wilson 
2018). Unlike sham or forced marriage, sexual abuse and grooming do 
not stick to women of colour. Secondly, this process of victimisation 
involves the whitening of vulnerable children from a multitude of social 
backgrounds.
Reports have detailed the extent of institutional failures of multiple 
social agencies in Rotherham and other towns where young girls and 
boys reported sexual abuse and rape for up to fifteen years, with little 
or no action from authorities (see, for example, Jay 2014; Casey 2015). 
Official reports on institutional failures in Rotherham consistently showed 
that most of the girls who suffered sexual abuse were known to the 
police and frequently dismissed as petty criminals, ‘child prostitutes’ 
or ‘little whores’ (Jay 2014: 69, 112; Casey 2015: 34–35, 47). It has also 
been revealed that during those fifteen years, 67.5 per cent of perpetrators 
of CSE in Yorkshire were white (Drew 2016). Most of the young people 
Bordering intimacy156
who were victims of CSE were already marginalised and vulnerable, in 
care and predominantly from poor communities. This reminds us that 
whiteness is flexible. It is bodied. But it must be worked upon and 
crafted. These young people were not always ‘white girls’.
White heteronormative power works by privileging able-bodied, 
heterosexual, bourgeois white men. For these girls to eventually speak, 
be heard and have their stories recognised, they had to be discovered 
to be ‘white’. And they could only be discovered to be white through 
the monstrous racial crime threat of grooming. By this, I mean that 
they could only be translated as white once they were established within 
the sexualised and racialised grammar of the protection of the white 
national family (as daughters, sisters, wives, etc. in need of protection). 
The ‘whitening’ of these girls and the frame through which ‘their’ story 
is told is saturated in whiteness because that was the only way it could 
become intelligible and listenable within wider codes of coloniality (i.e. 
as a wider threat to the white body, white family, white nation, white 
civilisation). The discovery of monstrousness involved a translation of 
‘child prostitutes’ into daughters of the white familial nation. At the 
same time, this eviscerated the voices of other women and girls (as well 
as men and boys) who were subject to abuse but who did not fit within 
this structuring of monstrous intimacies.
Conclusion
Defending Theresa May’s decision to strip naturalised citizens and dual 
nationals convicted of sexual exploitation or grooming of their citizenship, 
a Whitehall legal adviser argued: ‘There are no limits. It is not just 
potential terrorists who face losing their UK citizenship. Those involved 
in serious or organised crime, and who hold dual nationality, can expect 
similar justice’ (quoted in Cusick 2016). In the context of the racialised 
logic of grooming scandals and the anti-Muslim racism we see in the 
War on Terror, ‘there are no limits’ must be read as a specific threat 
against those who citizenship is already brought into question as ‘suspect’ 
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populations. As we have seen, even when white British citizens fight 
for Kurdish ‘terrorist’ groups in Syria they are shielded from the depriva-
tion of citizenship. The bordering practice of deprivation, which destroys 
the settled rights of citizenship and can lead to deportation, ‘sticks’ to 
certain bodies and slides off others.
The stripping of rights of those convicted of CSE was justified by 
the exceptional ‘monstrousness’ of these acts. But what is significant 
here is how, just as with terrorism or forced marriage, grooming and 
sexual abuse stick to ‘Asian’ and ‘Muslim’ bodies as serious and exceptional 
crimes. It is not only the crime of CSE that makes deprivation of citizen-
ship necessary and even celebrated (as in some parts of the media) but 
this relies upon the existing perceived deviancy of racialised populations 
who are already cast as unfamilial. To add to this, the case of grooming 
not only relied upon colonial ideas of deviancy (as we saw in the last 
chapter) but it is made sense of through the threat that racialised popula-
tions pose to ‘proper’, white, British family.
That the deprivation of citizenship is energised by the monstrousness 
of grooming reminds us of how interracial intimacy has remained a 
site of both extreme and normalised colonial violence. This violence, 
energised by racialised sexuality, has taken the form of lynch mobs 
claiming to defend white women against black rapists, explicit bans on 
interracial marriage and ‘miscegenation’ laws across the British Empire, 
anti-Muslim attacks, beatings and murders in the wake of grooming 
scandals. Particular imperial codes of the white European family have 
been used to justify white terror (Razack et al. 2010; Richter-Montpetit 
2014) – think, for instance, of Eyre’s justification for the massacre of 
black protestors in Morant Bay. Authorities harness and draw upon 
such racial violence to govern colonised populations. As I have argued, 
appeals to family continue to animate colonial bordering in Britain 
today. This means that borders can stick to certain people, even if they 
have citizenship – to remove their rights, to deport them, to line them 
up in the sights of an RAF drone. In analysing the role of ‘family’ in 
such bordering moves, we can appreciate how ‘family’ plays an ongoing 
role in practices of dispossession. Defending the white family involves 
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marshalling particular forms of ‘legitimate’ – that is, state-sanctioned 
– racial violence.
Grooming, I have illustrated, is made monstrous through the feelability 
of this violence, which is again made possible through a distribution 
of ‘racist sentiment’ (Hook 2005: 74). This violence can only be made 
sense of as worse than other forms of sexual abuse and rape (i.e. those 
carried out by white criminals) through the exceptionalism of interracial 
sexual violence as a threat to whiteness. This not only obscures violence 
and abuse done to women of colour (see Imkaan 2019) but obscures 
other structural conditions which made grooming possible such as 
deregulation, night-time economies, wider forms of patriarchy. As with 
forced marriage, this merely recycles a racist and culturalist analysis. 
The valorisation of whiteness, in the aid of white nationalism, creates 
the double bind of forgetting the everyday violence that affects many 
women of colour (Thiara et al. 2015), whilst equally readapting colonial 
racialised masculinity and claims of the undomesticated family to make 
new forms of legitimate violence possible.
Set in these terms, deprivation of citizenship works as a particular 
form of exceptional punishment. It is about securing the white family 
from the terror of the racialised monster through enacting the violence 
of deprivation. Here borders mark out and distinguish people as deviant 
and monstrous. The demarcation of the monster meets up with the 
sovereign power of the state to deprive a subject of their supposedly 
settled rights. This is the work of the sovereign border; because the 
border is sticky it follows and sticks to certain people as a tool of racialised 
governance. Against the many assumptions regarding borders as a tool 
of immigration, sticky borders are shown to stick to citizens as well as 
migrants. The violence of this move to dispossess is normalised and 
hidden because it is cast (through the logics of white nationalism) as 
a common-sense defence of the white family. White subjects who commit 
similar crimes, who travel to war zones to fight, are not stripped of 
their citizenship because they are not racialised as ‘out of place’ – they 
belong, even when committing violence.
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This chapter has traced how borders stick to certain bodies, animated 
as this is by shifting modes of racialised sexuality. Here appeals to the 
white (often national) family work to constitute certain forms of violence 
as exceptional and monstrous. Some violence is thinkable and feelable 
in ways that create familial attachments – such as the ‘daughters of the 
nation’. Such attachments I have shown both silence and but also generate 
other forms of violence. We are reminded of how ‘family’ is not only 
related to processes of control within colonial domestication but also 
dispossession. In this way, it is important to not examine the case of 
grooming in isolation but to probe at what this tells us about the character 
of borders and citizenship in postcolonial Britain more broadly – where 
borders go and what they do to apparently settled rights. This demands 
a broader analysis of the deprivation of citizenship, which I turn to in 
the next chapter.
Notes
1 In terms of method in this chapter, I largely drew upon Sara Ahmed’s work on 
affect to trace the emotional circulations that different discursive utterances, 
images and narratives bring together and manifest. Affect is about the coalesc-
ing of emotions, moods, atmospheres, senses which are always embodied but 
that can be shaped by interaction with discursive and textual objects (novels, 
documents, images, etc.) (Ahmed 2004: 13–14). To Ahmed (2004), emotions 
circulate and emerge (and can be fostered) in a way that brings certain points 
of contact together. Using this approach, I studied thirteen novels on the subject 
of grooming published between 2011 and 2018 to examine what emotional 
impulses they shaped and directed around the racial dynamics of grooming. 
Here I employed discourse analysis to understand the grammar and logic of 
these narratives and how they connected to wider social grammars around 
grooming, paying attention to the way emotions are brought up and used. To 
map this out further, I paid attention to how I felt and the emotions stirred in 
me whilst reading these novels, and also examined how the novels had been 
reviewed by readers and linked into broader debates about grooming – for 
example by right-wing organisations. This involved tracing the emotional politics 
of whiteness and grooming. 
2 Particularly the ‘spread’ of American ‘black gang culture’ into the UK through 
hip-hop music, but also localised genres such as garage, drill and so on.
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3 Black and Asian people make up 26 per cent of the prison population in England 
and Wales but only represent 13  per  cent of the general population (Sturge 
2018: 4). 
4 Easy Meat is published by English Review Press, a subsidiary of the World 
Encounter Institute, which works to propagate a project of white supremacy 
through a blog series and book press. It does so through claims to protect 
‘Western civilisation’, which is often limited to just ‘English-speaking democracies’. 
As with much of the new right, this project claims to ‘speak truth to power’ 
through protecting ‘freedom of speech’ and this is used to justify a clearly 
Islamophobic agenda. See the mission statement here: www.newenglishreview.org/
World_Encounter_Institute/ (accessed 23 July 2018). 
5 It may seem (as it did to me) an unattractive prospect to critically analyse the 
personal experience and trauma of victims of abuse through such novels. But 
these accounts remain a vital site in the animation of coloniality for reasons that 
will hopefully become clear. These texts are also brought together as part of the 
economies of grooming. Whilst dubbed as ‘confessional’ and ‘autobiographical’ 
accounts, we should remember that they are not spontaneous outpourings of 
trauma but are commissioned by publishers and editors as part of an industry 
of voyeurism that circulates and moulds such moral panics. 
6 In what might be a nod at dark irony, the font and format of the books mirror 
that of popular teen fiction such as The Baby-Sitters Club.
7 The covers of the books can be seen on the Penguin website – The End of My World: 
www.penguin.co.uk/books/1083666/the-end-of-my-world/9780091930523.html; 
Exploited: www.penguin.co.uk/books/109/1095140/exploited/9780091950460.html 
(both accessed 31 July 2019).
In the last chapter I showed how ideas of the imperilled white family 
have animated the scandal of grooming and play a part in how this act 
is rendered exceptional, and how this conditions the exceptional act of 
the state depriving subjects of citizenship. Now I want to delve into 
more detail regarding the tactic of deprivation itself. This means teasing 
out how deprivation works in relation to race, sexuality and empire. In 
this chapter I want to explore in more detail how ‘citizens’ are made 
into ‘migrants’ who can then be detained, deported and made killable 
(for example, at the end of an RAF drone). The threat of citizenship 
deprivation is used to throw light on postcolonial citizenship more 
broadly. This follows Saskia Sassen’s (2016) provocation that we should 
examine the ‘systematic edge’ because doing so reveals broader practices 
of border regimes, rights and the organisation of dispossession (also 
see Kapoor 2018: 6).
Following on from the investigation I began in the last chapter, I 
explore where the practice of citizenship deprivation came from and 
how it is used today in line with other bordering practices linked to 
the War on Terror. Whilst the militarisation and securitisation of the 
War on Terror and the hostile environment have expanded authoritarian 
governance through tactics such as deprivation (alongside deportation, 
passport removals and assassination), I show how deprivation is attuned 
to both the orientation and management of racial categories of empire 
and contemporary imperial formations. Against much of the contem-
porary work on citizenship deprivation, which argues that deprivation 




2017; Fargues 2017; Gibney 2017), I argue that de facto deprivation of 
rights and personhood was arguably foundational to modern citizenship. 
Rather than an aberration of citizenship, the racialised control we see 
today is better understood as an intensification of this past function. 
This I argue reveals a particular type of imperial family drama which 
rages through British citizenship.
I conclude the chapter by considering how contemporary rights and 
citizenship are shaped by the historical figurations of the ‘indentured 
labourer’ and the ‘fanatic rebel’ and/or ‘slave’. These figurations, and 
the colonial violence that accompanies them, continue to haunt and 
activate British citizenship today. Importantly, the act of depriving a 
number of terror suspects and CSE convicts of their citizenship further 
intensifies and normalises the practice of deprivation. We thus need to 
understand how this makes all naturalised and dual citizens amenable 
to the evisceration of rights. It makes large sections of society once 
legally categorised as ‘citizens’ into ‘migrants’.1
Deprivation and the terrorist
As I began to describe in the last chapter, the increasing use of deprivation 
of citizenship forms a part of wider counter-terrorism tactics in Britain, 
which have become bound up with the steady intensification of authori-
tarian immigration practices, such as detention, deportation and 
extradition (Kapoor 2018). Intensifying the use of legislation and royal 
prerogatives to dismantle citizenship forms a particular type of ‘sticky 
border’. This is because as a practice it threatens to potentially convert 
all naturalised and dual British citizens into deportable subjects.
Contemporary scholarship on deprivation has sought to reveal how 
this works as an aberration of settled forms of British citizenship (Gibney 
2014; Ross 2014; Sykes 2016; Webb 2017) – that is, as a particular, 
exceptional fusion of racialised immigration practice and security logics 
that have emerged out of the War on Terror (also see Kingston 2005; 
Bauböck 2014; Joppke 2016; Choudhury 2017; Gibney 2017). There is 
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good evidence to support this position. Deprivation of citizenship has 
emerged as a tactic in Belgium, France, Canada and Australia as a direct 
part of counter-terrorism protocol (Choudhury 2017). Whilst it has 
been legally possible to deprive British subjects of their citizenship since 
1918 if this was in the expressed ‘public good’ or for acts of ‘disloyalty’ 
(Webb 2017: 296), from 1973 to 2002 this power lay almost dormant. 
Whilst revamped in the wake of 9/11, it is predominantly after 2011 
that we see the wide application and acceleration of this power. Until 
the cases of grooming it had been used almost exclusively against those 
suspected of involvement in terrorism or for those accessing citizenship 
through fraud (which has been widely interpreted).
In 2002 and then 2007 the New Labour administration made it easier 
to deprive both naturalised citizens and those born into British citizenship 
of fundamental rights, but only if it could be proved that they had access 
to another nationality. Kapoor (2018) shows how this mirrored extradition 
legislation that made it easier to expel terror suspects to the United 
States. Since 2014, in order to circumvent international law on stateless-
ness, the Home Office has pushed the principle that a subject only 
‘potentially’ has to have access to another nationality for deprivation 
to be applied (effectively anyone with a family attachment – imagined 
or otherwise – to ‘elsewhere’). Using royal prerogatives, the Home 
Secretary has increasingly used cancellation of passports to avoid juridical 
procedures and (the albeit light) body of evidence needed to formally 
remove citizenship (Kapoor 2018). This also expands the population 
of people who can be subject to such policing. In 2018 it was reported 
that 115 ‘suspected terrorists’ had their passports cancelled (Lavi 2010).
Whilst formal citizenship deprivation works towards making citizens 
deportable and ultimately killable (usually at the end of a drone), passport 
removal works towards a cruddy method of social death internalised 
within the UK. Those who have their passports cancelled within Britain 
are bound by internalised borders (Kapoor 2018), this denies them a 
right to movement and in doing so it restricts access to housing, the 
job market, welfare and healthcare (especially given accompanying 
immigration rules mean that access to services and shelter relies on 
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showing a passport). As with the proliferation of mass detention and 
deportation for ‘irregularised’ migrants, this is a form of criminalisation 
and incarceration that bypasses the ordinary criminal justice system 
and expands a racialised state of exception (Hussain 1999). This use of 
sovereign powers not only bypasses juridical procedures but also 
parliamentary and civil accountability. For instance, the Special Immigra-
tion Appeals Commission (SIAC), which presides over cases of depriva-
tion, works by limiting the information available to defendants and 
defence lawyers.2
Whilst deprivation works to contain or expel (through imprisonment, 
detention, deportation or exile), and passport removal to expel or contain, 
this also joins up with the (im)possibility of acquiring rights to settlement 
and citizenship. Since 2001 successive British governments have made 
accessing citizenship more difficult to achieve – for example, by introduc-
ing expensive citizenship tests and ceremonies, and banning people 
with criminal convictions (including for immigration offences) from 
applying. Multiple forms of structural disadvantage (poverty, involvement 
in criminality) are reinforced in this practice where the state reinforces 
the precarity of populations without settled rights by making them into 
‘eternal guests’ (de Noronha 2016). Such hostility has been a central 
feature of the architecture of the hostile environment in the UK, which 
concerns irregularising migrants and criminalising them at the same 
time. Investigations into what became the ‘Windrush scandal’ have 
shown that it is not just those without settled status who can be subject 
to deportation and subjects of the hostile environment. Commonwealth 
citizens who have been unable to evidence that they have citizenship 
(such as with a passport) have been regularly treated as ‘illegal migrants’ 
and exiled to Jamaica (Gentleman 2018a).
This reflects increasing links between counter-insurgency practices, 
the criminal justice system, immigration practice and economic and 
social inequalities structured by race. Recent operations by the Home 
Office have ramped up the targeting of migrants with criminal convic-
tions for deportation. In 2012 the Metropolitan Police and Home Office 
initiated ‘Operation Nexus’ – an information-sharing programme aimed 
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at fast-tracking the deportation of ‘foreign criminals’. The scheme not 
only aimed to deport people with convictions but also those ‘suspected’ 
of criminal intent and behaviour, such as involvement in ‘gang activ-
ity’ (Griffiths and Morgan 2017). Given how racialised the discourse 
of gangs is in metropolitan centres like London and Manchester, the 
impact of such a move is significant. On the one hand, young black 
and Asian youth are policed for their suspected involvement in gang 
activity (e.g. in practices of stop and search, or losing access to social 
housing due to suspected gang activity); on the other, the heavy polic-
ing of black and Asian communities means that people with informal 
status (who may have been born and raised in the UK, we should 
remember) can be detained and deported for suspected gang involvement. 
Operation Nexus criminalises without individuals being subject to due 
process or criminal prosecution. It is significant that gang activity is 
frequently linked to the collapse of family structures. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the ‘failed patriarchy’ of black households is made 
hypervisible in cases of gang violence (Collins 1998; also see Sewell  
2018).
We can see here how existing inequalities produced through racialised 
capitalism with regard to job prospects, housing, education, welfare 
and the effects of austerity on wider black and Asian communities 
provide a further structural context for this type of border regime. 
There is also a clear geopolitical-imperial dimension to this expansion 
of sticky borders. Deportation programmes are reliant on diplomatic 
agreements, such as the one pursued by the British government in 2015 
when the state offered £25 million to build extra prisons in Jamaica for 
deported ‘criminals’ (BBC 2015), just as hundreds of people with distant 
links to the Caribbean are set on flights and abandoned in cities such 
as Kingston. The British state uses the structural linkages of empire to 
refashion and extend the carceral state overseas and to expel and contain 
its ‘problematic’ internal colonies (de Noronha 2016).
The racialised structures of criminal justice meet up in insidious 
and authoritarian ways with the renewed practices of deprivation and 
deportation (Home Office 2014b). It is important to note here that 
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whilst the white family is protected at all costs (as demonstrated in the 
previous chapter), violent practices of immigration raids, detention, 
deportation and deprivation split up or destroy intimate relations, 
kinships and families. And yet this so often goes unnoticed or unchal-
lenged. The dispossession of family and kinship ties is instead broadly 
accepted and normalised. The power of ‘family’ fails to stick to those 
racialised bodies and kinships ‘without’ value (de Noronha 2016; see, 
for example, the case of Kenneth Oranyendu described in Taylor 2018).
Deprivation of citizenship
Deprivation has without doubt intensified through the proliferation of 
counter-terror devices, closed courts and passport removals, alongside 
the extension of the policy of the hostile environment and the ease 
with which authoritarian practices are normalised through ‘monstrous’ 
security and policing concerns. Here the ‘jihadi terrorist’, the ‘illegal 
migrant’ and the ‘grooming gang’ do a lot of political work in joining 
up security mechanisms such as policing with the sovereign power of 
the immigration state – to expel, abandon and kill targeted bodies. 
We should consider in particular how neoliberal forms of racialised 
capitalism mark certain populations as surplus and without ‘value’. And 
how particular imperial military interests of the British state in the 
Middle East are served in the deprivation of citizenship – such as the 
case with ISIS recruits. Scholars of citizenship are right to reveal this 
worrying trend. However, we need to consider how much this offers 
a radical departure or aberration of British citizenship. Instead, I read 
the proliferation of formal deprivation and its corollary practices of 
detention, deportation and extrajudicial killing as already tied to the 
violent mandate of modern citizenship. The settlement and practice of 
British citizenship is not only forged out of empire but remains wedded 
to the categories and demarcations of colonial domestication which are 
reworked and adapted into our contemporary moment. To trace this 
means thinking more broadly about how deprivation has functioned 
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as a historical practice and how this shapes its current articulation. 
If de jure (i.e. formal, legalised, institutional) deprivation was almost 
dormant during most of the twentieth century then de facto (i.e. practical, 
structural, everyday) deprivation was alive and well.
For many colonised people, Commonwealth citizens or ‘subjects of 
the Crown’, citizenship has never ‘stuck’; it has slid off and over them. 
We need to remember that categories of the human have failed to stick 
to certain bodies/populations and such categories of the human are 
remade through contemporary border practices. Appealing to this 
genealogy of colonial deprivation allows us to consider more appropriately 
what the relationship is between citizens who are never allowed to 
belong and those who are formally made deportable, and with that 
killable. And in turn we must consider how this structures citizenship 
more broadly.
This is what I turn to now, offering up some examples to remind us 
how citizenship functioned across the British Empire, in processes of 
colonial domestication, before reflecting on the reworking of depriva-
tion and monstrousness today as an extension and readaptation of 
colonial rule.
Deprivations under empire
On 27 April 1888 the SS Afghan, a Japanese-owned ship, was stopped 
from disembarking in Melbourne Harbour. On board were up to sixty-
seven Chinese labourers who had travelled from Hong Kong for work 
in Victoria. Whilst the Chinese Restriction Act of 1881 allowed authorities 
in Victoria to restrict the movement of indentured Chinese labourers 
into the state, what was significant was that the majority of those travelling 
on the Afghan were British subjects. As subjects of the Crown they 
retained the right to move across the British Empire, codified in the 
promise of imperial citizenship which London was supposed to uphold 
(Gorman 2007). Amidst mounting pressure from white constituencies 
who argued that Chinese and other Asians were ‘unsuited’ for life in 
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Australia and posed an economic threat, the local authorities kept the 
ship under quarantine (Crawford 2014).
As the Afghan remained in the harbour, the port authorities worked 
a sleight of hand: rather than merely outright refusing entry to those 
onboard, they instead worked to ‘check the documents of the labourers’ 
and found that their naturalisation papers and contracts were in fact 
‘not bonafide’ (Campbell 1921); they were, to use a current parlance, 
‘illegalised’. Whilst protests were raised by both the ship’s Japanese owners 
and elites in Hong Kong, local authorities agreed that this was enough 
to warrant suspicion and the ship was turned away from the state of 
Victoria and subsequently quarantined in Sydney (Turner 1904: 278–279). 
In order to avoid further incidents, the Australian government issued 
quarantine orders on any ships arriving from Hong Kong, forcing shipping 
companies to stop selling tickets to people of Chinese descent.
That the passports of around sixty British subjects could be rendered 
‘fake’ or ‘inauthentic’ rests on how the body of these passport holders 
could never be fully translated into the authentic ‘British subject’. Whilst 
paying lip service to the ‘multiracial’ Empire, the British authorities 
worked in union with the Australian settler state to deprive these subjects 
of their right to mobility. Several months after the crisis, Colonial 
Secretary Baron Knutsford expressed sympathy with Australian authori-
ties, arguing that he was also ‘keen on not seeing Australia swamped 
by Chinese labour’ (Parl. Deb. 1888). Rather than being treated as British 
subjects, these labourers were instead translated into ‘unwanted’ remnants 
of the Empire. They could be subject to expulsion because the rights 
of ‘imperial citizenship’ could not stick.
As I demonstrated in chapter 2, this was how imperial citizenship 
was managed on an everyday level across the Empire: from dismantling 
direct shipping routes from the Indian subcontinent to settler states 
such as Canada, to medical inspections at the border, to the enactment 
of deportation and vagrancy orders. It was similarly found in the regular 
claims that identity papers were ‘fake’ or in claims that a person did 
not look like a spouse, partner or child of a British subject. These tactics 
became part of the institutional fabric of the Empire, where the claim 
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over the right of mobility, settlement and life were made (im)possible 
for non-white populations. They could be moved but they never had 
a right to move.
In considering why those aboard the Afghan could be denied entry, 
it is worth turning to Browne’s work on the early emergence of the 
control of movement. It is worth reminding ourselves that regulation 
has always been bound to distinctions over personhood. In contributing 
to a counter-history of the passport, Browne (2015: 52) shows how 
slaves were subject to extensive surveillance of mobility within and 
beyond the plantations of the Americas from the seventeenth century. 
This was regulated at ports, on slave ships, through the slave pass, in 
slave patrols and in ‘wanted’ posters. Merely not looking like a citizen 
(i.e. white) in many US states meant being subject to immediate and 
legally sanctioned violence. For instance, in 1845 a law in Georgia 
declared that any slave found off their master’s plantation without a 
pass would be subject to arrest and a standard twenty lashings.
Browne goes on to explore how the figure of the black slave animated 
bordering practices more broadly across empire. For instance, she details 
the formation of The Book of Negroes in eighteenth-century New York 
(Browne 2015: 88). This was a ledger that allowed evacuation from the 
city aboard British ships. If former slaves could be included in the book, 
they were given a right of mobility out of America (as part of a claim 
to be a British subject). To Browne, the legal struggles over which black 
subjects could be included in the book, often against claims by former 
masters and opportunists that they were ‘fugitive slaves’, reveals a 
particular struggle over the racialised codes of personhood. It reveals 
a struggle over the right to be treated as a person with the possibility 
of legal and political rights, or be deprived of all personhood and 
translated into property.
What we can begin to see here in these brief examples is that depriva-
tion is not only orientated towards depriving subjects of already existing 
rights. But deprivation follows a history of practices through which people 
have been categorised as political (in)humans with access to recognition, 
rights and dignity. Deprivation in this sense creates boundaries between 
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who can be human or not-quite/non-human. As I have argued across 
this book, this was continuously shaped and resuscitated by claims to 
the familial. Such violent distinctions between categories of the human 
rebounded across the British Empire. Writing in 1879 to the Imperial 
Office in London, Francis Lock, Brigadier General of Aden, provided 
a detailed assessment of new powers to expel ‘vagrants’ in his province 
(Lock 1879). Musing over the usefulness of deportations, Lock argued 
that the main problem in Aden was ‘African coastal migrants’. Whilst 
indentured labourers of ‘good character’ could be tolerated, he argued, 
Africans – who carried with them the ‘essence of slavery’ – merely 
cluttered the jail cells and lived lives of deviancy. ‘They no doubt 
are pleased’, he argued, ‘to be clothed, fed and watered’ (Lock 1879). 
Unconcerned whether the ‘African coastal migrants’ were British subjects, 
Lock proposed rounding up and expelling the whole of this idle and 
deviant population and barring them from re-entering the province.
Almost a decade later, the Governor General of Baluchistan, India, 
was outlining the best tactics to deal with the infiltration of ‘trans-border 
rebels’ into the Punjab region. Described as ‘Muhammadan fanatics’, 
the rebels were fighting a low-intensity insurgency against colonial 
outposts and hiding within the mountain villages (Spence 1887). Sharing 
a similar logic to Lock, the Governor General suggested that the penal 
criminal code was again inadequate to deal with these ‘fanatics’. Banish-
ment, deprivation of property rights, punishment of the wider family 
and tribe were all considered as possible options to deal with the rebels. 
However, it was proposed that the most effective deterrent to rebellion 
was to hang and burn the fanatic’s body in front of their family and 
village (Archer 1887). This spectacular act of violence, it was argued, 
was the only way to send a message to the fanatics and the wider com-
munity. If this message was not heeded, soldiers were then ordered to 
burn the whole village to the ground, and force the villagers to cut and 
burn their own crops and trees (see the Frontier Murderous Outrages 
Regulation 1901, also Punjab Murderous Outrages Act XXII 1867 and 
Act IX 1877, which legislated forms of brutal collective punishment 
over the ‘tribal areas’ of what is now Pakistan).
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As with the figuration of the ‘African coastal migrant’, the fanatic or 
rebel needed to be subject to physical and public forms of suffering. 
The body of the fanatic was subject to gratuitous violence both before 
and after death, precisely because they were considered the monstrous 
remainders of social order. Rights as subjects of the Crown did not even 
form part of the social calculus in either case here. Nor did the associated 
kinship ties and community relations they were viewed as embedded 
within. The wider Indian penal code was too good for them; trial and 
imprisonment made no sense here. The ‘African migrant’, the ‘fanatic’, 
and then the whole ‘Muhammadan village’ were already rendered outside 
of logics of progress, labour and thus personhood.
Colonial differentiation
These scales of deprivation structured imperial and colonial rule. Whilst 
some subjects could become included within modes of personhood as 
not-quite-human (those who could pass as ‘British subjects’, labourers 
or who could be included in The Book of Negroes), this rested on the 
categorisation of others as non-human (the fake citizen-subject, the 
captured slave, the rebel/fanatic, the African coastal migrant). Here we 
are able to dig deeper into the different racialised-sexualised subject 
positions of coloniality, and with this the structural positionalities which 
are arguably resuscitated today through modern British citizenship. For 
certain classifications of colonised subjects, a right to labour, settlement 
and family could be provisionally met and sustained, as long as it worked 
in equilibrium with the demands of the imperial capitalist and liberal 
order. We might here consider the figure of the indentured labourer as 
one who is temporally employed, subject to disciplinary violence but 
included in a modified form of wage labour and certain rights of mobility 
and kinship, if not full personhood. Against this, other subjects were 
viewed as incapable of personhood and family life – as merely flesh, 
property or as a threat to the reproductive circulations of empire. The 
exemplary figure here is that of the ungendered slave who is converted 
to chattel, unable to ever attain access to European ideas of personhood 
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such as gender, sexuality and family; their work is never convertible 
into labour, and they can never have family – they can only reproduce 
(Spillers 1987).
It is worth remembering here how the figure of the black slave has 
underpinned the stratification of people into human/not-quite/non-
human. It was the black slave who was both denied family life, had all 
forms of kinship dismantled and was depicted as outside of liberal time 
and progress. Blackness, via the position of the slave, and engendered 
slave body, is the defining feature of the unfamilial. To Sharpe (2016), 
the black body has subsequently been demarcated as the site of gratuitous 
violence and suffering. Wilderson (2010) further argues that what 
arranges both suffering and death in colonial modernity is ‘anti-blackness’. 
Following Weheliye (2014) and Mbembe (2003), anti-blackness relates 
to the structuring of violence and organises treatment of individuals 
and populations. Here anti-blackness and the propensity towards 
spectacular violence, social and physical death that reached its peak 
under chattel slavery can also be applied to other populations who are 
not socially recognised as ‘black’. In this way we can consider how 
anti-blackness and the reducing of people, bodies, populations to the 
position of the non-human (i.e. the slave) structures all colonial categories 
of people and their treatment. Those who are cast in relationship to 
blackness can be subject to increasingly gratuitous violence (such as 
the fanatic or African coastal migrant above) because of how they are 
positioned on scales of differentiation between white and black. However, 
whilst the indentured labourer could be ‘useful’, the slave was ultimately 
expendable and killable. Whilst the indentured labourer held the 
structural position of the not-quite-human, the slave (and/or the fanatic) 
was explicitly non-human. Violence aimed at the non-human did not 
have to be justified or accounted for; it was already structurally accepted 
and normalised.
Struggles over the deprivation of personhood have arguably structured 
the foundations of modern citizenship. As I have begun to sketch out, 
this was premised not just on who had access to full political rights, 
but more fundamentally on who had the right to recognition of life, 
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body, intimacy and personhood. Bringing this discussion back into the 
contemporary moment, we can reflect on how modern British citizenship 
has been consistently shaped by the (im)possible rights claims of colonised 
people. If we cast our minds back to chapter 3, we can remember that 
the British Nationality Act 1981, which created the national definition 
of British citizenship, relied on an act of mass deprivation. Whilst often 
overlooked, this Act effectively meant that some four million people 
across the Commonwealth were deprived of claiming their historic 
rights of British citizenship. It ended the rights that colonised people 
had fought to maintain and the legal framework that made it possible 
to move and settle in the British metropole, to join family members or 
support communities through work and remittances. Just as British 
subjects were denied rights and personhood across the Empire in a de 
facto fashion, this legal deprivation followed and institutionalised this 
legacy. It did so by marking out the national space as a white family 
hosting long-invited guests of colour (see Dixon 1983; Kundnani 2001).
As the case of grooming suggests, when these ‘guests’ transgress, 
their right to citizenship can be removed, a practice that is not open 
to white subjects whose citizenship never comes into question (criminal 
justice is the response to transgressions, not the border). What monstrous 
transgressions such as grooming reveal is that citizens of colour, following 
the rhythm and orientations of empire, have never really had full citizen-
ship in the first place.
Impossible rights
In February 2018 the tabloid newspaper the Sun published an online 
article explicitly celebrating the assassination of Naveed Hussain 
(otherwise known as Abu Usamah al-Britani) by an RAF drone in 
northern Syria (Akbar 2018). The headline read: ‘GO TO HELL’. Hussain 
remained a British citizen at the time of his death. The article represents 
a particular theatre of racist violence and sexualised voyeurism which 
is relevant here. It was reported that Hussain had previously attempted 
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to convince a Page Three model to convert to Islam and join him in 
Syria. The paper celebrated Hussain’s death as the destruction of a 
monstrous deviant. And it did so by juxtaposing his death with a half-
naked picture of the ‘innocent’ white model, who we are invited to 
imagine has been ‘saved’ by the RAF drone strike. Revealing the slippery 
character of the deprivation of rights/personhood in our contemporary 
moment, on this occasion the British state did not remove Hussain’s 
citizenship before his death. There was no legal wrangling. He was 
simply killed as an ‘enemy combatant’.
What was particularly noticeable in this event were the circulations 
of rage, hatred and glee that ran through the comments under the 
online article. Most commenters celebrated the act and the need for 
more drone strikes (‘Wonderful News!’ read one from Redbean, 17 
February 2018, comment on Akbar 2018). Others called for this kind 
of spectacular violence on UK streets: ‘when finished over in sand-land 
they can land on the target in any UK inner city’ (James Soros, 17 
February 2018, comment on Akbar 2018). Again, as we saw in chapter 
4, war comes ‘home’, attached as it is to the racialised-sexualised body 
of the non-human terrorist/monster. Such racist nationalism could be 
viewed as exceptional (even monstrous) as it often is to liberal audiences, 
with the one rejoinder that the killing of Hussain was carried out by 
the British military with barely a protest in the Houses of Parliament.
That the British state did not need to deprive Hussain of his citizenship 
formally is significant. It was not necessary because his citizenship could 
never stick in the first place. One comment on the Sun article (Maximus 
Hispania, 17 February 2018, comment on Akbar 2018) was just as 
revealing as the actions of the state:
British? hahaha That monster has no British cultural background, even 
if he s [sic] born in London. Your parents condition your real nationality. 
And monsters like these don’t deserve British citizenship.
At Sassen’s (2016) ‘systematic edge’ (the assassination of an enemy 
combatant who remains a British citizen) we learn how tightly citizenship 
is bound to colonial intimacies and the white family. Monsters, we 
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should remember, and those who occupy the structural positions of 
the non-familial/non-human monster have no citizenship in contem-
porary Britain.
Deprivation as colonial violence
Through the above examples, I hoped to illustrate the persistence of 
deprivation of citizenship and its varied forms. Deprivation is bound 
to broader claims to personhood, because if humanity cannot stick to 
certain bodies then how can citizenship? In this context, contemporary 
deprivation cannot only be understood as shaped by the War on Terror 
or the hostile environment.
Instead, deprivation might be more keenly understood as part of 
the wider racialised governance which has circulated globally throughout 
modern empire. It is not that British citizenship has been fundamentally 
altered but that for certain populations citizenship has always been 
impossible. It has been impossible because the humanity of colonised 
people is constantly in question. Contemporary changes to the rules 
of deprivation map onto, resuscitate and are normalised by this historic 
impossibility. Citizenship in this sense is not only imprinted by imperial 
‘legacies’ but is better described as ‘designed’ to continue and enhance 
hierarchies of empire (for a more detailed discussion of ‘failure by design’ 
see Tyler 2010). Here contemporary imperial interests such as carrying 
out colonial military operations in the Middle East, the emergence of 
ISIS and the rapid expansion of ‘surplus’ populations through contem-
porary racialised capitalism meet up with older logics of deprivation.
I want to conclude this chapter by suggesting that cases of deprivation, 
exemplified by what happened in Rotherham, reveal important things 
about ongoing colonial and familial hierarchies. Citizenship in con-
temporary Britain is structured by the afterlife of the colonial categories 
of the human/not-quite/non-human
The powers of deprivation we have seen develop since 2002, which 
were expanded in the wake of the Rotherham grooming scandal, continue 
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to make all citizens who have an attachment to another state, or who 
are naturalised or dual citizens, into potential ‘migrants’. Here possessing 
citizenship can longer be viewed as protection against bordering and 
immigration practices. What the threat of deprivation does is transform 
mainly non-white citizens into a structural position akin to the indentured 
labourer – that is, these subjects hold provisional rights, and are subject 
to exploitation and discipline. This exploitation, discipline and provisional 
regime of rights are increasingly made arbitrary with limited recourse 
to legal challenge. These communities are made steadily deportable as 
borders become stickier – that is, they can be subject to citizenship 
stripping, detention and deportation as their rights become conditional. 
We can think here of how the removal of passports works as a method 
of enclosure, or of how those whose citizenship appears to be brought 
into question are denied essential medical treatment (Gentleman 2018a), 
or of the high rates of incarceration of young black and Asian men 
(Elliott-Cooper 2016). The indentured labourer, we should remember, 
was at times useful: they could be temporarily ‘good’ and ‘worthy’, they 
held provisional recognition of kinship. But their worth and rights were 
always contingent. This is the realm of the not-quite-human.
What conditions the temporality, control and exploitation of the 
not-quite-human is the possibility and threat of being subject to state-
sanctioned and gratuitous violence. The normalised violence against 
monsters – street groomers, terrorists, gangs – reminds us that not-
quite-human populations can be quickly transformed into killable bodies 
and populations. Here people who are stripped of their citizenship, 
abandoned, killed by drone strikes or extradited (Kapoor 2018: 51–83) 
are arguably subjected to the remnants of anti-black violence that we 
saw perpetrated against slaves, fanatics and ‘African coastal migrants’ 
above. Acts such as the deprivation of citizenship, drone assassinations, 
torture, expelling of unwanted migrants are orientated towards the 
destruction and raw punishment of bodies (Richter-Montpetit 2014). 
We can see this death drive in the glee that runs through the celebration 
of the deportation of grooming convicts, the expulsion of ‘foreign 
criminals’, the drone strikes on ‘terrorists’. It is a spectacle of violence 
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which is desired and celebrated as the gratuitous deaths of the mon-
strously perverse. But in these acts of violence is the structuring of the 
vulnerability of wider racialised populations whose rights and bodies 
are also brought into question. What differs in terms of the subject 
position of the racially exploited and those of the (fanatic or) terrorist 
is that rather than this violence being orientated towards life, as a 
productive force, it is focused on death. Here we can consider this 
parallel violence as linked to the history of anti-blackness as a death 
drive (Sexton 2011). This is the realm of the non-human. Because this 
violence is motivated through racialised-sexualised claims to personhood, 
intimacy and evolutionary ideas about family, it structures the treatment 
of wider populations and creates further conditions for the evisceration 
of rights and personhood.
Conclusion
What I have demonstrated in the last three chapters is that the family 
is bound to economies of life and death in ways that do not appear 
immediately obvious. Whilst chapter 3 examined the way that appeals 
to family worked to manage colonised populations as shams, in chapter 
4 and here the family was orientated towards protecting and sustaining 
whiteness, bound as this is to gratuitous forms of violence. If the modern 
liberal family is outwardly presented as inclusive, when we push at this, 
we can see how imperial, privileged whiteness is reasserted powerfully. 
Family thus works as control but also dispossession in our contemporary 
moment. For example, borders are arranged to limit the rights to those 
deemed shams; citizenship is restricted through the denial of inheritance. 
But borders are equally bound to securing the white family against its 
perverse others.
Recognising that deprivation of citizenship acts as a particular form 
of sticky border has revealed the extent to which British citizenship is 
already sustained by colonial orientations and racialised logics. Here 
it is important to further examine how bordering haunts non-white 
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citizens, whether they were born into British citizenship or whether 
they were naturalised – people can be subject to an evisceration of 
rights and subsequently their lives. This reminds citizens racialised as 
non-white that not only can they never ‘belong’ but that their access 
to personhood (and with it, rights, habeas corpus, survival) is constantly 
in doubt. In the case of parents losing their citizenship, this effectively 
means that dependent children are also stripped of their rights (Woods 
and Ross 2013). Just as legal categories of ‘slave’ or ‘free person’ were 
natally transferred or how citizenship is passed on through bloodline, 
in modern Britain deprivation can now be inherited through women’s 
bodies (see, for example, Embury-Dennis 2019). This is not merely a 
‘legacy’ of empire, attuned as it is to hierarchies of imperialism, but the 
ongoing fabric of colonial rule which feeds off the stratification and 
management of populations along deeply racialised lines.
To understand the role that monstrous violence plays in contemporary 
bordering is to be attuned to the way that spectacular violence and 
suffering remains attuned to anti-blackness. Here coloniality is animated 
by securing the white heteronormative family and paternally managing 
‘tolerable’ populations; but it is equally bound to the spectacle and 
desire to inflict punishment and suffering, orientated towards bringing 
certain ways of being in the world to an end. If the feminised body of 
the reproductive (unintegrated) woman is a threat to the nation through 
her fertility and failed motherhood (as we saw in the chapter 3), the 
masculinised monster demands more martial solutions.
If non-white citizens are rendered deportable populations, attached 
to the legacy of the indentured labourer, they are bound to an inevitable 
form of failed (or sham) citizenship. They remain positioned by liberal 
developmentalism as an example of underdeveloped sexuality and family 
life within the postmetropole. This works to legitimise forms of violent 
bordering that not only control but also expel people, and in so doing 
enhances inequalities and creates even more precarious populations 
and spaces of abandonment. Underpinning this, and structuring this 
precarity, is the ever-present possibility of being demarcated as killable; 
as the monstrous; as the expendable. This is the demarcation of not 
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only failed citizenship but also failed futurity (Mbembe 2003), where 
bodies are rendered beyond the social calculus; that is, outside of and 
without a future.
Notes
1 This chapter was based on archival work undertaken in 2016 and 2017 at the 
National Archives, Kew, the British Library, London, and the Bristol Archives.
2 Deprivation of citizenship can be done on the basis that it is in the ‘public good’. 
The definition of this is entirely up to the discretion of the Home Secretary. 
Subjects can appeal through SIAC. However, because the state has the legal right 
to withhold evidence if it is in the ‘interest of national security’, defendants and 
lawyers rarely have adequate material to base their case on. Equally, the Home 
Office regularly issues deprivation orders when a subject is out of the country, 
meaning that lodging an appeal may be impossible in the time frame (ten days 
after a letter of expulsion has been received). Courts are extremely cautious of 
overturning cases based on issues of security. Furthermore, the legal basis of 
deprivation stands on such arbitrary grounds that even suspicion of collusion 
with terrorist organisations can be enough for the court to rule in favour of the 
Home Office. This evidence-light approach is reflected in the low success rates of 
appeals: between 2009 and 2017, only one appeal against citizenship deprivation 
was successful, six were dismissed, two were struck out and three remained 
open (a list of decisions can be found at http://siac.decisions.tribunals.gov.uk/). 
The good migrant is placid. The good migrant accepts their place. The 
good migrant contributes. The good migrant pays their dues. The good 
migrant is domesticated. The good migrant is always happy to be here, 
forever grateful for the tolerance and begrudging acceptance of their hosts. 
They change their name because it was always too hard to pronounce. It 
made people feel awkward. They are happy to be given their marked and 
cramped space at the margins of the tolerant nation. The good migrant 
subjects themselves to the endless gaze, compromises their history to ‘pass’ 
and pose for the camera, in the thankless yet highly visible task to be 
‘included’.
On 17 October 2016 a small group of child refugees arrived in the 
English town of Croydon under a newly devised child resettlement 
scheme (commonly referred to at the time as the ‘Dubs amendment’). 
Under this scheme the government had reluctantly agreed to allow 
initially 480 unaccompanied children, previously based in the informal 
settlement or ‘Jungle’ camp in Calais, the right to settle in the UK.1 
Despite widespread initial support for the scheme (including from usually 
hostile right-wing tabloids), the fourteen minors stepping off coaches 
that day were doggedly hounded by the press. Almost immediately 
questions were raised as to whether these refugees were ‘really children’. 
As further doubt was spread over the next few days, journalists began 
referring to them as ‘burly lads’ (Greenhill et al. 2016). Attention was 
placed on their masculinity and bodied features of age such as ‘crow 
feet’, ‘eye bags’ and ‘facial hair’. The Conservative MP David Davies 
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tweeted that ‘they don’t look like “children” … I hope British hospitality 
is not being abused’ (quoted in McLaughlin 2018: 7).
Faced with what Elizabeth Brown (2011) calls ‘unchildlike children’, the 
Daily Mail became the first newspaper to publicly use facial recognition 
software to ‘test’ the refugees’ ages (Wright and Drury 2017). The front 
covers of the following day’s papers were full of photographic portraits 
of the children – now transformed into ‘youth’ or ‘young men’ – with 
their suspected, computer-generated ages showing them to be adults. 
Focus fell on the apparent risk these ‘young men’ would pose in British 
schools as a sexual threat to young girls (Wright and Drury 2017). 
Speaking in an interview on BBC Radio 4, Davies argued that these 
‘unchildlike’ children should be subject to dental examinations and 
X-rays to prove their age (BBC 2016). Warding off arguments that 
this would be unethical and a violent intervention, Davies suggested 
that this was nothing compared to what asylum seekers (or ‘economic 
migrants’ in his lexicon) go through – a mere dental examination 
could not be compared to the risk of crossing the Mediterranean and 
surviving the conditions of the ‘Jungle’ camp (also see Royston and 
Mills 2016). If they were ‘real’ children after all, what did they have 
to hide?
This event captures a number of different bordering moves around 
the body of the child, the ‘real’ refugee and the ‘good’ or domesticated 
migrant, bordering moves which are tied up with a powerful politics 
of victimhood, innocence and ‘deservedness’ and the visual regimes of 
all three. The figuration of the child does a huge amount of political 
work in this encounter and in global politics more broadly (Faulkner 
2011). As I touched upon in chapter 4, ‘the child’ is bound to heter-
onormative futurity, and with this hope, and thus is made into the 
ultimate vulnerable subject. But this relies equally on who can be a 
child and, subsequently, who can be innocent, vulnerable and a subject 
of empathy and protection (Crawley 2011). It makes us ask which 
bodies are maintained by the dominant value of childhood, and how 




Global regimes of humanitarianism rely upon the codification of child-
hood as victimhood, for example to ‘save’ and ‘protect’ refugees or 
vulnerable people. And yet we already know that childhood, and with 
that victimhood, is already racialised, gendered, sexualised in particular 
ways. Sharpe (2016) reminds us that childhood is never accessible to 
some. Consider how black children are consistently rendered as ‘youth’, 
and with this dangerous and threatening (Jackson and Pabon 2000; 
Duru 2004), often known only through violence, ‘gang culture’ or ‘knife 
crime’ (on asylum seekers see Davidson 2016), or how the above child 
refugees were immediately converted into a sexualised threat to white 
school girls. The messiness, cultural and geographical locatedness of 
childhood is obscured and often only made intelligible in relation to a 
white, Western and universalised idea of family. There is childhood, 
and there is sham childhood.
In the assertion by Davies that ‘they don’t look like “children”’ we 
are reminded initially of how images of children work to create empathy 
in the context of humanitarian events and disasters; and secondly, of 
how this produces a grammar of ‘real’ suffering. Consider, for instance, 
the now infamous picture of Alan Kurdi, the toddler whose dead body 
was photographed lying face down on a beach in Bodrum, Turkey, in 
2015. This picture is often upheld as a devastating and humanising 
moment of photojournalism (Gunter 2015). It is understood by many 
to have shifted the European public’s perception of the ‘migrant’ or 
‘refugee crisis’ and created the conditions for more liberal policy-making 
(including, some argue, the Dubs amendment discussed above; Bleiker 
2018: 32). And yet, as Miriam Ticktin (2016) argues, this image was 
able to pull at Western heartstrings because the photo captured the 
dead child in the likeness of a Euro-American boy in holiday beach 
wear. It is significant that when I look at that picture now, I still see my 
own son. It is devastating. But this is fundamentally about who can be 
imaged, and at the same time imagined, as (un)worthy (see Butler  
2010).
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Who gets to be a ‘child’ – known, seen, empathised with as a ‘child’ 
– is historical, just as who gets to be seen as a refugee or ‘good’ migrant 
is historicised within particular terms and relations of who is familial. 
In order to be accepted as ‘genuine’ refugees, or even to be mourned, 
children must fit within the dominant account of childhood and the 
family (Holland 2004). Or more precisely, they must be amenable to a 
population who can see them as their own children – as children that 
can slot into a national family and be protected, cared for, or grieved 
for by benevolent, white, European parents.
This gaze is not only present within Western media but it also organises 
the everyday practice of mobility. Human traffickers, for instance, are 
keenly aware of the racialised politics of vision. It is well documented 
that lighter-skinned refugees, particularly women and children, are often 
arranged on the top of boats crossing the Mediterranean, whilst black 
and darker-skinned people are often forced into bowels of the vessel. 
This is a stark reminder to Sharpe (2016) of the ongoing presence of 
the hold for black lives. Those thought to be seeable as ‘real’ refugees, 
as victims, as more human, are placed within plain sight in order to be 
counted worthy of saving.
Visuality
These bordering moves rely on ideas of who is the ‘real’ child and the 
‘real’ refugee or ‘good’ migrant. But as I have begun to sketch out, this 
is always bound to particular forms of visuality, or ways of seeing. As 
well as not fitting within regimes of childhood, the children stepping 
off the coaches in Croydon could be photographed and rendered ‘adults’ 
and ‘unchildlike’ through particular visual techniques. Photography 
was used here not only to represent moving bodies but also to capture 
and render the inner truth of suspicious movement (Amoore and Hall 
2009). As discussed in chapter 3, the delineation between who is genuine/
in-genuine and deserving/undeserving (in this case the refugee) demands 
an ever-present suspicion of the intimacies and bodies of those moving 
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and claiming rights. Likewise, this also relates to suspicions over relation-
ships, kinships, age, the authenticity of identity documents and the 
recognition of embodied likeness (see Turner and Vera Espinoza 2019). 
As with the sham marriage, suspicion demands the use of technologies 
to extract the ‘truth’ from migrants, where deservedness can be read 
in textual evidence, images and on the body (from body language, skin 
colour, scar tissue).
In this context, the attempt by newspapers to use facial recognition 
software to test the age of child refugees is telling. Facial recognition 
software has become a key aspect of security practices and biometric 
technology which attempts to locate, categorise and capture subjects 
on the move – from airport scanners and passports, to checkpoints and 
police patrols. Despite huge technological problems with facial recogni-
tion software, making it almost practically useless for mass surveillance 
(Dodd 2018), it still continues to proliferate. Whilst most liberal argu-
ments against such surveillance rely upon issues of privacy, we might 
consider the way this re-networks racialised codes of humanness (and 
with that ‘childhood’, ‘adulthood’, ‘gender’ and ‘sexuality’). It works by 
codifying particular bodies as (ab)normal. Browne (2010) demonstrates 
how this technology relies upon the recognition of key facial feature 
that are attuned to a ‘standardised’ facial imprint of white Europeans. 
The ‘normal’ is coded through particular appeals to white ‘epidemiological’ 
features (Browne 2010). The use of facial recognition on child refugees 
reveals the ongoing circulations of the racialised body in visual surveil-
lance of contemporary bordering.
It is worth dwelling on a further point regarding vision and race 
here. When David Davies argued that the UK government should subject 
‘unchildlike’ refugees to dental examinations, he redeployed a key logic 
of racial/colonial science, one birthed from eugenics: that the facial, 
dental and bone structure of people should be compared, studied and 
categorised to extract the ‘truth’ of their character and morality. The 
supposed scientific promise to know the truth of the suspicious body 
(in images, X-rays, algorithms) is conditioned by colonial epistemologies 
and ways of seeing populations and bodies (Ittmann et al. 2010; 
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Nishiyama 2015). This is not so much about ‘fixing identities’, but rather 
about finding the inner purpose, morality, danger and deviancy of 
particular subjects (Amoore and Hall 2009).
Davies also offered up another colonial ‘truth’. In arguing that dental 
examinations should be brought in to test refugees, he made the case 
that they were already exempt from ethics and rights. Presenting the 
idea that they had ‘been through worse’ recognised that they had already 
been dehumanised. Or, they were never properly human in the first 
place. The proposal to X-ray these children is a culmination of ‘thingifica-
tion’ (Cesaire 1972: 42). They are made into ‘things’, not people subject 
to rights and ethics, but caught in the racialised trap of the not-quite/
non-human. That is, they are made into flesh to be examined.
Here, the ways of seeing and imagining who is a ‘real’ child and thus 
a ‘real’ refugee or ‘good’ migrant, becomes conditioned by technology 
but also by histories of the visual. Photographs are one significant practice 
in the codifications of humanness, attached as they are to a particular 
national/civilisational grammar of suffering and empathy. ‘Family’ here 
is again both the quiet remainder and energising principle of such circula-
tions. Family translates the seeable, it converts and modifies those that 
can be human-like, through welcome, threat or expulsion.2
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Pictures are not simply of what things looked like, but how things were 
made visible, how things were given to be seen, how things were ‘shown’ 
to knowledge or to power – two ways in which things became seeable. 
(Rajchman 1988: 91)
Drawing upon the example of the treatment of child refugees above, 
I propose that if borders are intimate (chapter 3), if borders are sticky 
(chapters 4 and 5), then borders are also visual. This chapter further 
pushes at the visual regime through which contemporary bordering 
operates. If the last three chapters focused on the explicit violent practices 
of contemporary colonial bordering, this chapter aims to examine how 
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people are made to look ‘out of place’. It does so, perhaps counterintuitively, 
by tracing the contemporary rendering of the ‘good’ migrant in the 
UK and beyond. It focuses on those mobile subjects whose presence 
is tolerated, welcomed, even ‘celebrated’ in the UK. Off the back of 
the contemporary governing promise that ‘real’ child refugees can be 
welcomed, that ‘genuine’ marriages can allow settlement, that the good, 
‘integrated’, minority citizen deserves rights, I want to ask: what does this 
domesticated subject look like? Or to put it differently, how is the ‘good’, 
familial and integrated migrant imaged/imagined? That is, on what visual 
terms, and on what cultural codes and intimate relations, are moving 
bodies ‘included’, allowed to belong or at least ‘pass’ in contemporary 
Britain? It explores these questions by investigating the role of images 
and photography in both reproducing and contesting borders.
In the last two chapters I focused on how bordering/borders are 
energised by threats and dangers, from ‘suspicious’ to ‘monstrous’ 
intimacies. This arguably has led to reinforcing precarity, vulnerability 
and the abandonment of racialised settled and migrant communities 
alike. If the figure of the monster (terrorist, groomer, gang member) 
and the sham drives this bordering, so too does the figure of the ‘good’ 
migrant – the one who can be welcomed and included. Domestication, 
we should remember, is a liberal strategy: it includes to exclude. Borders 
need to be constantly redrawn around who is (un)domesticated, who 
is familial, who can move/settle, who is ‘out of place’. It is from the 
potentiality of improvement, inclusion, progress that liberal government 
is re-energised. And with it, the violence that underpins domestication 
is equally rationalised and silenced. What I want to probe at here is 
how the promise of the ‘good’ migrant can also work to hide and remake 
the colonial hierarchies that dominate mobility and citizenship.
Consider, for instance, how the depiction of the ‘good’ child refugee 
– vulnerable, innocent, victim – conditions the unchildlike ‘burly youth’ 
or ‘bogus asylum seeker’. Or how sympathy for victims of what became 
known as the ‘Windrush scandal’ in the UK have been used to justify 
the continued deportation of ‘illegal’ migrants (de Noronha 2018, 2019). 
Or how a fixation on women and men who have ‘escaped’ Islamic 
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communities and joined ‘mainstream society’ (Razack 2007; Casey 2016) 
is used to justify the surveillance and discipline of Muslim populations 
more broadly. Who can be a subject of empathy conditions who can 
be forgotten or silenced, and who is unworthy. In exploring how ‘good’ 
migrants are imagined, and by this I mean made thinkable and seeable, 
I tease out how this creates further bordering moves. Delineations around 
who is ‘good’ are also key sites for colonial duress.
In this chapter I turn to the role that photography and exhibitions play 
in the making of the ‘good’ and, equally, ‘familial’ migrant. I first explore 
the role of photography in colonial domestication and in particular the 
place of family portraits in the ordering of intimate relations across 
empire. I investigate how photographs played a significant role in limiting 
who could be part of a family. I then bring this analysis up to date by 
considering the role of photography and vision in contemporary border-
ing both in the UK and Europe. This pays attention to the exhibiting 
of the ‘good’ migrant, which occurred during the ‘refugee crisis’ that 
came to prominence from 2015. I pay special attention to exhibitions 
and projects that claim to contest or challenge the dominant negative 
representation of immigration, mobility and settlement, and produce 
a positive account of migration. To analyse this in more detail, I focus 
on the photographic exhibition Arrivals: Making Sheffield Home as one 
example of how positive stories and imaginaries are formed around 
migration, through appeals to local/global ideas about humanitarianism, 
as well as multicultural and civic nationalism. I thus explore what is 
contested and reproduced in these visual practices of inclusion and in 
making migrants familial, and more significantly, what the limits are 
to a politics of humanitarian or compassionate nationalistic welcome 
and inclusion.
Photography and looking back
Throughout this chapter, photography is treated as a key but ultimately 
part component of visuality – which is what Gregory (2012a) refers to 
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as culturally contingent vision or way of seeing. In the use of ‘visual 
regime’ throughout the chapter, I refer to a series of components which 
work in a relatively autonomous but interconnected manner to make 
up a dominant way of visualising and constituting social reality. To 
refer to a visual regime is to consider both how things are seen and 
represented but also the ways that things are rendered historically seeable 
and unseeable (through techno-cultural processes). So, for instance, 
there is a visual regime of childhood. This is made up of different 
components (discourses, ideas, past images, visual techniques) and 
histories (heteronormative socialisation, Eurocentric ideas of the superior 
white family, commodification, racialised capitalism, gendering) that 
align to make, for example, one body look like a ‘helpless child’ and 
another a ‘burly lad’. In discussing the ‘gaze’, I refer more specifically 
to a dominant visual regime that is tied to particular formations of 
social control and power relations. Mostly I speak, via bell hooks’s 
(1992) seminal work, of the ‘colonial masculine gaze’. This gaze was 
central to imperial and colonial government and continues to proscribe 
and haunt contemporary imaginaries and ways of seeing.
In studying how the ‘good’ migrant is imagined/imaged, this chapter 
engages with the politics of photography itself. Photography has histori-
cally been a key resource and product of the colonial masculine gaze, 
even as a creative and artistic enterprise. That photography has been 
relatively democratised (Bleiker 2018: 27) does not negate its role in 
empire-making. This is also reflected in humanist projects of modernity, 
where photography has been central to regimes of extractive truth telling, 
or used in practices of security and biopolitical management (Meek 
2016). The legacy of these histories continues in bordering today, for 
example in the use of facial recognition software, security scanners at 
airports or biometrics in the control of mobility. As I demonstrate, 
photography also plays a key role in normalising and reproducing borders 
in everyday and mundane places like newspapers or art exhibitions, 
particularly in celebrations of whiteness (or in the case I examine, 
progressive/humanitarian whiteness).
The good migrant 189
However, images – and photographic images in particular – also 
hold the power to disrupt. If photography remains a site of colonial 
domestication, this power is relational; it is constantly resisted and 
shaped by numerous social forces. Visuality and aesthetics play an 
important role in resisting bordering. Such analysis has been largely 
absent in this book and I attempt to introduce some of these questions 
here before expanding on them in the penultimate chapter.
Photography as domestication
Photographs are a powerful force because of how they relate to the 
claims of Western knowledge to access unmediated and scientific truths 
(Debrix and Weber 2003). Imperial and colonial rule was shaped by 
technological possibility of knowing, capturing and recording the 
‘reality’ of territories, populations and movement (Jay and Ramaswamy 
2014). From the inception of photography in 1839, the medium was 
tied into other practices such as cartography and demography in the 
governance of colonised people and lands. Photography could provide 
detailed records of lands, infrastructure and natural resources central 
to military strategy, surveillance or accumulation. We know that the 
power to see ‘at a distance’ was vital to the development of modern 
military power (Virilio 1989; Collins 2017). This was as true with 
the violent pacification and aerial bombardment of Iraqi civilians 
throughout the 1920s, as it was with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and 
again in the expanding drone war that continues over the Middle 
East today (Gregory 2012a). Rendering territories and populations as 
seeable through still (and then moving) images is central to the art of 
colonial war and extraction (for more on this see Barkawi and Stanski  
2012).
Movement again was constituted as both problematic and controllable 
within particular visual regimes. As we may remember from chapter 3, 
visual identifiers were used by colonial states to mark out and categorise 
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criminals, suspects or those moving bodies thought to be ‘troublesome’. 
Branding was central to the control of slaves in the American South 
and the West Indies, tattooing and then fingerprinting was developed in 
India to make criminals categorisable and visible prior to the creation 
of photographic recognition and ‘mug shots’. Photographic recogni-
tion would eventually be established in the passport and identity card 
systems of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but these 
were predated by practices such as slave ledgers and ‘wanted’ posters 
(Pegler-Gordon 2009: 11; Browne 2015). The recorded image shaped 
how the labourer, the rebel or the slave could be made knowable and 
classified (Thapar 2015), just as it made it possible to make lands and 
people primed for penetration and extraction – such as in the feminised 
images of the Orient as a space of sexual promiscuity and decadence 
(figure 1).
Said (1978) proposed that orientalism was a visual as well as textual 
regime. Colonial power required the construction ‘of a sort of Benthamite 
panopticon’ from whose watch-towers ‘the Orientalist surveys the Orient 
1 ‘In the harem’, Lehnert & Landrock postcard, 1900s–1910s
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from above, with the aim of getting hold of the whole sprawling panorama 
before him’ in every ‘dizzying detail’ (quoted in Gregory 2012b: 152). 
This unidirectional and centralised analysis of vision has been contested 
(see Jay and Ramaswamy 2014). But we should remember how colonial 
administrators pursued photography as a means to visualise and thus 
make territory and people amenable to being governed. This worked 
both in terms of representing absences and producing places as familiar. 
The means of capturing still images as ‘objective truths’ could be used 
to reduce the complexity of social life into simple generalisations. To 
Mitchell (2000: 6–10), the colonial gaze was not always about taking 
pictures of the ‘East’ but instead making the East into a picture. Pho-
tography was a vital aspect of the cultural economy of imperialism, 
from travelogues and commercial photojournalism to postcards and 
exhibitions, which circulated images and imaginaries of the exotic/
erotic to populations across metroimperial space who were ready to 
consume the visual production of empire (on animals, imperialism and 
visuality see Margulies 2019).
The state of the photo album
The production and consumption of images also worked to manage 
racialised social relations. Colonial photography played a powerful role 
in constituting and distributing scientific racism. Coco Fusco (2003: 
16) has argued that ‘rather than recording the existence of race, pho-
tography produced race as a visualizable fact’. Photography provided 
anthropologists with an ‘objective lens’ to record and sensationalise 
ideas of human difference, progress and civilisation. European exhibitions 
often provided a space for such a spectacle, just as imperial and settler 
state archives held thousands of images of ‘native’ subjects for education, 
inspection and often entertainment (Maxwell 2000). Images provided 
‘evidence’ of colonised people as savage and primitive, and as ethno-
graphic records rather than people (consider the Savage South Africa 
exhibition described in chapter 1).
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In the 1870s ethnographers Henry Huxley and J. H. Lamprey devised 
a systematic way of photographing aboriginal people across the British 
Empire. Their subjects were stripped naked and photographed in front 
of measuring apparatus, including a cross sectional mesh, so to compare 
anatomical characteristics. Huxley saw this as useful for racial categorisa-
tion but also to make judgements about the suitability of populations 
for coerced labour and other types of work in mind of moral ‘uplift’ 
(Maxwell 2000: 42–43). This ethnographic approach was contrasted 
with later cultural relativistic photography and more ‘benevolent’ methods 
of study where indigenous people were cast as bearers of unique and 
fast-disappearing cultures. In this way, colonised people were photo-
graphed as a mode of extractive racial categorisation, as a means of 
knowledge production for empire, for the benefits of imperial capitalism 
and as a spectacle to confirm European progress and development, 
which meant that images were produced and consumed as both for 
‘scientific’ study and for titillation and desire.
Commercial and ethnographic photography was a key optic of the 
domesticating state, but equally artefacts such as family photo albums 
or portraits provided an intimate site for the production of coloniality, 
race-making and the scripting of the white self. Exploring the archives 
of colonial administrators reveals how colonised people were invariably 
conditioned as the observed – for example as ‘house boy’, ‘labourer’ 
or ‘farm hand’, ‘native’, ‘criminal’ – or as ethnographic remnants. The 
camera lens both provided a means of objectification but equally a 
technology through which the myriad of white colonial selves were 
performed – the adventurer, entrepreneur, philanthropist, home-maker, 
artist, socialite. Here it is important to recognise how this blurs (if not 
totally eviscerates) the line between what we might consider ‘private’ and 
‘public’ photography – photographs are always public, even if meant for 
private consumption (such as those that find their way into official state 
archives – see the Bristol Archives British Empire & Commonwealth 
Collection collection, for example).
The most striking example of this is the family album or portrait. 
Lalvani (1996) argues that photography did not merely reflect bourgeois 
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colonial family values but was part of its architecture. Portraits, for 
instance, arranged particular codes of the white bourgeois European 
family – father, mother, children arranged in hierarchical order. According 
to Lalvani (1996: 65):
The family album is both a document of social assertion and a sentimental 
register … The regulation of images, in providing for ‘a common sexual 
and economic goal’ and in enabling ideological oversight to permeate 
the private realm, plays ‘a central role in the development in the … 
ideology of the family.’
Drawing on Lalvani, we can consider how an artefact such as a hanging 
photograph becomes a means of shaping and producing ‘family’ and 
‘family memories’ as regulatory ideals (Wexler 2000). This is significant 
because of the way photography works to frame normative ways of 
being but also because the aesthetic of the family photograph produces 
excesses and conditions who can be seen as ‘out of place’. This is about 
what and who is permissible to photograph but also about how a 
photographic type relays continual ‘truths’, in this case intimate truths 
to be stored, displayed and treasured.
Just as photography was an intimate site of family-making in Europe, 
this was used in different social relationship across empire. Colonial 
administrators often focused on photographing domestic spaces as a 
means of showing how colonised land could be tamed and pacified, 
such as with fencing, gardening, the building of European style homes 
or bungalows (Mills 2008: 102–136). Colonised subjects were brought 
in to reproduce settler households within shifting codes of gendered 
and racialised stratification – as ‘workers’, ‘gardeners’, ‘house boys’, 
‘nannies’, ‘milk maids’, or as ‘lovers’. Importantly, colonised subjects 
could be partially included in the household but they could not be 
sustained or photographed as ‘family’ (see, for example, Stoler 2002 
112–140). Whilst intimately connected, they remained subordinated 
and racialised labourers (as presented in figures 2 and 3).
This intimate inclusion/exclusion is important. The partial inclusion 
of ‘good’ colonised subjects within the settler household firstly reveals 
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the racialised inequality of who worked for who under white supremacist 
capitalism, but equally this partial, often intimate, ‘inclusion’ in the 
household (such as the being viewed as the ‘good house boy’ or ‘ayah’; 
see figure 2) works to obscure the dispossessive violence of wider colonial 
structures. It hid this violence by the appearance of intimate ‘inclusion’.
The intimate dehumanisation of African bodies was often obscured in 
the complex ‘inclusion’ within colonial settler houses. But such pictures 
remind us of how easily black bodies were turned into objects, com-
modities or used as a spectacle of white pleasure and entertainment, 
such as in one infamous image of the African Oil Nut factory workers 
(see figure 3). It is significant that Badagry was a major Atlantic 
slave point, home to Gberefu Island – ‘the point of no return’. As this 
photograph demonstrates, abolition did very little to alter such social 
relations.
The structure of the white colonial household and the family album 
was equally paralleled in the everyday experiences and visual registers 
of colonised subjects who travelled to the metropole, as British subjects, 
or after 1947 as Commonwealth citizens. Black and Asian photographers 
grew in number during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Their 
work often troubled dominant modes of visuality, for example by 
examining and representing kinship and belonging in alternative ways 
(see, for example, Gilroy and Hall 2007). Despite this, however, dominant 
forms of photography and popular visual culture in the UK focused 
on framing black and Asian subjects and communities as both inferior 
and ‘out of place’. Consider how images circulated to reveal the problem 
of ‘race relations’ or orientalist codifications of exoticism (Tolia-Kelly 
2016), of ungoverned domesticity and poor motherhood (Webster 1998), 
or inversely fixated on nostalgic images of a ‘lost’ whiteness, contaminated 
by decolonisation and the movement of black and brown bodies and 
intimacies. Reconstituting the colonial masculine gaze, Commonwealth 
citizen migrants were rendered visible along an axis of assimilable subjects 
who could be civilised into the marked space of the ‘good’, domesticated 
migrant, and those deemed unassimilable, who needed to be contained 
and expunged.
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2 ‘My house boys’, taken in Badagry, Nigeria, 1922, by ‘Mr Verdin’, 
manager of the African Oil Nut Company. He annotated the photograph 
‘My house boys… Godrey, James and Godrey’s wife’. Godrey and James’s 
subjugation within the colonial settler house is equally marked by the 
evisceration of Godrey’s wife’s name.
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The family portrait
If empire is always bound to family, as this book argues, then how could 
we think of colonial photography in relation to the family album or 
family portrait? If the family portrait was shaped by who could be 
photographed in relation to the family (settler household, white national 
family), we need to consider how photography worked to remake and 
normalise the treatment of colonised people: it demarcated who could 
be viewed as living outside modern time (ethnographic photography), 
or as an object of white consumption and subjugation (the family 
portrait), or as the primitive ‘native’ to be examined and preserved, or 
as a problem population ‘out of place’ (such as the presentation of 
Commonwealth citizens as migrants). Colonial photography worked 
to reduce personhood into bodies or things, as a subordinate to white 
personhood. In all of this, colonised people are materialised as in excess 
3 The Verdins’ idea of a Christmas card (same photographer as figure 2), 
again taken in Badagry, 1923
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of proper familial relations with their appropriate gendered and sexualised 
codes of civilisation, nation, family.
Here the family portrait becomes the absent presence in photographs 
of colonised peoples and then people on the move. That is, it works to 
reveal what is missing or lost, figuratively or literally. As Wexler (2000) 
has argued, whilst colonised subjects and freed slaves took up photog-
raphy, almost from its inception, not only did they face issues of resources 
and access but what could be recognisable as people and kinship within 
those photographs was shaped by the dominant white order. The colonial 
visual regime relates to how close one is able to perform European 
bourgeois domesticity. So, whilst some colonised populations were and 
continue to be cast as ‘without family’ – such as indigenous people or 
the enslaved – others are deemed as progressing towards heteronormative 
personhood. This is often revealed in how people were photographed 
or made seeable in relation to the (white) family portrait.
Photography, control and mobility
What I hope to highlight here is not just that pictures have symbolic 
power but that they also do things. It means thinking about how images 
are already placed within particular colonial power relations, bound to 
processes of domestication which circulate within imperial capitalism. 
Consider, for instance, how the portrait photograph became institu-
tionalised into bordering practices through the emergence of identity 
cards and passports. The passport works through immigration law to 
constitute the individual subject as the holder of rights, but this is bound 
to how a subject resembles a photographic portrait – in other words, 
how they are ‘seen’ (see Torpey 2009). At the turn of the twentieth 
century, ‘looking’ like a passport photograph became one of the primary 
means for states to organise the movement of people, distinguishing 
between worthy/unworthy, the genuine/in-genuine (Browne 2015). This 
supplemented other visual practices such as medical inspections, and 
would eventually be proliferated in practices such as immigrant identity 
Bordering intimacy198
cards, police inspections and registration. Resembling a photograph 
became a dominant means of accessing rights of mobility and settlement 
and for authorities to expunge and control. How one is seen and made 
seeable matters.
As I touched upon in the introduction to this chapter, visuality plays 
an ever-expanding role in the government of mobility in contemporary 
states – from drone images and naval mapping, to heat tracing and 
facial recognition. Whilst northern states propagate these regimes, 
tracking, surveillance and imaging of ‘events’ such as the ‘refugee crisis’ 
in Europe is also done by international organisations, NGOs, militaries, 
corporate media and private security contractors, as well as by subjects 
on the move themselves (Tazzioli and Walters 2016). For instance, the 
United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) uses visual recognition 
software called ProGres to profile asylum seekers, to manage their claims 
for refugee status, but also in the distribution of resources such as food 
and increasingly as a tool used indirectly in the push to deport those 
with ‘failed’ claims. The EU similarly relies on the Eurodac system to 
monitor the arrival of mobile people into the EU through fingerprint 
tracing as well as facial images – this data is explicitly used to track, 
contain and deport those back to country of entry or origin (The 
Economist 2017; for a long discussion of borders and biometrics see 
Scheel 2019).
Who is made invisible, who is pictured, who is imaged as a problem, 
who is imaged as in need of saving or as a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ migrant runs 
through these technologies and shapes the contemporary politics of 
mobility. But perhaps, as importantly, such a regime of visibility is also 
about invisiblity – who can avoid detection, who can escape or dodge 
the camera or the scanner. To Tazzioli and Walters (2016: 453), the 
governing of mobility is not merely enacted through the camera, but 
the ‘dynamics which the camera imparts profoundly shapes’ how border-
ing functions. This includes the possibility of not being pictured.
Whilst this regime of visuality is expanding technologically, photo-
graphs remain key to how state actors make judgements over suitability 
for the right to move and settle. Think again of how the UK regulates 
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the movement of people by claiming that kinship ties or ‘romantic’ 
relations between subjects are invalid or in-genuine (chapter 3). This 
works beyond surveillance and the passport photo. Those moving on 
the basis of kinship, dependency or love often have to demonstrate 
‘family relations’ through paper identification but also visual recognition 
(see Shah 2012). Here a ‘family portrait’ can quite literally become a 
legal document to evidence proof of intimate relations or be used as a 
justification for state officials to deny entry (White 2014). In the UK 
family migration visa application, for example, photographs are used 
to make claims over the subsisting and genuine nature of a relationship 
(Turner and Vera Espinoza 2019). This means that photographs are 
read for signs of love and intimacy by state agents suspicious of sham 
marriages (D’Aoust 2018). This raises questions about who has access 
to photographic technology (which is still overstated even in the era 
of mobile camera phones) but also the cultural history of how socio-
sexual intimacy is made intelligible. It relays a history of who can be 
recognised as ‘familial’ within the specific colonial terms of the (white) 
family portrait.
If borders are visual, we need to be attentive to the ways that mobility 
is seen and how migrants and mobility are imagined. In the next section 
I want to examine in more detail how particular bodies and populations 
are made to look not only ‘out of place’ but ‘welcomable’ – as subjects 
of ‘inclusion’ into the national or family space. Visual bordering works 
to distinguish the ‘familial’ and ‘unfamilial’, the ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’, 
the ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Reflecting on how colonial photography was preoc-
cupied with making colonised populations categorisable as exotic and/
or domesticable, I now turn to contemporary strategies to imagine the 
‘good’ migrant.
Imaging and imagining the ‘good’ migrant
On November 2017 the Arrivals: Making Sheffield Home photographic 
exhibition opened in Weston Park Museum in the northern English 
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city of Sheffield. To the collection’s photographer, Jeremy Abrahams, 
this set of curated images offered an explicit ‘counter-narrative’ to the 
way that immigration and migrants were represented in the mainstream 
media in the UK (interview with the author 2017). In the context of 
the proliferation of dehumanising images of the ‘refugee crisis’ (Bleiker 
et al. 2013), of drone images relaying depictions of ‘swarms’ and ‘flows’ 
of people crossing into Europe in the summer of 2016, of nationalistic 
anxiety about ‘foreign others’ and ‘cultural difference’ and explicit policies 
designed to create a hostile environment, the exhibition and wider 
campaign was intended to display a positive visual story about migration. 
In this context, the exhibition sought to ameliorate the conditions of 
different people from across the world who were ‘making Sheffield 
home’ (Abrahams 2016).
This relied on the curating of seventy-two portrait photographs of 
people who had made Sheffield ‘home’, creating, it was hoped, a ‘joyous 
and uplifting portrait of a creative and diverse city’ (Abrahams 2016: 
1). Reflecting international photo campaigns such as the International 
Organisation for Migration’s (IOM) ‘I am a migrant’, each portrait was 
underpinned by a textual narrative of the subject’s journey to the UK 
and practices of home-making. What was promised in the exhibition 
was that the portrait could be a frame through which someone stopped 
being a ‘migrant’ and became a ‘Sheffielder’, and in the civic terms of 
‘inclusion’ could be viewed as a human (or at least more human). It is 
equally noteworthy that Sheffield is the next city over from Rotherham, 
the town that’s name became a byword for grooming scandals and the 
scene of accompanied anti-Muslim (state) racism which I covered in 
chapter 4.
I want to linger on this exhibition because it offers an everyday site 
for what are both global and colonial logics surrounding the humanitarian 
‘welcome’ of migrants and particular visual registers of ‘good’ migrants, 
‘integration’ and multicultural nationalism in the UK. Furthermore, I 
am intimately entangled with this exhibition and campaign. The Weston 
Park Museum lies directly behind the department I worked in during 
the research and writing of this book. I would often walk through the 
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exhibition space on my way to work or on breaks. After the exhibition 
closed, the photographs were displayed across the city and throughout 
the university. Several of the photographs now hang in the City of 
Sanctuary community centre, which aims to support and welcome 
refugees, asylum seekers and migrants to the city. Furthermore, the 
circulating politics of the images were invested in and claimed within 
the global and local struggle to welcome people on the move. This joins 
other campaigns by IOM, UNHCR, international art exhibitions and 
activist groups to provide a humanitarian response to moving people, 
in which refugees and migrants are made welcomable.
The dominant visual regime of contemporary migration often found 
in the news media is preoccupied with images of boats, masses, camps 
and imperilled victims. It is often organised around both the dangerous-
ness of black and brown men and also the hypervisibility of what Enloe 
(2018) calls ‘womenandchildren’. This visual regime has been revealed 
as dehumanising and orientalist by numerous scholarly accounts (Johnson 
2011; Bleiker et al. 2013; Philo et al. 2013). What is less obvious is how 
positive and humanising visual regimes may have similar effects.
The visual terms of who can be welcomed and included in the UK 
are thus important for how we understand the politics of bordering 
and its ongoing colonial orientations. Not only do such exhibitions 
energise bordering but they also connect up with and reproduce a 
broader visual regime which makes particular moving bodies ‘out of 
place’. Exhibitions such as Arrivals are not isolated events; they render 
often very explicitly what are wider logics and circulations of ways of 
seeing people. Here I want to consider questions of visibility with regard 
to the exhibition and construction of the ‘good’ migrant – that is, who 
is viewed as welcomable and how this welcome is made intelligible. But 
I also want to explore invisibility – who, or what, is obscured and unseeable 
in these campaigns. The exhibition is not read here to responsibilise 
anyone, but rather to understand the logics, assumptions, silences that 
shape and are reproduced across the both the photographs, the narrative 
of the exhibition and the local and global discourse of the ‘good’ migrant 
more broadly (see, for example, Shukla 2016).
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In utilising the medium of portrait photography, the Arrivals exhibition 
partakes in a wider global push to ‘humanise’ migrants and redraw 
borders in relation to more cosmopolitan and liberal logics. The intention 
of Abrahams’s (2016) campaign was to ‘remove immigration from the 
zone of contention … and to humanise it through images and stories 
of people who have migrated from around the world’. This connects up 
with humanitarian approaches to contemporary mobility, where the 
assumption is that if only northern publics could see migrants as equally 
human – or more precisely, as individuals and people – they could 
empathise with their plight (see Johnson 2011). The stress here is on 
how the deaths of people crossing the Mediterranean in particular are 
ungrievable (Butler 2010) because of the way they are dehumanised as 
collectives and though animalistic metaphors – as ‘swarms’, ‘hordes’, 
‘cockroaches’ and so forth.
Portrait photography has become the go-to medium for the visual 
counter-practice of humanisation.3 Rather than focusing on mobility, 
collectivities or masses – a focus which is viewed as dehumanising 
and replicating a racist field of vision – the portrait photograph is 
supposed to show to the audience the humanity of the migrant. This 
follows social-scientific research which has evidenced how pictures of 
individuals and particularly images of faces tend to energise feelings 
of empathy and compassion in audiences (Bleiker et al. 2013). Jenny 
Edkins (2015) reminds us of how the history of the portrait is always 
concerned with the biography of the liberal self and its quest for wholeness 
as a symbol of the human. Arrivals relays this logic in the composition 
of images which foreground the face and body of its subjects. Rather 
than situating the ‘migrant in peril’, the stress of these pictures is on the 
inclusion and home-making capacity of its subjects, who are pictured 
as embedded within the urban fabric of Sheffield. Differing from the 
humanitarian images of disaster, it is not suffering that is supposed to 
humanise the migrant in Arrivals but rather their capacity to function 
within the cultural and productive economy of the city and nation. 
This is the visual cue of their relatability and the promise to ‘become 
human’.
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Take, for example, the photograph that opened the Arrivals exhibition 
and campaign: Pedro Fuentes is pictured in Sheffield Forgemasters, 
perhaps the city’s most famous steelworks (figure 4). The hard hat and 
goggles worn by Fuentes relate to his role in the steel industry, just as 
he is positioned in front of the kinetic sparks of the furnace. Fuentes 
is captured in the very symbolic heart of the city, which prides itself 
on its industrial past (and steel-making in particular). We should note 
here how the foreign body is rendered as ‘integrated’ and made ‘useful’ 
in relation to both the city’s and nation’s industry of production. The 
terms on which Fuentes has made a ‘home’ and is made ‘welcomable’ 
is depicted through the masculinised role of his labour. This is key to 
the substance and renewal of the city’s economy as well as nostalgia for 
its place in the circuits of imperial capital and wealth. The terms on 
which Fuentes can be viewed as ‘at home’ in Sheffield, as a masculinised 
labourer – contributing by producing steel – is tied to the wider role 
that ‘contribution’ has in the politics of mobility in the UK and beyond. 
‘Contribution’ has become key to figuring who is a ‘good’ and worthy 
migrant, and equally who is redundant, ‘illegalised’ or deportable.
4 Pedro Fuentes, photographed by Jeremy Abrahams (2016)
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‘Contribution’ (i.e. through work and labour) is superficially econo-
mistic. But this understanding of economic value is bound to circulations 
of heteronormativity and with it racialised accounts of the nation. As 
I have previously argued, the liberal account of nationhood relies on 
making distinctions over who produces economic and cultural value, 
tied as this is to inclusion in the labour market, principles of self-
government and progressive familial intimacy. As I showed in chapter 
3, this is how multicultural difference is pacified and presented as 
deracialised in liberal discourse. Contributing is to be forward-facing, 
modern and to reproduce for the nation (Berlant 1997: 83–85). Fuentes 
can be welcomed because his body is rendered central to the reproduction 
of the city’s (and thus the nation’s) symbolic and economic value.
In this way, the question running through the Arrivals exhibition 
could have been: what have migrants contributed to Sheffield and the 
UK? What are they ‘giving back’? Or as Ahmed (2010) reinterprets it 
– they are merely ‘giving back what they owe’. These photographs reveal 
subjects embedded in the city’s urban space but also as tied to key 
economic and civic institutions: the town hall, cathedral, city parks and 
universities. This visual narrative of place and value is intended to trouble 
the outwardly hostile depiction of the migrants as a ‘drain on resources’, 
as social and economic ‘parasites’ or as an unintegratable subject of 
‘cultural difference’ (think back to chapter 3). Instead, the ‘good’ migrants 
– those who can tell a positive story about migration – are rendered 
as both normal participants in the city’s/nation’s economy of value but 
also exceptional, ‘gifted’ and talented contributors.4
Contribution is not only visualised in economic and civic terms in 
the Arrivals collection but it is also codified through love as a circulation 
of value and progress. Just as I examined love to function in relation 
to the white family or nation in chapters 3 and 4, love here brings 
together different points of contact. Whilst many of the portraits capture 
individualised subjects, a number focus on heteronormative and familial 
love as key aspects of home-making – as anchoring proper belonging 
(see below). Starting a family and especially having children is central 
to the exhibition’s attempt to explore what a ‘good’ migrant is and what 
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a domesticated subject looks like. What is emphasised across the exhibi-
tion is how people either ‘travelled for love’ or ‘found love’ in the city. 
Heteronormative (and to a far lesser extent homonormative) familial 
love circulates across the photographs, such as in the focus on close 
body contact, holding hands, touching on a sofa, hugging children. 
Here ‘proper’ familial intimacy is offered as the solution to the challenge 
of mobility and belonging.
But love is also projected onto the people of Sheffield and the city. 
The ‘good’ migrants are not only shown as embedded within the urban/
national space and within heteronormative domesticity but their con-
tribution (what makes them ‘good’) is also found in their expression of 
love to those who welcomed and ‘hosted’ them. This love is orientated 
towards both the people of Sheffield and correspondingly the nation. 
‘We love Sheffield, its friendliness, trees and parks, its civic culture’, is a 
common sentiment expressed through the exhibition. Here the migrant 
story is presented as one of displaced violence which is fixed by the 
love of the host nation. This is particularly the case for those who have 
claimed asylum or been guaranteed refugee status. Here violence and 
state oppression are rendered a ‘nightmare’ – spatially and temporally 
positioned elsewhere, far away from the city in past lives and foreign 
lands – whilst the transfer of love, welcome, tolerance is grounded in 
Sheffield and Britain.
The visualisation of love throughout the portraits is not only found 
in examples of heteronormative intimacy and domesticity but also in 
the relationship to productive activities – such as gardening, painting, 
civil society activities and paid labour – and in emotional appeals to 
codes of happiness such as smiling and laughter. Here the contribution 
of the migrant works to ameliorate their difficult presence. Their difference 
and potential for diasporic melancholy (Brah 1996) can be diffused by 
appropriate intimacy and the expression of grateful love and happiness 
at being ‘here’ rather than ‘there’. This is given away in the promise of 
the exhibition, which is to provide a ‘joyous and uplifting portrait of 
the city’ (Abrahams 2016: 1). Love is not only to build heteronormative 
relations to secure the future of the multicultural nation but also to be 
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happy, to commit to and to love the new home. We come to know that 
the ‘good’ migrant is the ‘loving’ migrant.
Love thus works in this context to make certain migrants ‘good’ and 
familial. But love has another function: it equally works to obscure and 
make ‘difficult’ experiences of racism and the ‘imperial grooves’ of 
mobility unseeable (and forgettable), even when accounts of racism are 
explicitly raised in the exhibition. In juxtaposition to his smiling portrait, 
Abdi Aziz Suleiman describes in his story how the racism he experienced 
in the UK ‘was like a grenade thrown at the foundations of our carefully 
constructed confidence’ (Abrahams 2016). This is a powerful intervention. 
And yet despite several contributors raising the issue of racism in their 
stories, the visual regime of the exhibition is figured towards the celebra-
tion of joy and positivity and love of the city. This means it is unable 
to explore the poetry of Suleiman’s words. Instead, the images of ‘good’, 
civic (and often white European) migrants feeling love/lovingly functions 
to smooth over these cracks and difficulties, or works to push racism 
into being a thing of the past. Racism is something that could occur 
in the 1950s, goes the refrain, but not now. Through a focus on joyous 
love, struggling against institutional racism is rendered unrepresentative 
of the ‘good’ migrant experience. It does not fit within the register of 
being happy and loving one’s host society. Ahmed (2010: 144) reminds 
us that the ‘melancholic’ migrant who holds on to racism and struggles 
with it is always an obstacle to the happy and loving nation. Thus, to 
be a ‘good’ migrant is to let go of race and learn to love. Love not only 
smoothes over the force of institutional and structural racism and violence 
in the UK but it does so to pacify and make certain migrants look 
‘familial’.
Here it is worth considering which bodies are presented as indicative 
of the ‘migrant experience’. The Arrivals exhibition works to create a 
visual register where EU migrants speak from the same position as 
non-European migrants and subjects who travelled from ex-colonies 
– often as Commonwealth citizens. This is also a common liberal strategy 
in global campaigns (IOM, for example) because, after all, moving is 
viewed as ‘universal’. This firstly eviscerates different positionalities and 
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global-colonial inequalities. It secondly works to hide racialised, sexu-
alised, classed and gendered structures and experiences. Whilst people 
of colour in the exhibition attempt to raise the issue of race and a more 
complex claim to belonging, white European migrants empathetic appeal 
to the love of the city and place allows them to speak for all migrant 
experiences, and to whitewash the experience of others through their 
happiness and joy. We are reminded here that the good migrant of 
colour must overcome injury and prejudice for the future endurance 
of the multicultural nation into which they can (partially) ‘belong’ 
(Fortier 2008).
Visual borders
What we learn from such exhibitions and the wider logics they shore up 
and distribute is that the ‘good’ migrant ‘contributes’. This contribution is 
materialised as different types of value: love, individualism, heteronorma-
tive family, domesticity, happiness, forgiveness are all terms on which 
the migrant is visualised as good, included and thus domesticated within 
‘multicultural’ Britain. The visual regime of the Arrivals exhibition works 
because it reproduces wider local/global registers of recognition, such 
as humanitarianism and multiculturalism, but codifies this in local/
national terms. Here ‘family’ works as a developmental logic, reveal-
ing and demonstrating humanity and progress, and making migrants 
welcomable.
Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2016) argues that the promise of the 
contributing migrant has come to dominate the treatment of mobility 
globally. Following on from the logic of contribution that we saw with 
Arrivals, she highlights the expansion of the ‘super-refugee’ (e.g. the 
Olympian swimmer who has overcome obstacles to achieve herculean 
feats, the hypersuccessful entrepreneur, the genius who changed the 
world). To be welcomable, the refugee must evidence being an ‘excep-
tional person’ or an exceptional contributor to humanity and nation. 
In parallel, this motivates the exceptional act of welcoming refugees 
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and migrants by European publics (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2018). Whilst 
expressively about welcoming and revelling in difference, these examples 
remain orientated towards both a global humanitarianism and a local 
‘compassionate’ nationalism, which draws borders around who can be 
empathised with and who cannot, translated as who can contribute 
to and benefit the civilisation and/or the nation and who cannot. In 
this way, the reification and materialising of the ‘good’ migrant, such 
as in the exhibition Arrivals, can be thought of as a site of bordering. 
Here it is important to recognise that sites such as exhibitions matter 
because of the way they benignly reproduce broader local and global 
logics, and they do so whilst appearing to be ‘unpolitical’ and merely 
about ‘humanity’ or ‘art’.
But I do not want to just leave this here. Such sites normalise ideas 
about the good/bad, worthy/unworthy. But they also do work to comple-
ment and energise powerful modes of domestication. We need to 
remember the significant role photographs and images play in the control 
of mobility in the codification of who can have rights, move, settle. 
Sites such as the Arrivals exhibition can be viewed as part of a connected 
visual regime which actively materialises who looks ‘out of place’ and 
who ‘belongs’. We can think here of how bordering criss-crosses such 
a set of images, reifying certain figurations (the ‘good’, familial migrant) 
at the same time as producing other absent presences (the unintegratable 
woman, the rebel, the terrorist, the illegal, the monster, the melancholic 
and angry migrant or citizen of colour, the sham family – those who 
love and inclusion cannot be extended to, who cannot be imagined as 
familial). If welcome can be extended to those who fulfil the criteria 
of the ‘good’ migrant, this redraws borders around those who remain 
risky and those who need to be expunged.
Within the wider construction of humanitarianism and the visual 
regime of migration, this set of images does further political work and 
bordering. To Abrahams (2016, my emphasis), the exhibiting of these 
images proves that that ‘they have indeed become part of our community’. 
They have proved to us their inclusion and thus their worth. As with 
wider humanitarian visual regimes of migration, the exhibition is 
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orientated towards proving both the national value but also humanity 
of the photographic subject. As with wider humanitarian visual regimes 
of migration, the exhibition is orientated towards proving both the 
national value but also humanity of the photographic subject. This form 
of humanitarianism works to coax empathy and compassion out of a 
‘host’ society – which is imagined to be nationalised, settled and pre-
dominantly white. Not only are migrants imagined to be exceptional 
contributors and benefactors for the host community – in other words, 
they can be included because they are good families, good workers, 
good civic leaders – but they are also expected to be forever grateful 
for the benevolence of the host nation.
Arguably, what is hidden through the intimacy of the portrait 
photograph is not only the institutional racism suffered by black and 
Asian migrants but also the colossal architecture of bordering which 
traps, contains and excludes racialised and mobile subjects. As with 
humanitarian appeals to help those suffering, this works to hide the 
violent architecture of borders and the complicity of the white audience 
in these structures. As with the inclusion of colonised subjects within 
the domestic space of the colonial household, the ‘good’ migrant is not 
only subordinate but their presence is only ‘good’ when their lives are 
put in service of the economic, social and cultural renewal of the 
postcolonial nation and family. We might consider a parallel here with 
the colonised subject who was intimately included or excluded from 
the settler household. In this way, the ‘good’ migrant is haunted by the 
image of the colonial ‘house boy’ whose subordinated presence and 
proximity both reveal and hide dispossessive violence. This parallel to 
the colonial ‘house boy’ works to hide how racialised populations are 
contained and continually interpolated as not-quite/non-human.
Humanitarianism, and its accomplice compassionate nationalism, 
ignores the intimate violence of bordering, which as I have discussed 
in this book is far from ‘elsewhere’ but in fact is intimately bound to 
racialised governance in Britain. My point here though, is that these 
images matter because of how they map onto and reproduce wider 
local and global visual regimes and how this feeds into other border 
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sites. Images of who is a ‘good’ migrant circulate and feed into a wider 
landscape where decisions over who can move, settle and claim rights 
are taken. The happy, loving, heteronormative/homonormative and 
contributing migrant has social power.
Given how authorities work to distinguish who looks suspicious, 
a sham or a monster, the figure of the ‘good’ migrant circulates and 
energises distinctions over who looks welcomable and who looks danger-
ous. Consider how refugee resettlement schemes prioritise protection to 
‘children’ and ‘families’ in camps across the Middle East, or visa regimes 
are orientated towards productive individuals through the UK tier system, 
or how moving as a dependent of a settled person is conditional upon 
looking like a spouse/partner or dependent child. In all of these sites, 
authorities make distinctions over who can be included premised on 
clear visual registers of who could be a ‘good’ migrant. This is more 
than an issue of (mis)representation. Instead we need to recognise that 
because borders are visual, the imaginary of the ‘good’ migrant helps 
play a part in creating the conditions of who can move, who can be 
given rights and who can be expelled. In light of this, consider the 
figures for the scheme for the resettlement of unaccompanied refugee 
children to the UK which we began this chapter with (of which the 
Dubs amendment provides one particular route to settlement). It was 
widely publicised in 2018, in the wake of the ‘unchildlike’ child refugee 
scandal, that only twenty child refugees had been resettled from camps 
in the Middle East (out of three thousand places initially promised). 
It was also noted that resettlement from informal camps in Calais has 
almost ground to a halt (Townsend 2018). Who can be imaged/imagined 
as a refugee or a ‘good’ and welcomable migrant matters.
Humanising migrants
As I noted above, portrait photography (such as illustrated in the Arrivals 
exhibition) is frequently offered as a solution to the explicitly racist 
representation of migration in the mainstream media – from the drone 
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images and biometric scans, to the photography of crowded boats. This 
reflects broader ideological principles and assumptions that run through 
the politics of liberal inclusion and humanitarian welcome more generally. 
This means that we should ask what assumptions run through the 
‘humanising’ promise of the portrait photograph and its focus on the 
‘human face’.
It is telling that in her discussion of colonial photography, Maxwell 
(2000: 44–45) argues that portrait photography offered more dignity 
to colonised people. It was ‘humanising’, regardless of who was taking 
the photograph or for what purpose. Against older practices of ethno-
graphic recording, the portrait is viewed as empowering subjects, because 
those subjects could meet the colonialist gaze and be given ‘equal’ status 
as a nameable subject. However, Maxwell’s argument and the liberal 
humanism that dominates the welcome of people, locally and globally, 
arguably falls into the trap of wishing away the power relations of 
photography, its cultural location and the visual regime and hierarchies 
it helps to maintain.
Through the proliferation of the masculine colonial gaze, acceptance 
and inclusion into personhood has been premised on being able to be 
imagined (if never included) as part of a family portrait, as a series of 
gendered and sexualised relations within the family home. The examples 
of child refugees, or the imaginary of the ‘good’, contributing migrant, 
demonstrate how the very conditions of personhood are mediated by 
who is, or can be imagined to be, part of the national/civilised family. 
Just as the family portrait was the frame through which colonised subjects 
were offered claims to their humanity (by whether they were able to 
look like a family), the portrait does similar work to obscure and hide 
who gets to be viewed as human.
In appealing to a humanitarian logic of empathy and compassion, 
or a joyous celebration of diversity, migration is viewed through portrait 
photography as a universal human journey. This has become exemplified 
in focus on the human face as universalising. The structural conditions 
and imperial grooves that continue to move people, and move people 
to the UK, are unseeable in this apparently universal story. Take, for 
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example, the historical conditions such as transnational diasporas, 
connections through imperial language or ongoing forms of neocolonial 
warfare, capital accumulation, global inequality, kinship ties. This 
humanitarianism is repeated in similar naive cosmopolitan claims such 
as ‘we are all migrants’ or ‘all refugees’, a position which obscures the 
history of colonial violence and inequality that both created borders 
and sustains the movement of people to the Global North.
In viewing the portrait as humanising, this also firstly assumes that 
the humanity of migrants must be evidenced. This is problematic on 
its own terms, but even more so here because being photographed is 
the medium through which the migrant is supposedly transformed into 
the human, as an individual subject who is complete and thus relatable 
to as ‘human’. As problematically, this equally assumes that humanity 
is judged by the spectator. Under this logic, the person of colour and 
the migrant can only be included as human once they have been made 
visible through the dominant techniques of portrait photography, and 
by the visual codes and relatability of the ‘good’, contributing/familial 
migrant. Ultimately, the migrant awaits to be transformed into human 
by being pictured and then being witnessed and accepted by a pre-
dominantly white audience.
What I want to stress here in this reading is that rather than breaking 
free or challenging violent borders, the universal appeal to the human, 
compassion and empathy found in the imaging/imagining of the ‘good’ 
migrant’ not only obscures but reproduces colonial bordering. In idealis-
ing the ‘good’ migrant, this hardens the boundaries around the ‘bad’ 
migrant. This equally works to conceal and hide the violence of bordering. 
It does so by reproducing the patronising and paternal but also intimate 
offer to be included within the family/national home that we witnessed 
with the treatment of the colonial ‘house boy’.
Whiteness and compassionate nationalism
Whilst contesting explicitly racist and nativist accounts of migration, 
such as from the far right, the visual regime of the ‘good’ migrant and 
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leftist-liberal humanitarianism also arguably reproduces many of the 
assumptions of the white nationalism it supposedly contests. This is 
because this visual regime is geared towards satisfying an audience that 
people rendered ‘different’ (often encoded racially) can be pacified, 
made like ‘us’ or can even be ‘good for us’ (i.e. they can love ‘us’ or 
contribute for ‘us’). But also, because this works to praise the tolerant 
understanding and even ‘love’ of the host community, white spectators 
are invited to imagine themselves as benefactors, compassionate and 
ethical subjects. The working of racism, and with it gendered and sexu-
alised inequality, is concealed in this appeal to a tolerant community, 
just as (neo)colonialism and the questions of what continues to move 
people are completely erased.
What I argue is manifest in the imagining of the ‘good’ migrant is 
in fact a re-scripting of colonial whiteness (also see Danewid 2017 for 
a comparative argument). It is the outward rejection of a xenophobic-
racist nationalism and the reformulation of a supposedly compassionate 
and humanitarian nationalism. But what haunts both accounts are 
appeals to white innocence (Wekker 2016). Compassionate nationalist 
accounts have particular traction on the liberal left in the UK – where 
the ‘civic nation’ is reimagined alongside an appeal to British values of 
democracy, equality, tolerance and ‘postracialism’ (Fortier 2008). We 
see its inflections in the commitment to integrate Muslim women out 
of their troubled domesticity, or in attempts to work in solidarity with 
refugees, or in the push to protect the rights of ‘Windrush generation’ 
citizens who are threatened with deportation. This humanitarian leaning 
and often multiculturalist nationalism ‘includes’ and even celebrates 
diverse others, whilst constituting them as ‘welcomed’ guests of the 
original (unmarked but white) nation.
Ida Danewid (2017: 1682) argues that this compassionate nationalism 
is concerned with a re-scripting of the white national and civilisational 
self around ideas of tolerance and solidarity. It involves a reimagining 
of the white self, who is now bound to multiculturalism, migrant solidarity 
and liberal hospitality – values which in themselves seem appealing to 
a progressive audience. In this setting the reaction to the approach of 
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the migrant ‘stranger’ is one of empathetic welcome rather than hate 
and vilification. On the surface, this seems resoundingly positive. 
However, such a position of empathy fails entirely to produce a critique 
of the colonial masculine gaze and instead merely reinvigorates it. Just 
as with the Arrivals exhibition, under humanitarian and compassionate 
nationalism the migrant other is consumed and included, but only to 
renew the white national self and to evidence and celebrate the tolerance 
and benevolence of those who identify with it. Consider, for instance, 
how contribution is viewed in terms of the economic benefits the migrant 
brings to the nation, or the ‘love’ and thankfulness they demonstrate 
towards their ‘hosts’. Or equally, how the ‘good’ migrant is made welcom-
able by evidencing their exceptionalism. Such ‘cannibalisation of the 
other masquerading as care’ (Hemmings 2012: 152) is made possible 
by historical amnesia and the erasure of colonial dispossession, violence 
and the visual regime of ‘humanity’. It involves an active forgetting of 
the connecting tissue that moves people to Europe and the UK and the 
violence and exploitation that did and still accompanies this relationship. 
These tissues have been created through formal colonialism, the accu-
mulation and dispossession of imperial capitalism and in ongoing colonial 
war in the Middle East. This position of humanitarian/compassionate 
nationalism may not be explicitly nostalgic for empire, but it only works 
by hiding this history and by promising to offer the migrant their 
humanity back as a part of their inclusion in the national family. However, 
as I discussed in chapters 4 and 5, inclusion in British citizenship for 
the once colonised is always a failed promise.
Not only are the boundaries between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ migrants re-
established in this discourse but this type of humanitarian and compas-
sionate nationalism is a complex work of resuscitating white social 
relations on the terms of empathy and progressivism (Danewid 2017). 
Firstly, this works to dehumanise migrants by ‘offering’ them their 
humanity through the spectacle of being welcomable. Secondly, it renews 
what Wekker (2016) has called ‘white innocence’, which works not only 
to silence colonial histories and presents but also actively works to 
preserve the unjust structure of the status quo and its visual hierarchy 
The good migrant 215
of the human (also see Mills 2017). The imaginary of the good migrant 
not only structures bordering around who can be included or excluded 
but it is also used to reproduce and renew the very structures of white 
nationalism that deny migrants humanity in the first place.
To consider the visual regime of the ‘good’ migrant we have to consider 
how it is connected to a celebration of the white family portrait. Recognis-
ing this is important for understanding the distinct limits and silences 
of attempts to ‘humanise’ people on the move, which has become so 
central to contemporary logics and counter-visual practices of humanitar-
ian and compassionate nationalism.
Conclusion
I started this chapter by demonstrating how mobility is regulated around 
who can be imagined as a ‘good’ migrant. Child refugees can be trans-
formed into ‘burly lads’ by a visual regime of childhood which makes 
certain bodies ‘unchildlike’ and subsequently undeserving of rights. 
This helps us understand how borders are visual, as they are ‘sticky’ 
and ‘intimate’. Being made ‘out of place’ is also a product of being made 
visible as ‘out of place’. This follows the increasing way that borders rely 
upon visual technologies to distinguish and categorise people, to track 
movement and manage access to rights. Imagining who belongs, who 
can be welcomed and who can also be expendable is also about who 
can be imaged as such. But this imagining/imaging is constantly wrapped 
up in the politics of family, who can look domesticated, who can look 
familial – as ‘wife’, ‘husband’, ‘partner’, ‘child’, and we might extend this 
to ‘good neighbour’, ‘civic actor’, ‘citizen’.
This, I argue, relates to a wider interlinking history of colonialism 
and visuality of which photography is an important part. In exploring 
the role of photography under wider empire I demonstrated how images 
were central to race-making and presenting people as objects, com-
modities or other. Photography was central to the regulation of popula-
tions through warfare and anthropology, just as it was in organising 
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the intimate relations of the colonial household. Family portraits, for 
example, stand as a key means of arranging who could be counted as 
worthy of family and who could only work for the family (as ‘house 
boy’/‘labourer’/‘ayah’). Photography helped arrange often-intimate 
hierarchies within households where colonised subjects could be 
‘included’ but only as subordinate and never as properly familial. This 
point is more than about symbolism. With the networking of photographs 
into the global regulation of movement, through identity cards, passports, 
surveillance technologies and visa applications, images (and with them 
ways of seeing people) have become powerful sites of bordering.
In pushing this book’s argument that borders are dispersed and 
networked through more than immigration law, I turned to how activist 
campaigns and art exhibitions play an important role in the imagining 
of ‘good’ and familial migrants. Rather than focusing on delineations 
of sham or monstrous others, I explored examples of where migrants 
are celebrated and ‘humanised’. Using the exhibition Arrivals, I revealed 
how humanitarian logics of ‘welcome’ fail not only to contest right-wing 
and explicitly racist depictions of immigration (that is, as disembodied 
hordes, dangers, deviants) but also reproduce heteronormative whiteness 
and a forgetting of colonial violence. Rather than an endless imperilled 
victim, the ‘good’ migrant here is presented as the contributing, loving, 
familial migrant. ‘Family’ here works as a developmental logic. It shapes 
claims over who is worthy/unworthy. It is on these terms that they can 
be ‘included’ and offered ‘humanity’. This again is far from being only 
symbolic. Just as with the example of the child refugees, who is made 
seeable as the ‘good’ migrant is central to how mobility is regulated and 
how colonial sensibilities are reformed and reworked. Bordering in sites 
as distant as family visa applications, refugee resettlement programmes, 
points-based immigration systems, works to offer rights, mobility and 
settlement based upon fulfilling the terms of the ‘good’ migrant.
Whilst a celebration of the progressive white self who can welcome 
distant others, the humanitarian and compassionate nationalist logic 
we can see circulating in northern states is both limited and paternalistic. 
The welcome of the ‘good’ migrant can be treated as a recycling of the 
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position of the colonised ‘house boy’ who was offered an intimate place 
subordinated within the colonial household, only ever to work for the 
good of the ‘real’ family/national home. This does nothing to alter the 
terms under which bordering continues to make people ‘out of place’, 
nor does it work to challenge the way that structural logics of racialised 
violence continue to drive government in the UK.
If, as I have argued, the colonial masculine gaze still dominates ways 
of seeing, what of hooks’s (1992: 115–116) provocation of how colonised 
and enslaved people look back? If humanitarian logics merely replicate 
colonial ways of seeing, what other alternatives, what other ways of 
looking have worked to resist and look away from this visual regime, 
and with it, colonial borders and the power of family? It is to this 
question of other counter-visual practices and resistance to bordering 
that I now turn.
Notes
1 Although it was hoped this might make way for wider scheme of up to three 
thousand resettled children.
2 This chapter is based on archival work undertaken in 2017 and 2018 at the 
Bristol Archives, which holds the Commonwealth Photography archives. It 
also draws upon ethnographic and observational field work conducted at several 
exhibition sites – the Weston Park Museum, Sheffield, the Bristol Museum, the 
British Library, the Migration Museum, London, and interviews with photog-
raphers, artists and participants. I visited galleries, exhibition spaces and museums 
that hosted events and exhibitions on mobility, empire and family across an 
eighteen-month period (2016–2018) At the core of this chapter is an engagement 
with visual analysis (Bleiker 2018) which aims to investigate what Gregory 
(2012a) calls the techno-cultural history of photography, mobility, race and 
borders. Rather than focusing purely on visual methods as a form of represen-
tational practice, I consider how visuals (photography in the main) emerged 
within the history of colonial expansion and warfare and how the very technology 
we tend to consider as neutral and objective is culturally and politically located 
within colonial modernity (also see Virilio 1989). This involved examining 
common themes and styles of photography across archival photographs, moving 
images, family portraits in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
(predominantly in the British Empire & Commonwealth Collection in the 
Bristol Archives), investigating visual methods and surveillance during this 
time, such as the rise of the passport, and examining the styles, representational 
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practices and techniques used in photography exhibitions on human mobility 
in 2016–2018 (in exhibitions across Britain, as noted above). 
3 For similar themes, see National Geographic, ‘The New Europeans’, avail able 
at www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2016/10/europe-immigration-muslim-
refugees-portraits/; the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants’ ‘I am an 
immigrant’ campaign, available at www.iamanimmigrant.net/i-am-immigrant-
poster-campaign; IOM’s ‘I am a migrant’ project, available at http://iamamigrant.
org (all accessed 11 September 2019).
4 The full collection of photographs from the Arrivals exhibition can be viewed 
at www.jeremyabrahams.co.uk/arrivals_sheffield (accessed 17 September 2019). 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the artist Jeremy Abrahams for 
taking the time to speak to me about the project and for sharing his images in 
the spirit of productive engagement and critique. 
Seven young and adolescent children sit with an older man, eating 
melon in a working field in Jamaica, around 1860. They are wearing 
the working clothes of the agricultural poor. It is likely that they are 
indentured labourers, bound to both the land and white settler farms 
by indenture contracts which dominated the imperial economy in Jamaica 
after the abolition of slavery. This photo, entitled ‘These water melons’ 
(figure 5), captures a particular intimate moment of the British Empire.
Kate Anderson and Graham Mortimer Evelyn (2019) remind us that 
the photograph would have taken over fifteen minutes to compose. 
It is worth imagining the intimate racial dynamics of those fifteen 
minutes: the white photographer lining up the shot, fixing the children 
in the line of sight of the camera, the shuffling, tiredness, boredom, 
the potential bafflement, indifference or quiet resilience to the gaze of 
the camera and imperialist. When I first stumbled across this photo 
in the British Empire & Commonwealth Collection (Bristol Archives), 
I ‘saw it’ and ‘read it’ as another example of the colonial masculine 
gaze. The fixation on these labourers eating melon, sheltering from the 
sun, replicates multiple colonial stereotypes: of ‘idle’ black labourers 
gorging on water melon, or undomesticated, unchildlike children or 
youth. They are ‘reduced to caricatures set in the Jamaican landscape’ 
(Anderson and Mortimer Evelyn 2019). The caricatured ‘joke’ (i.e. that 
Jamaicans just eat melon, a stereotype which begat the phrase ‘watermelon 
smile’) strips these subjects of their humanity. As did their subjuga-





The second time I encountered the image was in the Bristol Museum 
gallery in a display on Empire through the Lens, a display of twenty-seven 
images describing the impact of the British Empire. This time, the image 
was accompanied by a reading by Anderson and Mortimer Evelyn (2019). 
They highlight the racist composition of the image but also argue that 
in these labourers ‘look’ is a recognition that they are being caricatured. 
Within this look, they argue, ‘resides a testament to endurance’. The 
children’s stare, which could be tiredness and exhaustion – as in my 
reading – is posed instead as oppositional. There is a knowing in this 
reading, one that suggests a subversion of the colonial masculine gaze 
and an excess of this regime of visuality which I initially saw as dominat-
ing and dehumanising.
5 ‘These water melons’, c.1860.
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Visuality and contestation
This raises a number of questions for how we are to understand the 
duress of empire, race, the colonial masculine gaze and the possibilities 
of other intimacies, kinships and ways of being in the world (that ‘look 
back’ and ‘endure’). It also raises questions over how my own structural 
positionality and the power of whiteness obscures and shapes my own 
analysis (such as in my reading that overemphasised the subjugation 
and dehumanisation of the labourers in ignorance of practices of subver-
sion and agency).
If the colonial masculine gaze is co-opting in its ability to reform 
and translate into new and ‘progressive’ forms – such as the tolerant, 
multicultural nationalism and humanitarianism – we must also consider 
the proliferations of ways of ‘looking back’, contesting and enduring. 
There are many ways of ‘looking back’ which struggle within and against 
historic and contemporary regimes of bordering, and with it visuality. 
As hooks (1992: 115–116) reminds us, within any power relations 
there are always counter, oppositional and subversive ways of seeing 
and being seen. Under slavery, hooks argues, looking was not only a 
means of control over the slave but a form of resilience, a slave was 
expected to look down in encounters with the master so looking back 
or away was a primary strategy of defiance (also see Browne 2015). 
According to hooks (1992: 115–133), black women have developed 
particular strategies of looking which have flourished after abolition, 
Jim Crow, decolonisation, the civil rights era and diasporic migration. 
We can see these ways of looking as cracks, openings, alternatives that 
capture, renew and refuse the bordering of the domesticating state. 
Alternatives can be co-opted, or can replicate the terms of coloniality 
– such as local/global humanitarianism and compassionate national-
ism – others provide for and recover more critical sensibilities and 
orientations.
In this penultimate chapter, I examine three strategies of struggle 
over contemporary visuality which are also in turn struggles over borders, 
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mobility and hierarchical claims to family. What mark these practices 
apart from the plethora of other forms of resistance, is the way they 
attempt to renew and recover mobile and (post)colonial personhood 
which have been enacted globally from anti-colonial struggles and 
decolonisation. In doing so, they can work to (in)directly challenge and 
deconstruct the politics of the ‘good’ migrant and liberal promises of 
‘inclusive citizenship’, and with this challenge and disrupt codes of 
intimacy, family and domestication which animate the exclusion of 
people racialised as non-white from humanity.
The three strategies and forms of struggle I expand upon are: 1) 
inversions, the inverting of the colonial gaze and its patterns of seeing 
against itself – this can be through forms of counter-surveillance or 
through practices of visual empowerment; 2) escape – that is, modes 
of becoming invisible and refusing to work within dominant ways of 
seeing; and lastly, 3) decolonial aesthesis, a political and ethical orientation 
used both to show the violence of colonial rule and recover and forge 
new expressions of being in the world.
Inversions
In diverse environments, from migrant camp dispersals, to police stop 
and search, to protest movements, the use of photography to hold the 
state and its agents and international organisations to account has become 
increasingly powerful. Whether this is filming police violence (Wall 
and Linnemann 2014), or illegal detention practices, or physical and 
sexual abuse, photography is increasingly used to put pressure on states 
or to attempt to persecute individuals, companies and governments. 
The proliferation of images taken by people on the move to and across 
Europe, or into the UK, has revealed the danger of moving and the 
conditions people are subjected to. We should consider these means of 
documenting and revealing the deep violence of borders, from the 
reporting of drone strikes, to deaths of migrants in the Mediterranean, 
to resistance against counter-terrorism practices. I call such strategies 
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‘inversions’ because they invert the gaze of the domesticating state by 
revealing its violence. Smartphones, for example, have become central 
to the contemporary migrant experience. Not only do phones provide 
a lifeline and a survival strategy (Stierl 2016, 2019) but they also provide 
a means of photographing deaths, destitution and abandonment that 
would otherwise go unnoticed.
Such strategies of visibility have been deployed historically by numer-
ous social movements and in artistic and activist experiments to recognise 
and render violence, and the subjects of violence, worthy of seeing. In 
the UK the United Families and Friends Campaign (UFFC) uses 
photographs to make visible those who have died at different border 
sites – at the hands of the police, in prison or psychiatric custody. UFFC 
use photographs of the dead to reveal these forgotten victims of state 
brutality and have increasingly done so by linking to international 
movements such as Black Lives Matter and anti-detention protestors 
(Elliott-Cooper 2016). In their annual procession in London, UFFC 
members wear T-shirts with the faces of the dead ‘so they are not forgot-
ten’ (Picture Capital 2016). Whilst speaking for ‘everyone’ who has died 
in police custody, the movement was born out of black communities’ 
experience with the police and reminds us that it is young black men 
who are most likely not only to be subject to police harassment through-
out their lives but also to die at the hands of the police (see Andrews 
2018). UFFC often appeal to themselves as a ‘family’. Significantly for 
us, this is a ‘family’ bound not by European heteronormativity but by 
the historic experience of the colonial state and police oppression which 
forms a series of intimate political bonds (for a longer discussion of 
gender and race in the context of anti-police struggles see Elliott-Cooper 
2019). Such an appeal to a wider networked and historical appeal to 
family is about producing solidarities for survival. Such inversions are 
a refusal to remain invisible (also see Sancto 2018). In the case of the 
UFFC, visuality is used to call upon the state to recognise and act by 
making visible what state authorities and white audiences want to forget 
– the institutional racial violence of law enforcement and the criminal 
justice system (Perera 2019).
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Another very different and less explicit example of inversions might 
be those who use techniques such as sham marriages to gain rights. 
Playing off the suspicions of inappropriate intimacies created by the 
colonial state, subjects can facilitate the appearance of love and ‘familial-
ness’ with others who the state would not normally deem a ‘couple’ or 
a ‘family’ (friends, short-term partners, acquaintances, non-biological 
dependents) to move and make claims to settle in northern states. They 
do this by emulating and forging intimacies with subjects to gain rights 
and settlement through looking like a ‘genuine’ heteronormative/
homonormative couple (see White 2014; also Turner and Vera Espinoza 
2019). A performance of love – such as providing evidence of ‘looking 
like’ a romantic couple – can be a way of accomplishing political needs 
at the behest of a state that can only recognise particular affective 
relationships over others. Because it is deemed evidence by the state, 
photography can be utilised to perform the sham of the heteronormative/
homonormative couple.
What inversions have in common, and what distinguishes them from 
humanitarian/compassionate nationalist approaches, is that they focus 
on calling out the violent inequality of bordering/borders. They can 
also be attuned to the racial violence of the domesticating state. Rather 
than offering themselves as ‘good’, domesticated, ‘familial’ migrants or 
happy multicultural citizens, these movements and practices of resistance 
appeal to a collective demand to be recognised on the terms of past 
and present exclusions (see Butler and Athanasiou 2013). This is not a 
strategy that demands that people be viewed as ‘contributing’ in the 
eyes of a white audience; it is instead born out of the historical experience 
of being excluded by the domesticating state.
These strategies, which recognise and make visible histories of 
exclusion, also work to foster bonds and affective relations that are in 
excess of heteronormative/homonormative and nationalist appeals of 
‘belonging’. Examples include UFFC’s appeal to family as a disparate 
connection of those who have suffered police oppression, or the inverting 
of the genuine family by performing a sham marriage to gain rights. 
These types of affective relations can be compatible with other ways of 
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being together which are politically and socially significant but equally 
troubling to an account of ‘family’ (see the decolonial approaches I 
offer below). In the examples above, what bonds people together is 
rooted in historical experiences of movement, of bodied violence and 
the racialised sexuality of modern citizenship. Inversions stare the state 
down on its own terms without necessarily rejecting it, its visual regime 
or the function of national liberal citizenship as the dominant way to 
be seen and recognised.
Escape
If inversions use the visual regime of portraits and images to empower 
subjects and/or build communities then this is still built on the promise 
of visibility and, with it, recognition – that is, recognition of deaths or 
of being ‘couple-like’. Holding the colonial state to account by asking 
to be recognised can be effective in challenging certain border practices 
and claiming limited liberal rights. However, this is ultimately a limited 
political project. Such strategies are limited because they fail to explore 
the wider issue of who is seeable and the terms under which someone 
is humanised in local and global racial-colonial hierarchies. Calling for 
migrants, colonised and racialised communities and the violence to 
which they are subjected to be made more visible is ultimately a call 
for recognition (see Coulthard 2014). Recognition is performed on the 
terms set out by the beholder, the colonial masculine gaze and the 
domesticating state. Whilst often a necessary project, this risks a scenario 
in which visibility remains conditioned by colonial hierarchies of human/
not-quite/non-human.
Glen Coulthard (2014) argues that recognition will always remain 
a limited strategy when groups are asking for recognition from (settler) 
colonial states. Rather than working towards freedom and dignity outside 
of liberal claims to citizenship it ultimately leaves the subject position 
of the colonised/colonialist in place. If being recognised is to be made 
visible and amenable to ‘equal rights’, then it risks limiting this strategy 
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to a demand to be included and accepted as a citizen within the confines 
of the colonial domesticating state. Strategies of inversion can either 
work by using the tools of the state to gain rights (e.g. performing a 
sham marriage) or asking to be seen and given due process (the UFFC). 
These tools do little to challenge the more fundamental problem of the 
way the colonial state reproduces the distinctions of empire through 
citizenship, a citizenship which, as I have demonstrated, replicates people 
as human/not-quite/non-human.
In realising that the system of citizenship and bordering in the UK 
(and we can offer a parallel to other European and northern states here) 
is always set up to fail them, at the expense of their humanity, mobile 
subjects are sometimes forced to become ‘invisible’. People moving to 
and within the Global North often practice what Papadopoulos et al. 
(2008) call modes of ‘escape’. Disfiguring fingerprints, burning passports 
and identity papers, smashing smartphones, running away from sheltered 
housing or social services, ignoring asylum interviews – the very visual 
cues and strategies of ‘managed migration’ – are used as means to refuse 
and to disappear from methods of domestication and the orderly rhythms 
and humiliations of ‘legal’ migration (Tazzioli 2014). In the context of 
the asylum system in the UK, this can be called ‘going ghost’ (also see 
British Red Cross 2018).
Given the increasing fragility that settled rights such as citizenship 
offer (after the extension of deprivation, deportation, precarity and 
state-sanctioned death), this reflects the dismantling of the myth of 
liberal inclusion. Often born out of desperation and fatigue but also 
displaying in-depth knowledge of border techniques and surveillance, 
these strategies subvert through dismantling forms of visibility and 
recognition (see Tazzioli 2014: 150–153). They rely on the promise, 
perhaps quite a radical promise, to become ‘unseeable’. If borders are 
intimate, sticky and visible, refusing to be seen appears to offer a powerful 
way to contest the domesticating power of the contemporary state.
Eduardo Glissant’s (1997: 189) appeal to a ‘right to opacity’ is useful 
to consider here. If dominant modes of visuality are bound to colonial 
power, and rest on hierarchies of the human, then Glissant makes a 
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political and ethical demand to be ‘unseeable’ and thus ‘unknowable’ 
to the modern state and its adjunct authorities – that is, to refuse the 
terms under which one is seen and made ‘transparent’ (made meaningful 
and categorised in Western thought). An increasing body of scholarship 
has taken up this politics of (in)visibility by arguing that refusing to be 
visualised within the terms of the ‘good’ migrant, citizen or family, such 
as with the destruction of paper identity and in countering legalised 
routes of mobility and rights, offers transformative potential. To many 
scholars (see, for example, De Genova 2017) such acts represent the 
forgings of hybrid ethical and political subjectivities which push up 
against, escape and reform liberal codes of domestication, bordering, 
intimacy and liberal labour commodification (also see Papadopoulos 
et al. 2008; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). Here invisibility is treated as 
an ambiguous process (i.e. can anyone ever become entirely ‘invisible’?) 
but part of a broader struggle over imperial capitalist relations and 
hetero- or homonormative citizenship, and with it, dominant claims 
of ‘family’.
Invisibility may not only be a form of abandonment but a strategy 
to forge alternative political and social spaces through movement, and 
in doing so produce other ways of relating to each other. Agathengelou’s 
(2004) work, for instance, examines how the rejection of the managed 
migration of domestic workers has led to informal solidarity movements 
and the creation of women-only communities of care and support. 
Escaping the legal regime and visibility of domestic work and the border 
regimes that shape this precarious work, offers to these women (temporal) 
bonds of affection. These communities of affection are not arranged 
around the intimacies of the heteronormative family and its gender 
relations. Such communities provide forms of material survival which 
mean that subjects are not reduced to working as ‘domestic help’ for 
the social reproduction of bourgeois households (Agathangelou 2004: 
153–178). They are bonds of alternative modes of care, sexuality and 
intimacy in excess of the family.
If inversions rely on recognition, as I noted above, then strategies 
of escape help question whether all political subjects are seeking 
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citizenship, even if citizenship still remains the dominant mode of being 
recognised as politically human. To Papadopoulos and Tsianos (2008), 
practices of invisibility, such as passport burning, involve a splitting of 
the name and the body. It is a strategy that ‘deliberately abandons the 
humanist regime of rights’ that is so central to local and global forms 
of outwardly xenophobic but also liberal nationalism and humanitarian-
ism (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2008). It is a rejection of the terms 
under which someone is seeable as politically human. The ‘right to 
opacity’ can be brought into being through escaping regimes of surveil-
lance and a refusal (intentional or otherwise) to be subject to the 
imaginary of the ‘good’ migrant and claims to heteronormative citizenship 
and family that go with it. Connecting back to hooks (1992), we might 
say that escape is about ‘looking away’ from the colonial masculine 
gaze and the domesticating state.
Decolonial aesthesis
If inversions rely on recognition, and escape relies on strategies of invis-
ibility then decolonial aesthesis (Lockwood 2013; Mignolo and Vazquez 
2013) offers a further way of ‘looking back’ and a different politics of 
struggle. Inversions contest borders by highlighting the violence of the 
colonial state. But, as I have suggested, this is often done on its own 
terms of visuality and intelligibility – through legal recourse and state 
recognition of violence. Strategies of escape can instead be understood 
as forging ‘alternatives’ which subvert dominant forms of domestication 
such as problematising the idea that everyone seeks citizenship and 
with it heteronormative family by refusing to be recognised or claim 
rights of asylum or citizenship.
However, it is worth asking how far a strategy of escape can go to 
challenge the domesticating state, colonial hierarchies of the human 
and with it bordering. After all, irregularisation and invisibility (that 
is, denying mobile and racialised subjects recognition) are both ways 
in which the state manages populations, and makes them amenable to 
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exploitation and forms of abandonment and expulsion. ‘Looking away’, 
whilst often a strategic necessity, remains limited when it is so conditioned 
by the very rhythms, orientations and violence of colonial bordering. 
To put it simply, if inversions are too concerned with recognition and 
visibility, then escape lacks the promise of a future transformation and 
ultimate escape from coloniality and imperial capitalism. Is escape not 
the underbelly of colonial borders rather than an alternative? In this 
context, decolonial aesthesis offers a further form of contestation which 
explores both the problem of recognition found in forms of inversion 
and the absence of being able to critically engage with colonial violence 
found in forms of escape.
Decolonial aesthesis is an explicit creative and artistic project (see 
Lockwood 2013) that is bound to the wider social movement of decolo-
niality. This is the assertion that decolonisation is not ‘over’ and so nor is 
coloniality. As its starting point, decolonial aesthesis is a critique of the 
plethora of ways that colonial power is bound to knowledge and, with 
this, ways of seeing and being seen (Mignolo and Vazquez 2013). Visuality 
was central to colonial power, but equally, contemporary Western art 
and aesthetics (ways of appreciating artistic form) have remained tied 
to more or less explicit forms of orientalism and the degradation of 
colonised peoples as inferior and/or exoticised. In this way, decolonial 
aesthesis (rather than aesthetics; see Mignolo and Vazquez 2013) is 
invested in producing activistic and creative projects which call out the 
ongoing legacies of colonialism, including borders, citizenship and the 
bourgeois claim to (white) family. But equally, as Alanna Lockwood has 
argued, the movement is not limited to revealing colonial violence but is 
attuned to the production and embrace of forms of immunity ‘healing’ 
(Lockwood 2013, but also see Mignolo and Vazquez 2013) – that is, 
rediscovering, reorienting, curating ways of seeing colonised people 
which are in excess of the colonial masculine gaze.
To Shilliam (2013), this is a project of ‘retrieving and redeeming 
aesthetes that have been dismissed by colonial masters as superstitious, 
irrational, ugly, and primitive’. Examples include forms of indigenous 
knowledge, diasporic connections, religious and spiritual practices, 
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artistic forms of the Global South, which work in parallel with, not 
separately from, colonial modernity. It is also about re-establishing the 
connectivity of histories outside of the assumption of national/civilisation 
ideas of colonial states (Bhambra 2014). For example, the term ‘Afropean’ 
shows the unresolvable connections between Europe and Africa, which 
are bound by the history of slavery and direct colonial control, as well 
as extraction of wealth and resources (Hansen and Jonsson 2014). This 
directly shapes contemporary imperial capitalism as well as the movement 
and death of people crossing the Mediterranean (see Black Europe Body 
Politics 2013). This recognises the intimate bonds that bind people to 
each other through the ongoing experiences of global patterns of imperial/
colonial dispossession.
The orientation in this work, which has evolved within artistic 
exhibitions, moving/still images and sculptures, or soundscapes (Weheliye 
2005), is not about demonstrating the humanity of the colonised, mobile 
or postcolonial subjects and communities. It is instead a refusal to be 
‘familial’ to a predominantly white audience and white gaze (and we 
might think of whiteness here as epistemic as well as bodied). It is 
instead about reasserting forms of personhood that have run alongside 
or been extinguished by colonial violence and with this the development, 
control and dispossession of ‘family’. To Alanna Lockwood (2013), this 
project is directly linked to the contemporary politics of mobility, citizen-
ship and borders. It begins with a rejection of having to account for 
yourself as someone ‘out of place’ within colonial ideas of time and 
space. It is a refusal to have to account for yourself (and be recognised) 
in the terms of liberal inclusion, national citizenship and the structures 
of the (white) family. Instead, Lockwood (2013) asserts the primacy of 
colonial exploitation to the presence of black and colonised people in 
Britain today: ‘we have always been here as the hidden side of modernity, 
therefore our presence is self-explanatory’. We might think of this in 
relation to Ambalavaner Sivanandan’s famous provocation to ‘the English’ 
in explaining the imperial grooves of migration: ‘we are here because 
you were there’ (Sivanandan 1989).
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Rather than needing to be recognised or humanised, and thus toler-
ated, the movement of people to postmetropoles is directly tied to the 
global/colonial histories of exploitation and violence, from the slave 
trade, to the forced mobility of indentured labourers, to the use of 
Commonwealth citizens to rebuild the British economy after the Second 
World War. The problem of the border and being seen as ‘out of place’ 
no longer rests with the migrant or the citizen of colour; it is instead 
the structure of white ignorance that fails to understand the historical 
conditions of mobility that is the problem. Slavery, abolition, colonial 
dispossession, underdevelopment, the racialised control of movement, 
mass deprivation of rights become the loci for thinking about mobility. 
In his scathing critique of the actions of the British state in deporting 
‘irregularised migrants’ and those without ‘bona fide’ citizenship claims 
to Jamaica, the campaigner Burt Samuels argues for a reorientation 
towards this history:
‘The legacy of slavery is why we are so impoverished and why so many 
of us have had to leave Jamaica for greener pastures, to send remittances 
home,’ he says. ‘We were British subjects until 1962. We fought in two 
world wars, we sent our soldiers who shed their blood for Britain. Then 
all of a sudden it became a policy that we had to apply for a visa to go 
to a country that used us for three centuries. We felt discarded. It is 
widely accepted in Jamaica that Britain has used us and refused us.’ 
(Quoted in Gentleman 2018b)
It is not the failure of migrants to integrate, or modernise, or contribute, 
but the historical terms on which colonial ideas of humanity, structural 
violence and the creation and perpetuation of local/global inequalities 
that need to be examined under such a project.
An important aspect of the project of decolonial aesthesis is directed 
at the particular racialised-sexualised codes of intimacy and the 
heteronormative family, for instance the historic and contemporary 
degradation of black women’s bodies, which as we have seen is frequently 
orchestrated through depictions of failed motherhood/womanhood, as 
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outside of love and appropriate intimacy. This continues to be reinvented 
across numerous social sites from international sports (Nittle 2018) 
to the treatment of MPs (Elgot 2017b). Artistic activist projects have 
sought to reclaim the position of black womanhood (also see Morrison 
2014), such as in Teresa María Díaz Nerio’s performance of Hommage à 
Sara Bartman re-exhibited at the Black Europe Body Politics exhibition 
in 2012 (figure 6). This installation aimed to directly capture, sustain 
and trouble the sexualised-gendered ‘failures’ of the enslaved black 
woman.
Nerio’s performance in the disfigured and grotesquely sexualised 
body suit directly reasserts the contemporary relevance of the figure 
6 Teresa María Díaz Nerio’s performance of Hommage à Sara Bartman, 
2012.
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of Saartjie Baartman. Baartman was a Khoikhoi woman from South 
Africa who was exhibited as a typified ‘Hottentot’ woman throughout 
Europe, and was frequently photographed as a subject of imperial fascina-
tion, desire and eroticism/exoticism during the early nineteenth century. 
As Dalia Gebrial (2017) reminds us: ‘even in her death she was not 
spared the racialised misogyny of the European gaze; her brain, skeleton 
and sexual organs remained on display in a Paris museum until 1974, 
more than 150 years after her death in 1815’. As a symbol of the com-
modification of anti-black racism and its visuality, Nerio’s performance 
calls out the degradation and ungendering of black womanhood. It 
does so by revealing the apparent absences of feminised blackness which 
have always been fixed on ideas of failed womanhood, motherhood 
and improper intimacy/domesticity, but primarily rooted in hypersexual-
ity (such as the grotesque enlargements of the suit).
Nerio’s performance is a troubling assertion of the continuity of the 
colonial masculine gaze. What this performance does not ask for is for 
Baartman to be recognised and included as a ‘real woman’ on the terms 
of either the ‘good’ migrant, citizenship or family. This performance 
instead refuses to make colonial violence comfortable or historicised 
as ‘a thing of the past’. It instead forces us to wrestle with the way that 
black women’s bodies have been used to create degrading hierarchies 
of intimacy, kinship and the human, whether as impossible mothers 
(chapters 1 and 2), conducting suspicious intimacies (chapter 3) or 
reproducing youth/gang violence (chapter 4). At the same time, it reminds 
us that whilst violence against colonised women’s bodies was normalised 
– unless suiting the interest of the colonial state – violence against white 
women could energise and justify spectacular displays of violence (such 
as deprivation of rights and personhood). Thus, such a performance 
can be directly contrasted with attempts to imagine the ‘good’ migrant, 
who is always orientated towards proving the benevolence, toleration 
and goodness of the white national subject.
In confronting the installation and Nerio’s performance, Shilliam 
(2013) recalls the affective and embodied experience of witnessing this 
colonial violence and the ethical/political orientation it calls upon. He 
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recounts how this emerged ‘like a cadence of scream(s) and grunt(s)’ 
as he walked through the exhibition space. He recollects:
At first, a horror of being racially interpolated; the second, a gut response 
to these caricatures of violence visited upon the self through dehumaniza-
tion. Similar to Fanon’s famous experience of being challenged by ‘Look, 
a Negro!’, these art works invoke what I would call an aestheSis of outrage. 
This aestheSis is often mobilized to challenge the sanctioned ignorance 
of white publics and to compel them to recognize their complicity in 
the coloniality of power. (Shilliam 2013)
Here colonial violence is front and centre. As Shilliam recollects, this 
involves a double bind of both the experience of being ‘racially inter-
polated’ but equally a calling out of white publics for their ignorance 
and complicity. Through such a disturbance this rejects the figuration 
of the would-be included ‘good’ migrant just as it rejects the renewal 
of the white self that we see in projects of compassionate nationalism 
and humanitarianism. It refuses the progressive promise of domestication 
and liberal order by centring racialised sexuality and familial absence 
at the heart of the performance. It is a rejection of fitting within the 
frame of the colonial family portrait.
As Shilliam (2013) reveals, this works in excess of a humanitarianism 
which offers humanity back to colonised and racialised populations at 
the behest of compassion and empathy. Decolonial aesthesis is an outright 
refusal ‘to engage the coloniality of power in its own public space’ but 
it equally ‘defends black publics wherein the sensibilities of personhoods 
can be cultivated other-wise’ (Shilliam 2013). This is an outward rejection 
of recognition and its codes of heteronormative citizenship that I have 
illustrated dominate the politics of family and borders in contemporary 
Britain. Exposing colonial wounds and making them visible does not 
equate in this strategy to an asking for recognition and accountability 
by the colonial state (although this can be useful). It is instead orientated 
towards the cultivation of personhood that is bound to coloniality but 
is always in excess of it.
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Artistic practice here is not only an end in itself but a means to heal 
wounds and create space for energising further struggle. The material 
effects of colonialism must be made visible to be dismantled, whilst 
cultivating alternative ways of being in the world (Coulthard 2014: 144).
Decolonial struggle and intimacy
I lingered on Nerio’s work because it demonstrates a rupture/continuity 
with ways of seeing and thinking about intimacy that I have explored 
in this book. To take decolonial aesthesis seriously involves an overhaul 
of the orientations, structural conditions and imaginations that still 
dominate the seeable/unseeable, sayable/unsayable in contemporary 
postmetropoles, and retracing the imperial orientations of governance 
in Britain and other postmetropoles and settler states alike. In calling 
upon decolonial aesthesis as a different way of seeing/being, I want to 
stress that this is not an abstract, ‘artistic’ reorientation, but rather one 
that is grounded in everyday experiences of communities in ongoing 
anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggles. This feeds across numer-
ous sites of historical resistance to empire, some of which we have 
already encountered: from the Morant Bay rebellion, the Indian War 
of Independence and black community organisers defending sailors 
in Liverpool in 1919, to the refusal to accept police oppression and 
brutality in Southall in 1979, Toxteth or Brixton in 1980, the resistance 
to the criminalisation of forced marriage by Asian, Islamic and black 
women’s groups, or the demands of Black Lives Matter, and renewed 
calls from Commonwealth countries for colonial reparations (for more 
global circulations of violence/solidarity see Davis 2016). Coulthard 
(2014: 131) points to how creative and artistic endeavours have always 
been central to such anti-colonial struggles, from the Francophone 
cultural and literary critique often called ‘negritude’, which came to 
prominence in the 1930s, to contemporary movements such as Black 
Europe Body Politics. Creative and cultivating ways of seeing are not 
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indulgences but have been central to the dismantling and challenging 
of colonial rule and colonial duress.
Family, borders and decolonisation
We should consider these sites of struggle in respect of the dual forces 
of family and borders/bordering that run through this book. It is arguably 
within anti-colonial and decolonial struggles that we need to situate 
the movement of people from the Global South into Europe – for example, 
in the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, or the multicultural realities of contem-
porary Britain (Gilroy 2006; Modood 2007). Despite efforts to the 
contrary, the mobility of people continues to escape the management 
of international organisations, states and the violent practices of bordering 
that aim to subdue and order people (Plonksi 2018). Colonial control, 
as I have argued throughout this book, was premised on the domestication 
of movement through primitive accumulation, dispossession and the 
regulation of dangerous populations and bodies; movement continues 
to shape neo-imperialism and colonial bordering in northern states. 
Part of this movement is born out of desperate circumstances of colonial 
war and inequalities; but at the same time this movement is a demand 
and refusal to be ordered by colonial categories of worthy or unworthy 
movement. The biggest shift in our current moment is to orientate 
ourselves towards thinking about the (de)coloniality of movement, 
through orientations offered by decolonial thought and decolonial 
aesthesis.
The whole way that mobility and settlement has been made thinkable 
is shaped by colonial hierarchies, claims to civilisation and the normalised 
idea that spaces like Britain have been timeless, white domestic nations. 
How mobility is made seeable and thinkable is bound by these categories. 
This both silences colonial histories, historical patterns of movement 
and imperially mandated global inequality that bring people to post-
metropoles (even in compassionate versions such as the humanitarianism 
I discussed in the last chapter). Such histories are central to the orienta-
tions of black community and feminist movements (such as the Southall 
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Black Sisters and Imkaan), or in radical black politics, or Pan Africanism 
inspired by figures such as Marcus Garvey (also see Andrews 2018: 
94–99; Rodney 2018). Such connections remain intimately experienced 
by many communities in places like the UK, but almost unseeable and 
unthinkable to wider white publics. This is perhaps best evidenced in 
the discipline of migration and refugee studies, which whilst promising 
to offer insights into the politics of contemporary movement too often 
reiterates forms of colonial amnesia (for accounts of this see Wekker 
2016; Bhambra 2017a; Mayblin 2017).
But what of family? As this book has argued, what has energised – and 
continues to energise – bordering and colonial domestication is ‘family’, 
and with it, hierarchical claims to intimacy, love and domesticity that 
are hidden as ‘universal’. Decolonial aesthesis, as I sketched out above, 
directly works to disrupt and unsettle the apparent universalism of 
‘family’ and put it into its colonial context. This can work as a critical 
stance towards heteronormativity but also an affirmative stance in 
cultivating and emphasising the myriad of affective, intimate relations 
and kinships that exceed the recognition of the white bourgeois family. 
Here we might consider how mobility can in itself constantly disturb 
the connections of citizenship, nation and family that the modern state 
rests on. Firstly, patterns of dependencies stretch both transnationally 
and through relations that would not be termed ‘familial’ – friends, 
lovers, partners, polygamous relationships, acquaintances, even pets. 
These relations exceed and refuse to be domesticated. Secondly, mobility 
itself creates intimate encounters and forges new connections, dependen-
cies and sensibilities. These forms of kinship are not merely the excess 
of ‘family’ but can be a different way of orientating social relations.
An example of such forms of kinship could also be the case of the 
UFFC, claiming familial connections through a history of oppression, 
or the case highlighted by Agathangelou (2004) of communal solidarity 
formed by irregular domestic and sex workers. If decolonial struggles 
can be supplemented by forging new ways of being and living otherwise, 
then we can see how mobility forms part of these political struggles. 
We can consider how people on the move often dismantle and disrupt 
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heteronormativity and patriarchal gender relations, and forge alternatives 
in the act of movement. But thinking and claiming intimacy otherwise 
does not have to lead here to recognition by the state. Likewise, the 
objective of such a struggle is not exclusively securing citizenship or 
rights for a dependent (although that might be useful or practical in 
certain struggles). Instead, I would link this being otherwise to the 
forging of a non-colonial future; that is what a decolonial aesthesis 
orientates us towards.
The role that family has come to play in modes of race-making 
necessitates not merely that we shift how we think about affective relations 
within socio-sexual relationships, or their recognition by the state. 
Gebrial (2017) argues that to ‘decolonise the family and love’ we need 
to think of how the weight of race works both within and beyond 
intimate relationships. It is not simply enough to change how we relate 
to each other through relationship etiquette or more pluralised forms 
of household labour and sex, whilst keeping colonial structures intact. 
Instead, resisting colonial bordering is about orientating ourselves towards 
collective endeavours to alter the material and representational forms 
of the colonial present (Gebrial 2017), a colonial present which is able 
to hide behind a politics of family (which again so often works to 
resuscitate forms of white/colonial amnesia highlighted above). It is 
about working towards dismantling the relational forces that condition 
who gets to be family, who gets to love and be properly intimate in the 
first place. This is a key part of ‘looking back’.
Conclusions
In this chapter I have considered different ways of looking back: practices, 
sites, struggles over the visual bordering practices of the domesticating 
state. Exploring three different political orientations to looking back, 
which I called recognition, escape and decolonial aesthesis, I argued that 
the last orientation provides a more vital form of contestation. This is 
primarily because it is able to deal with colonial histories and presents 
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in ways that the two former forms of resistance are unable to. A decolonial 
and decolonial aesthesis approach contests contemporary accounts of 
family and borders in ways that are both alive to the ongoing structural 
conditions of race and orientated towards moving both within and 
beyond these historical processes. I have shown how far from being an 
abstract or artistic exercise, decolonial aesthesis is already bound to 
existing struggles which directly link to anti-colonial struggles globally, 
and in doing so help us put contemporary mobility and the politics of 
family in their rightful place.
This book began as an investigation into the relationship between family 
and borders; however, it became increasingly apparent that this makes 
no sense outside of the history and legacy of empire. Government and 
the organisation of violence continue to be shaped by imperial and 
colonial histories and the ongoing remaking of liberal empire within 
and beyond postcolonial states like Britain.
In this context, borders and bordering are better understood as modes 
of colonial rule brought ‘home’ to metropoles, energised and legitimated 
through appeals to family. This meant first understanding how the 
regulation of mobility and borders/bordering emerged as an imperial/
colonial project and how this continues to shape the function and 
character of borders today. We see this in the orientation of borders 
– who they keep out, contain or include, such as people marked as 
not-quite/non-human from ex-colonies and peripherised parts of the 
globe – but also in where such practices of control came from. These 
practices, for example deprivation of citizenship, intimate surveillance 
of migrants, deportation regimes and visual registers of normality, 
emerged as experiments of colonial management.
Central to the continuity of colonial borders has been the way that 
‘family’ works as a transit point for colonial taxonomies of perversion 
and the human – that is, in categorising who should be subject to 
borders, who can move, who can settle, who is dangerous. From sham 
marriages, to monstrous intimacies, to the ‘good’, domesticated migrant, 
I have shown the work that the normative power of family does in 
making certain people appear normal, domesticated, familial – and 
Conclusion: pasts and presents
Conclusion 241
others abnormal, undomesticated, unfamilial, and in this way subject 
to different modes of bordering and violence. This is about placing 
bordering/borders and colonial rule within a complex system of 
racialised-sexualised ordering, or what I call domestication.
Here I propose that rather than ‘family’ not being treated with enough 
respect, or rights within current bordering regimes, instead the problem 
is that dominant conceptions of the family continue to produce exclusions 
and organise violence and dispossession. The problem is that through 
colonial histories, certain populations and groups are continuously 
rendered as bereft of family and familialness. This provides a powerful 
means for the readaptation and resuscitation of colonial and racial 
violence in the present.
Tracing the varied work that family does to make empire in our 
contemporary moment means examining how micro governing practices 
and logics, from the family unification visa, social work safeguarding, 
to criminal prosecutions and even photographic exhibitions, work to 
reproduce borders/bordering – that is, how they both govern and align 
social groups as ‘out of place’, unfamilial and how this makes people 
privy to cruddy, everyday and sometimes spectacular forms of violence. 
Bordering emerges as a complex network of practices which govern 
racialised mobility and this book has examined three overlapping forms 
of borders. The first, ‘intimate borders’, police and govern intimacies 
of migrant families as shams but also other populations deemed suspi-
cious. In the current moment, and with the expansion of counter-
terrorism practices, intimate borders focus on Muslim households, but 
there are historical precedents littered throughout social work and welfare 
interventions in black and Asian families. ‘Sticky borders’ are the 
emergence of borders that ‘stick’ to some subjects and fall off others. 
In the case of deprivation of citizenship specifically, sticky borders 
dismantle previously settled rights claims of British citizens and can 
make them stateless and killable. This further reveals not only the legacy 
of colonial borders but also how citizenship remains organised less 
around rights than about claims to personhood. Lastly, the book examined 
‘visual borders’, which work to interrogate migrants/citizens for their 
Bordering intimacy242
‘genuineness’ and in doing so produce who looks ‘out of place’ and who 
looks like they belong. If borders/bordering have been understood as 
orientated towards the regulation of racialised populations moving from 
the Global South, the imperial orientation of this regulation is matched 
by the way that colonial bordering also regulates people within Britain. 
This is to recognise, as Walia (2013: 41) argues, that ‘large-scale displace-
ments and precarious conditions … are not coincidental but rather 
foundational to the structuring of border imperialism’.
In considering the power of heteronormative family in contemporary 
liberalism, the book has set out the case that colonial taxonomies continue 
to uphold white bourgeois domesticity as the model of family life. ‘Family’ 
remains a means of developing, controlling and even dispossessing 
subjects and communities who are cast as ‘backwards’ and in need of 
domestication. I have shown how being cast as unfamilial, so not doing 
family properly, or endangering the normative and intimate relations 
of family, can lead to material violence: social work intervention in 
households; being separated from loved ones by visa requirements; 
becoming subject to intimate surveillance; stripping of citizenship; 
passport removals; deportation. These practices are far from simply 
being remnants of empire but are intensified in contemporary projects 
of security which flow from the Global War on Terror, the resurrection 
of anti-Muslim racism and anti-immigration projects such as the hostile 
environment.
In exploring borders as more than immigration law and attached to 
broader forms of bordering, the book has pushed at the often-false 
dichotomy presented between ‘citizens’ and ‘migrants’. Whilst citizenship 
is often considered to be about settled rights, this distinction hides 
more than it reveals. Taking borders and bordering as modes of racial 
governance, borders are not solely confined to the policing of migrants 
but also orientated towards abandoning and making precarious settled 
citizens of colour. This reveals the extent to which spaces of the not-quite/
non-human continue to expand within postmetropoles like Britain, 
tied not to divisions over formal citizenship but the making and unmaking 
of personhood.
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In this context, teasing out how love and family make empire means 
showing where continuities with formal empire are grounded. But it 
also means revealing how this is constantly and subtly remade through 
liberalism as colonial duress. Colonial racism and its attachments to 
family may have changed but they have far from disappeared. Whilst 
seemingly postracial, advanced liberal claims to worth, value, contribution 
and belonging still demarcate people as backwards or modern. This 
relies on the incorporation of people into a liberal political economy, 
but also the demonstration of properly intimate and familial relations. 
In our contemporary moment, forward-facing, ‘progressive’, liberal types 
of love are deemed of value, against those who are bound to tradition, 
culture and kinship, which are without value. Far from being postracial, 
this involves a remaking of nineteenth-century anthropological categories 
of perversion which work in tune with claims to the modern/progressive 
family and ideas of liberal love to make distinctions over value. For 
instance, the sham marriage debate in the UK and the legislation imposed 
to police shams relies upon codifying certain Asian and then Muslim 
communities as practising ‘traditional’ and hyperpatriarchal forms of 
marriage and domesticity (arranged marriage, forced marriage and 
honour killings are all hypervisible here). Such marriages and kinships 
are deemed perverse and ‘without value’ compared against the normative 
template of the ‘romantic love’ marriage idealised by liberalism. Not 
only have the kinship practices of Muslim communities been cast as 
perverse but they are presented as endangering Muslim women and 
the order of British society more broadly (through, for example, the 
reproduction of terrorism).
What this tells us is that whilst categories of the modern family have 
begun to include homonormative couples and rich (whiter) migrants, 
this produces numerous categories of perverse others who are categorised 
as not only without value but also not human enough to have a right 
to family life in the UK. The power of liberal categories of love is to 
produce racialised perversions but also cover this up. We should 
remember, for instance, how the work to police migrant families and 
Muslim households is all done in the name of ‘safeguarding children’ 
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or to ensure that all couples claiming rights are merely ‘genuine’. This 
works to equally hide the racist and misogynistic violence committed 
against Muslim women (Al-Shamahi and Lkaderi 2019) normalised by 
state policies such as Prevent.
Whilst advanced liberal categories complicate and rework the 
imperial mapping of people into backwards or modern, the modern 
family remains bound to both whiteness and anti-blackness. This is 
structured around the continual threat of black and brown masculin-
ity and hypersexuality – that which is deemed monstrous violence. 
White nationalism has long appealed to the ideals of family as a space 
of femininity and white purity – manifest historically in fears over 
interracial sex, proximity, marriage. What contemporary events, such 
as the ones I traced in Rotherham and the national debate around 
grooming and deprivation of citizenship of those convicted, reveal is 
that the liberal state is also energised through such appeals to the white 
family. Not only is the exceptional act of stripping those convicted of 
grooming of their citizenship highly racialised (i.e. white citizen sexual 
criminals are not subject to deprivation) but these crimes are only able 
to be viewed as exceptional because they rely on the sexual threat of 
race. Quite simply, other equally violent and horrific cases of grooming 
and CSE (see, for example, Independent Inquiry Child Sexual Abuse 
2019) do not produce the same practices of deprivation and martial 
solutions.
It is not progressive ideals of the modern family that the state seeks 
to defend in such cases but instead the compulsion to protect the white 
family from attacks from racialised others (in this case specifically bound 
to anti-Muslim racism). The point I have tried to make here is not 
about the rights and wrongs of the case of grooming per se, which 
remains an abhorrent crime, but how the responses to this crime play 
into the broader ideas about citizenship and belonging in modern Britain. 
What I have been interested in exploring is how citizenship is ultimately 
bound to whiteness and the white family. And in turn, what this does 
to (un)make the citizenship and, with this, the personhood of people 
of colour living in postcolonial northern states like Britain.
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This points to the powerful way that family makes and unmakes. 
Dominant claims to family can work to organise who is excluded, 
abandoned and killed, but also those who need to be protected. Family 
here can produce bodies and relations that can be empathised with, 
addressed and cared for in ways that demand sustenance and protection 
(from the state and related authorities). In the example of grooming, 
what becomes apparent is how much the whiteness of the family matters 
here. But this also stratifies others who can look more or less familial: 
for example, the real refugee is structured through the victimhood of 
‘womenandchildren’, and resettlement schemes focus on resettling real 
families. Equally, the ‘good’, domesticated migrant is promised inclusion 
by producing heteronormative family relations, upholding European 
forms of domesticity.
But of course, the sustaining and fostering of ‘real’ family also neces-
sitates the violence towards those who threaten the family; towards 
subjects who can be eviscerated in ways that reveal the authoritarian 
power of the liberal state (through being deported, or killed at the end 
of a drone). Equally, violence can be directed towards those who cannot 
be seen and recognised as family (that is, as ‘real’ family) and are subject 
to abandonment: the families subject to intimate surveillance through 
the Prevent strategy, families suffering immigration raids, families split 
up by visa requirements, or through deportation and detention (see 
Corporate Watch 2018: 65–96). Such kinship, intimacies and affective 
relations are not registered as families; they barely stir the emotional 
register of anything like the reaction to grooming scandals that accom-
panies the white family. These families are not mourned. More often 
than not, such violence is rationalised and made unthinkable precisely 
because they do not fit within the dominant codes of who is family.
In light of the discussions that have run through this book, the 
place of whiteness and family must also be understood with regard 
to its contingency and flexibility. Liberalism remains a violent project 
of domestication but it is also one of inclusion. Borders include and 
exclude. We should think here of the imagining of the ‘good’ migrant 
who can be familial, empathised with and even celebrated (such as 
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in the Arrivals: Making Sheffield Home exhibition). Humanitarian 
and civic nationalist appeals to show solidarity with, humanise and 
defend migrants reveal that there is more going on in liberal states 
than a relentless politics of dispossession and violence towards people 
on the move. There are attempts here to contest borders in ways that 
are attuned to valuing multiculturalism and thinking nationalism and 
internationalism otherwise.
However, in exploring who gets to be empathised with, celebrated or 
humanised, this also reveals the risk of such projects when they consider 
inclusion outside of the terms of colonial/imperial histories and the 
context of racism. In the forgetting of why people move, where they 
move from and to, and the histories of dispossession and inequality that 
structure this movement, it is often the case that humanitarian and civic 
multiculturalist projects end up repeating a form of colonial paternalism 
and benevolence. Because of this active colonial amnesia, such projects 
end up valorising white ‘host’ communities for their apparent tolerance 
and goodness and authentic domesticity and indigeneity. The further 
risk is that this not only produces whiteness as tolerant and progressive 
and silences colonialisation (of the past and of today), but it further 
dehumanises those communities who have been subject to colonial rule 
(both in the Global North and South). It normalises the violence that 
is endemic to contemporary colonial borders and the reproduction of 
not-quite/non-humans by the pretence that white societies are welcoming 
and ultimately tolerant. Rather than overtly justifying anti-black violence, 
this uses the figure of the migrant to ask questions of the extent of 
the ‘goodness’ of British (and with that European) society, thus again 
revealing that the humanity of migrants from the Global South and 
citizens of colour is continually up for debate.
The debates running through this book have focused on the mandate 
of colonial dominations. But this is not done in a vacuum or without 
resistance. This is not to diminish the struggles that black, Asian and 
migrant communities and other social movements have made in contest-
ing colonial borders, to gain legal redress against forms of racism and in 
the limited achievements of a politics of multiculturalism and recognition. 
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Instead, it is to suggest that without being attuned to the histories of 
empire such contestations can only go so far. And in the orientations 
to recognise the colonial character of borders and government we 
also need to recognise the role of family here, as one of the sites were 
empire is constantly made and unmade. Heteronormativity is bound 
to colonial racism and whiteness as much as it is to heterosexuality, 
so a decolonial politics must equally be attuned to this. In following 
this lesson, the contestation of normative intimacies to include differ-
ent affective relations, kinships, dependencies, is far from an issue of 
private orientations or about who can be intimate with whom; instead 
it is about how worth, value and with that humanity continues to be 
organised – that is, made and unmade – in postcolonial societies like 
Britain and beyond.
This book has demonstrated some of the reach, embeddedness and 
everyday character of colonial rule in contemporary Britain, and how it 
both conditions political possibilities and the broader social landscape, 
and also structures the more detailed work of immigration policy, social 
work, policing, citizenship law and so on. Exploring different sites and 
processes around family and borders/bordering from exhibitions, to 
counter-terrorism strategies, to novels, to deprivation practices, shows 
some of the intractability of these processes. Surveying different yet 
connected sites shows the reach and normalisation of these processes 
bordering into the fabric of both the colonial domesticating state and 
cultural and social life. It was to show some of the continuities that 
are often flattened out when we examine ‘migrants’ and ‘citizenship’ as 
separate dichotomous categories. And yet in following such an approach 
there have been notable absences and silences, for example the role of 
family in the organisation of detention regimes, immigration raids, the 
evisceration of asylum seeker rights, the deportation of undocumented 
migrants and the levels of destitution and dehumanisation of refugee 
communities. This of course deserves further examination (for other 
examples see Mayblin 2017; Davies and Isakjee 2018; De Genova 2018). 
And any account is always far from exhaustive. What the book instead 
has provided are points of connections and illustrations of broader trends 
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– both of how borders and bordering continue to organise racialised 
colonial governance and the way that family energises, rationalises and 
hides these processes. But there is always more to do.
One way of considering absences is to consider how Britain acts as 
a site for wider global processes. This is more than just saying that there 
are parallels with other (post)colonial states (which of course there are); 
how government and, with it, borders are configured in the UK is 
determined by Britain’s place as a postmetropole and a site of empire. 
Whilst I have chosen Britain as a case, the idea here has always been 
to forgo any methodological nationalism and instead to explore the 
global nature of colonial rule that has materialised in Britain. Borders 
emerged across European empires in the management of undomesticated 
mobility; these were imperially and colonially orientated experiments 
that have become embedded within the British state. Today, immigration 
law is a localised manifestation of global processes. The white bourgeois 
family was not solely born out of European social change and the 
emergence of capitalism in the West. Instead this social relation was a 
product of imperial and colonial encounters, including the discovery 
of ‘undomesticated’ populations and the accumulation of resources and 
peoples. In this context, the ideal of the family was needed to justify 
dispossession of land, kinships and communities.
Further to this, the reshaping of heteronormativity, liberal love, the 
anti-Muslim racism of the War on Terror are equally global (or at least 
international) in orientation and manifest in particular ways within 
Britain. Imperial formations, colonial domestication and racialised 
capitalism are always contingent. Whilst studying Britain, the relationship 
between family and borders that I have presented here is a wider story 
about the way that empire continues to organise liberal international 
order and the distribution of violence. This works between more overt 
forms of empire such as in overseas military interventions and colonial 
war but also in the ongoing structuring of forms of everyday and often 
more mundane internal colonisation and the structuring through race 
of inequalities (housing, education, labour market access, criminal 
justice).
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The point I make here, is that it should not be possible to study the 
politics of either borders or family, or government within northern 
states such as Britain without first recognising the role of empire, not 
as a past but also as a present.
Pasts and futures
The historical orientation of this book and the focus on continuities from 
formal empire should not dim our concern at the scale and intensity of 
bordering and borders today. The danger here is the normalisation of 
strategies of government which are inherently violent. Certain forms 
of state force appear acceptable because of the apparent necessity of 
borders. This necessity of borders and the violence attached to them is 
constantly naturalised by claims of ‘family’/‘family values’/‘family life’. 
Claims to uphold the family continue not only to organise but also hide 
the violence of bordering. For example, that we have come to a point 
where it is widely accepted that there are such things as sham marriages 
that need policing, reveals the extent to which evermore restrictive 
racialising border policies can be enacted and overtly supported by 
northern publics. Or the absence of attention given to the evisceration 
of family rights of unification of refugees by the mainstream media. 
This reveals both a complete amnesia, or instead a worrying delight, 
in the types of violence done in the name of, say, policing sham mar-
riages, in ignoring the affective relations and kinships of dehumanised 
populations.
Tied into such concerns, we need to recognise that we are increasingly 
witnessing the normalisation of authoritarian forms of rule, borrowed 
from colonial experiments in the policing and bordering of racialised 
communities. These relate to both colonial experiments of the past and 
present – such as in the adoption of counter-insurgency strategies honed 
during wars in the Middle East, in the use of RAF drones to assassinate 
‘problem’ citizens, or in the use of closed courts (such as SIAC). We 
should also be concerned that this authoritarianism is normalised and 
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extended through the colonial stratification of people. We can see this 
in the surveillance of extremism and radicalisation through the Prevent 
programme, which has rapidly expanded into every public service 
sector since 2015. Or, in the extension of detention and deportation 
practices to all categories of irregularised migrants and the development 
of the detention estate throughout the UK (Tyler 2013). Furthermore, 
it is also evident in in the stripping of citizenship, the use of closed 
courts to hear cases regarding terrorism offences, extradition orders, 
passport removals, targeted assassinations of former British citizens 
by drone. These are not merely policies and practices of the hostile 
environment created by the Conservative administration since 2010, 
but developments which cross the political spectrum. Many of the 
most draconian of border practices, such as detention and deportation, 
began under New Labour (and of course have much older lineages). 
But they are expanded and accepted through the threat of race that 
energises them.
Whilst such authoritarianism can begin to target ‘exceptional’ popula-
tions, for example the small number of extremists or violent grooming 
gangs, the normalisation of such forms of rule should point to worrying 
trends for everyone. We can note, for instance, the increased use of 
powers to strip people of citizenship enacted since 2002. Whilst there 
were only eleven people deprived of their citizenship up until 2011 
this blossomed to eighty-four by 2015 and in 2019 Home Secretary 
Sajid Javid claimed that hundreds may have their citizenship deprived 
(Javid 2019). This does not include passport removals – a de facto 
removal of rights – and those who have had application for citizenship 
denied often on the basis of granting of such being deemed not in 
the ‘public good’. The removal of citizenship is enacted by the Home 
Office, with the only juridical oversight being SIAC. This is a closed 
court which, as Kapoor (2018: 83–113) argues, functions like a colonial 
court – there is no jury, just a panel of judges who make decisions 
on evidence that is frequently withheld from the defendant and their 
legal team on grounds of ‘national security’. We should remember that 
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citizenship deprivation was used (and used rarely) to punish treason 
offences throughout much of the twentieth century. It was then expanded 
to deprive those charged with terror offences after 2002 (albeit again 
rarely), but it has been further expanded after 2010 to cover association 
with terrorists, involvement in gang activity, grooming and other cases 
where granting of citizenship rights is deemed not to be in the interest 
of the public good. Such a normalisation of this authoritarian practice 
of bordering works to expand those populations who can be subject to 
deprivation of citizenship. As I argued earlier, it makes all those citizens 
with kinship links to, migration histories and secondary passports from 
other states subject to deprivation and deportation. Such power may 
reflect deep trends shaped by empire but it should not stop us attend-
ing to this violence now. What this demonstrates is the potential for 
the broadening of authoritarian powers over any ‘troublesome’ social 
group.
Here we might consider how border practices and the racialised 
government of mobility provide a perspective or a lens through which 
to view other modes of government. We should note the violence done 
to communities and how this is often silenced (through the workings 
of race and, with this, claims to family). But we should also recognise 
that borders expand and grow and filter through different populations 
and enact violence on different people, possibly not always on those 
first intended. For example, we would do well to remember that the 
emergent regulation of mobility was experimented with in the slave 
trade, on plantations, in the regulation of vagrants. Emergent immigration 
law was trialled in settler states to manage the movement of indentured 
and ‘Asiatic’ labour. Immigration law in the UK grew in relation to 
restricting ‘coloured immigration’ from the newer parts of the Com-
monwealth. This was then expanded to include all migrants from non-EU 
states (not just those from former colonies). In the wake of a possible 
Brexit in 2019 it is likely that immigration rules will now apply broadly 
to all non-British citizens. Whilst deportation historically has targeted 
non-EU citizens and often people from former colonies (de Noronha 
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2019), it is striking that in 2017 a total of 5,301 EU citizens were deported 
from the UK (Young 2017). The normalisation of borders has a dragnet 
effect of pulling people in and spitting them out.
Equally, we might consider the recent concern about the crimi-
nalisation of democratic protest in Britain as part of these issues of 
normalisation of authoritarian bordering. With high-profile cases such 
as the arrest and prosecution of fracking protestors in Lancashire, or 
the Stansted 15,1 or cases such as the heavy-handed tactics of the police 
in student fees protests, or in the clearing and eviction of the Occupy 
movement, questions have been raised as to how the police suppress 
democratic protest in the interests of elites and particularly those of 
international capital. However, we should bear in mind the lineage of 
these authoritarian tactics of policing (Iqbal 2018). The violent policing 
and suppression of ‘mobs’ was honed in colonies (e.g. the 1919 Amritsar 
massacre; Morant Bay in Jamaica; the ‘Mao Mao’ rebellion in Kenya; 
the Troubles in Northern Ireland); this was translated into the relentless 
policing of black and Asian communities in Britain (exemplified in 
practices like stop and search and the suppressive violence used in 
the 1919 Liverpool ‘race riots’; Nottingham in the 1950s; Southall 
in 1979; Brixton in 1980; London in 2011). This has since been expanded 
to the treatment of other anti-systematic protests and unruly groups. 
We should remember who is subject to this and where these practices 
came from.
Understanding what borders do, where they go and how racialised 
governance is enacted also tells us about the broader government of 
everyone. To put this back into terms of family and domestication, we 
can think about the expanding terms of who begins to be recognised 
as unfamilial and undomesticated. It concerns the expansion of the 
definition of those that threaten the familial nation and the narrowing 
of the definition of those whose lives are deemed ‘family life’. This 
sentiment returns in the language around ‘hard-working families’ as 
well as ‘illegal migrants’, constructs that have grown in use to normal-
ise who is (un)deserving in austerity/Brexit Britain. If we take such 
authoritarianism as a general trend, further elicited by the War on 
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Terror and the intensification of the hostile environment in Britain, then 
colonial histories do not just point to the past, they also point to the 
future.
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1 The Stansted 15 were a group of anti-deportation activists who were charged 
using anti-terrorism legislation after they successfully attempted to stop a 
deportation charter flight scheduled to depart from Stansted Airport on 28 
March 2017 (for more on the case see de Noronha and Chowdhury 2018).
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